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ABSTRACT 
The jin-de-siecle incarnation of a specifically ethno-graphic anthropology is 
arguably marked out by one trait more than any others: its burning 
epistemological, aesthetic and ethical impulse to inscribe - to write, to draw, to 
photograph, to phonograph, to film - to deploy, in other words, an array of 
-graphic technologies to represent its 'ethnic' object. Such technologies overlap 
and interweave in complex ways, rise and fall in relative popularity and produce 
archival traces that call for multiple readings and rewritings. Focusing on a case 
study of the intern:tedial writings of zoologist-turned-anthropologist, Alfred Cort 
Haddon (1855-1940), this thesis is an attempt to thrust deep within the roots of 
such an impulse. It traces these roots to a pivotal historical and philosophical 
moment (the late nineteenth century) within which the nascent discipline of 
anthropology, armed with an array of such '-graphic' technologies, conjured forth a 
spectral object: at once vanishing and vanished, disappearing and disappeared. 
Death was both to-come and already there, and this spoke to a desire for an 
Indigenous plenitude that was both threatened and lost. 
However, in the emerging play between these two plenitudes, both were replaced 
with a (technologically mediated) spectre. Subject to the brute force of an all-
powerful 'external' world-system (capitalist, colonialist and Christian), but without 
the means of even documenting the history of its own destruction, much less 
challenge it, such populations were posed as being hopelessly cast adrift: forever 
dead and dying, and in need, therefore, of representational 'salvation'. How, then, 
do these two sets of processes (inscription and loss) interact with one another, and 
what is their role within the vast archival writing 'machines' of colonialism? 
Exploring the interstitial space between medium specificity (photography-
Cinematography-phonography) and intermediality, this thesis is an attempt to 
resonate such questions, to set them in motion, to make them sound. 
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Reading the Writing-Machine: 
Inscription, Loss and the Ethnographic 
Imagination of A.C. Haddon 
To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is 
in turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not 
prevent from functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading 
and rewriting. 
Jacques Derrida, 'Signature, Event, Context' (1982, p. 316) 
Now is the time to record. An infinitude has been irrevocably lost, a very 
great deal is now rapidly disappearing thanks to colonisation, trade, and 
missionary enterprise [ ... J The most interesting materials for study are 
becoming lost to us, not only by their disappearance, but by the apathy of 
those who should delight in recording them before they have become lost 
to sight and memory. 
Alfred Cart Haddon, The Study of Man (1898a, p. xx) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Mimetic Machines, Moribund Objects 
and the Colonial Archive 
A sepulchral air lingers about the corpus of Victorian anthropology, for it was, as its 
authors readily and often attested, largely the record of dead or dying peoples. 
David Hoyt, 'The Reanimation of the Primitive' (2001, p. 1) 
David Hoyt's funereal insight succinctly sketches out the broad parameters of this 
thesis: the chiasmatic encounter between inscription, loss and anthropology at the 
turn-of-the-twentieth-century. More particularly, it traces the relationship 
between three overlapping fields of analysis: (1) the space between earlier 
-graphic l technologies, such as drawing and phonetic writing, and their fln-de-
siecle equivalents, such as photography, cinematography and phonography, (2) the 
discursive production of a moribund Indigeneity2 and (3) the colonial archival or 
epistemological impulse. Such a relationship is not fortuitous, and despite the fact 
that each tends to remain within its own historical and theoretical discourses, this 
thesis will attend to their intersection: how and why does the emerging discipline 
of ethnographic anthropology deploy such -graphic technologies to construct and 
capture a moribund Indigeneity? How does this intersect with the colonial archival 
or epistemological impulse, and what contingent legacies does this engender? 
1 The hyphen is used here to indicate that I am using '-graphic' both in a general sense (relevant 
to drawing and phonetic writing, etc.) and as a suffix (relevant to technologies such as 
photography and cinematography, etc., and also to the specifically. ethnographic branch of 
anthropology that I will be focused o.n in .this thesis). Th.is is an attempt to provisionally.draw 
together what is obviously an otherwIse dIsparate collectIOn of modes of inscription. It is not an 
attempt to elide the differences between them. 
2 !he general convention at pres~nt is t~. capitalize references to 'Indigenous groups' or 
Indigeneity' when they are meant In a specIfIc sense. 
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Such questions frame the ensuing debate, but the recurrent use of the definite 
article might be regarded as a stylistic convenience only. Following recent theorists 
of 'the' colonial, such as Nicholas Thomas (1994) and Ann Laura Stoler (2010), this 
thesis starts from the basic premise that there was no one overarching colonial 
experience, no dichotomous schism between colonizers and colonized, no singular 
colonial logic or rhetoric, but rather a complex and contingently mediated network 
of colonial agents and ideas who/which cast light on the crucial space between the 
language of metropolitan decrees and the lived experience of colonial societies. As 
a consequence, the main focus of the thesis will be narrower than my opening 
gambit suggests, even if its frames of reference are not. This is less an empirical 
specialization, then, and more a theoretical reflection on the complex mUltiplicity 
of colonial experiences read through three intersecting frames: mimetic machines, 
moribund objects and the colonial archive. 
The centrepiece of the discussion will be the embedded ness of fin-de-siecle British 
anthropology within such a nexus. For British anthropology, this was a period of 
transition between the anthropological grandeur of armchair evolutionism (as 
manifested by figures such as Edward Tylor and James Frazer) and the experiential 
minutiae of the ethnographic paradigm (as manifested by figures such as 
Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown) (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, ch. 1, partic. 
p. 29). However, this was also a period in which British anthropology came of age 
as a modern, ethnographic discipline, and its founding predicament was to do so at 
precisely the same time that its ostensible objects - most often, colonial subjects _ 
Were regarded as being 'on the wane' (Levi-Strauss, 1961). That loss was its 
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predicament; however, its 'tragedy'3 was that the conditions of possibility for both 
(Le. the rise of anthropology and the loss of its object) were one and the same. As 
Renato Rosaldo (1993, p. 70) remarks, this fact shields itself behind an 'imperialist 
nostalgia' that 'uses a pose of "innocent yearning" both to capture people's 
imaginations and to conceal its complicity with often brutal domination': 
Imperialist nostalgia revolves around a paradox: A person kills 
somebody, and then mourns the victim. In more attenuated form, 
someone deliberately alters a form of life, and then regrets that things 
have not remained as they were prior to the intervention (1993, pp. 69-
70). 
The response from within the emerging field was to occult such an anti-
foundational impasse (Le. that anthropology was an integral part of the very thing 
destroying its object of study) by posing itself as a redeemer of lost worlds - the 
so-called 'salvage motif or 'salvage paradigm' (Gruber, 1959), and we will come 
back to this later. However, the first generation of ethnographic fieldworkers did 
not formulate this motif with exclusive recourse to older -graphic technologies, 
such as phonetic writing, lithography or drawing. Indeed, their version of 
'redemption' was particularly instructive for what follows: these technologies 
were supplemented4 by nineteenth century -graphic technologies, such as 
photography, cinematography and phonography (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 4). 
The rise and· fall of such -graphic technologies within the disCipline is complexly 
3 By 'tragedy' here I mean a tension held in suspension without resolution (cf. Scott, 2004). I will 
develop this theme in the part III of the introduction. 
4 At this stage, I am using the term 'supplement' in a fairly conventional~ense, but it will take on a 
more specifically Derridean meaning later. Indeed, it will be part of my argument here to 
suggest that each of the -graphic technologies will come to cut into each of the others, exposing 
an unresolved play between plenitud~ and lack. At certain points I will use the term in the 
general sense, and at other points I will use it in the Derridean sense. However, it should be clear 
from the context which is which. 
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overdetermined, but it is something of an historical irony that both can be glossed 
via the same three interlocking or overlapping elements: firstly, a positivist 
commitment to anthropology as a quest for data not meaning, collection not 
interpretation; secondly, an assumption that such data reside on a visible or 
audible surface that can be captured by such technologies (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 
24; Edwards, 1998, p. 106; Griffiths, 2002, p. 128); and, thirdly, a fervent belief in 
the imminent destruction of the discipline's objects of study just at the very 
moment that the discipline comes of age. The first two are closely related, but both 
are greatly exacerbated and, indeed, justified by the third. 
However, such a combination of elements was fairly short-lived within the 
discipline as it gradually moved from data to meaning, collection to interpretation, 
surface to depth and, ultimately, from modern technologies of inscription back to a 
narrowly defined phonetic writing (cf. Grimsh?w, 2001, p. 25). Thus such 
technologies acquired· a certain taint by association and their use became 
unfashionable in mainstream social and cultural anthropology as a positivist 
leftover, despite spirited calls to the contrary from within the mainstream of the 
discipline (e.g. Margaret Mead) and from professional specialisms on its fringes 
(e.g. ethnomusicology and visual anthropology) (cf. MacDougall, 1997, pp. 290-
291). However, contrary to the prevalent view in anthropology that these 
technologies were handmaidens to an outmoded positivism, I will argue 
throughout this thesis that there are resources within their deployment which 
provide for a powerfully resonant counter claim that undermines the foundations 
of the discipline at the very moment that it establishes them, exposing their gaps, 
uncertainties, anxieties and, ultim"ately, their sheer anti-positivist rawness (cf. 
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Edwards, 2001; Poole, 2005). 
From Loss to Inscription: A.C. Haddon and the Torres Strait Islandss 
In America, the most important figure of this early transitional6 moment was 
undoubtedly that of the German-American anthropologist, Franz Boas (1858-
1942), who patiently laid the foundations of what were to become codified as the 
disciplines or sub-disciplines of cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, 
anthropological linguistics and material culture studies. His students, followers 
and/ or peers (e.g. Alfred Kroeber, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Robert Lowie 
and Edward Sapir) would later go on to dominate the American discipline(s) well 
into the twentieth century and beyond. 
In Britain, the most important figure of this moment was arguably that of the 
zoologist-turned-ethnographer, Alfred Cort Haddon (1855-1940). Haddon's 
students, followers and/or peers (e.g. Charles Seligman and W.H.R. Rivers) would 
also go on to influence (at least elements of) the British discipline (most notably 
Rivers' genealogical method, for example). However, Haddon would ultimately 
remain known for one core achievement: his 1898 anthropological expedition to 
the Torres Strait Islands, a dispersed island group situated between what were 
regarded as two distinct cultural, geographical and racial zones (Australia and 
Papua New Guinea). Repeating my opening gambit, this expedition will be our key 
5 Following the broader logic of this thesis, the empirical details of Haddon's life, writings and 
scientific activities will be laid out in the specific contexts which I deem most appropriate ~o the 
associated analysis in which they are embedded. 
6 I am stressing the transitional nature of this moment in order to distinguish between earlier 
forms of anthropology not based on fieldwork and later forms of anthropology where fieldwork 
became fully institutionalized. Boas and Haddon are both transitional in this sense. 
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protagonist here for three interlocking reasons: its redoubtable faith in modern 
recording technologies, its epistemological urgency and its archival scale. 
Its roots, however, lie ten years earlier (circa 1888) and in another discipline 
(zoology). Haddon - then a young professor at the Royal College of Science in 
Dublin - was looking for a zoological expedition to make his name. His friend and 
colleague, Thomas Henry Huxley ('Darwin's bulldog'), suggested the Torres Strait 
Islands, in part because of their geographical situatedness, and in part because he 
had travelled through the region on his 1846-1850 voyage of the Rattlesnake 
(Goodman, 2005). Haddon therefore undertook a zoological expedition to the 
Strait in 1888. However, he effectively returned home an amateur anthropologise, 
convinced that the three Cs of colonial modernity (capitalism, Christianity and 
colonialism8) would lead to the obliteration of Indigenous culture (Haddon, 1901, 
pp. vii-viii; Herle, 1998b, pp. 81-82); zoology coul9. wait, anthropology could not 
(Haddon, 1897, pp. 305-306). 
Capitalism had arrived most concretely with the discovery - in the middle of the 
nineteenth century - that the Islands possessed rich and globally sough-after 
resources in pearl shell and beche-de-mer (Beckett, 1987, pp. 87-109). Prior to the 
emergence of cheap, mass-produced plastics - which would ironically litter the 
Islands and the region in later years - the former proved an irresistible material 
for the production of buttons and other ornamentation in Europe. Its pearly lustre 
and rainbow iridescence made it especially attractive as a fashionable accessory. 
7 In the process, he also simultaneously imported 'the' scientific method and the fieldwork model 
into the discipline. Indeed, Haddon is credited with being the first to use the term 'fieldwork' in 
an anthropological context. , 
8 The anthropologist, Jeremy Beckett (1987, pp. 24-60), glosses these three forces as 'Pearlers, 
Pastors and Protectors'. 
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The latter - a type of sea-cucumber - was a desirable delicacy for the Asian 
markets, where it was regarded as having aphrodisiac qualities. Therefore, pre-
existing and extremely long established 'vertical' trade networks between Papua 
New Guinea, the Torres Strait Islands and Aboriginal Australia started to become 
supplemented with more recent 'horizontal' trade networks between Europe, the 
Torres Strait Islands "and Asia. The latter channels were regarded as running 
infinitely faster and deeper than the former, brining in a raft of new cultural 
influences and material goods, taking out raw materials and turning Islanders and 
other inhabitants of the Pacific/Oceanic region into an intra-competitive group of 
proletarian wage labourers. 
Christianity arrived with the London Missionary Society in 1871 (the year" of the 
so-called 'coming of the light', see ch. 1). This took the form of an iconoclastic 
destruction of representative samples of sacred material culture along with a more 
subtle hybrid merger of cultural practices (Beckett, 1987, pp. 87-109). Education, 
literacy and 'modesty' took Christian form, even whet:t the content was often 
adapted from Indigenous sources. Together, the effect was rapid, widespread and -
in Haddon's view - irreversible. This would most often lead Haddon to become 
caught between 'salvage' - recording before it is too late - and 'reconstruction' -
recreating after the fact (the non-missionary equivalents of 'salvation' and 
'redemption'). As we will" consider later, the link between the two is usually 
memory: recreations from memory taking him closer to prelapsarian recordings. 
The point is to rout out and archive memory by rendering it .visible, audible and 
tangible: the insensible brought both to the senses" and to a supplement~ry, 
machinic sensorium. Therefore, unlike the missionaries, Haddon's 'salvation' and 
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'redemption' would be of memory rather than the soul. 
Colonialism not only took the form of the general encroachments of British 
imperialism - which, since Captain Cook's voyages through the region, had 
regarded the land as 'Crown land' - but also the more specific encroachments of 
Australian colonial policy, which annexed the Islands in 1877 as part of 
Queensland and began to exert ever increasing controls over the subject 
population (Beckett, 1987, pp. 87-109).9 Given this, one would do well to heed 
those (like Thomas, 1994; Edwards, 2001) who refuse to see colonialism or 
imperialism as homogeneous blocks, of which more later. Suffice to say at this 
point that two very specific registers of colonialism/imperialism will therefore be 
minimally registered within this thesis: the broader discourses of British 
imperialism which circulate around the project (and are at times critically 
registered within it) and the more narrow discourses of Australian colonialism; 
both could be said to enable the project, albeit in different ways. 
On this basis - and despite having little or no formal training in anthropology -
Haddon became determined to mount a large-scale anthropological expedition to 
the Islands. After much lobbying for funding and several preparatory expeditions 
in Ireland (of which more later), he managed such an expedition in the March of 
1898, under the auspices' of the University of Cambridge. H~ led a team of 
physicians (Charles Seligman [1873-1940] and William McDougall [1871-1938]); 
an experimental psychologist (W.H.R. Rivers [1864-1922]); a musical scholar inter 
. . 
9 The wider relationship between Australia and the Islands is extremely complex and 
overdetermined and beyond the scope of this thesis (particularly in relation to the vexed issue 
of land rights). Suffice to say here, however, that despite elements of devolved governance, 
Torres Strait islanders are considered to represent Australia 's 'other' Indigenous community. 
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alia (Charles Myers [1873-1946]); a linguist (Sidney Ray [1858-1939]) and a 
photographer (Anthony Wilkin [1878-1901]) (Haddon, 1901, pp. viii-ix; Herle, 
1998a, p. 1). Given the size of the team, the scale of the expedition was such as to 
produce a vast body of archival materials - journals, notes, letters, reports, 
photographs, phonograph recordings and four minutes of extant film - now spread 
across a range of different cultural institutions.10 
This expedition thus constitutes an exemplary point of intersection between the 
three component parts of this thesis: the relationship between archaic and modern 
-graphic technologies, colonial loss and the archival or epistemological impulse. It 
was chosen for a number of reasons, reasons which often run contrary to its 
marginal position within the history of British anthropology. Firstly, this was not 
only one of the earliest large-scale anthropological expeditions of any kind, 
incorporating a range of specialisms in music, language and ethnology etc., but, 
more particularly, it was one of the first, and indeed last, to deploy an 
appropriately large-scale collection of -graphic technologies to accompany it: 
several photographic cameras, two phonographs, a cinematograph and a host of 
scientific measuring equipment. What makes Haddon's project particularly 
interesting in this regard is that, amongst its other modes of inscription, it deploys 
three of the century's central -graphic technologies photography, 
cinematography and phonography - technologies which, some have argued (e.g. 
Kittler, 1999, p. 1; Doane, 2002, p. 4), began to undermine the dominance of earlier 
-graphic technologies, such as phonetic writing and drawing. T~is .therefore places 
us in the crucial space between between old and new -graphic technologies, and 
10 For example, Cambridge University, the British Library, the British Film Institute and the 
Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. 
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between mechanical and non-mechanical and indexical and non-indexical 
inscription. 
Secondly, because the beginnings of a modern, ethnographic anthropology have 
usually been traced to Bronislaw Malinowski (anthropology's 'Conrad'), Haddon's 
writings have largely gone unexamined outside of their place as footnotes to a 
disciplinary historyll, and, more particularly, largely unexamined as writings (i.e. 
subject to literary analysis). Following on from the first point, what makes 
Haddon's project most interesting in this case is that it is an unfinished project 
composed of interweaving media and overdetermined fragments, rendering his 
writings amenable to multiple, overlapping and sometimes contradictory readings 
(cf. Clifford, 1986a, pp. 15-16). Haddon has to hold together mUltiple registers, and 
his failure to always assert an uncontested authorship is itself an interesting 
feature of his writing. Although Haddon undoubtedly occupies a privileged 
authoritative position 12, his signature is by no means the only one to be found in 
his work. His writings are co-signed, and not only by the other expedition 
members. Finally, by being one of the first anthropological projects to collapse the 
division between fieldworker and theorist, it was also one of the first projects to 
unwittingly begin to prise open the gap between experience and representation 
that would later come to shake the foundations of the discipline. 
Collectively, therefore, the choice of focus is a strategic one. As a result, the analysis 
that follows is neither straightforwardly literary (anthropol9gy as a 'kind of 
11 Martin Nakata's work (e.g. 2007) is an interesting exception. 
12 'However monological, dialogical, or polyphonic their form, [ethnographies] are hierarchical 
arrangements of discourses' (Clifford, 1986a, p. 17). 
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writing'13), visual (anthropology qua image analysis) or acoustic (anthropology or 
ethnomusicology qua sound analysis), nor is it uncritically media specific (phonetic 
writing, photography, cinematography, etc.). Instead, it will focus on the complex 
entanglement of different modes of inscription and their relationship to a 
particular motif of Indigenous loss (the 'salvage' motif, of which more later). 
Haddon is by no means uniquely situated in this regard, but alongside Franz Boas 
in America (who has incidentally received far more attention), he is nonetheless 
exemplary of a particular moment of desire vis-a-vis what I will be calling an 
'expanded' field of inscription and an 'expanded' field OflOSS.14 
Invariably, both fields are tightly wound together, and so although the following 
sections will attempt to unravel them in turn, it is more accurate to see this as an 
attempt to explore the same set of themes from different angles. Part I focuses on 
the emergence of 'writing' (Le. alphabetical script subject to literary analysis) as a 
problematic category in anthropology and expands this to include the complex 
embedded ness of other modes of inscription. Part II explores the broader contexts 
within which the associated figure of anthropological loss becomes expanded and 
meaningful, and part III attempts to explain how both are gathered together under 
the rubric of the so-called 'salvage motif. 
13 That is to say, alphabetical script subject to literary analysis. 
14 See fn. 18 for a clarification ofthe limited way in which I will be deploying the term 'expanded'. 
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I. Contexts of Inscription: 'Anthropology and the Scene of Writing 'iS 
Twenty five years since the publication of the landmark amalgam of 
anthropological writing, literary criticism, critical theory and cultural studies, 
Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus, 1986), one might be forgiven for thinking 
that it was uncontentious - even predictable, cliched - to scrutinize anthropology 
as a kind of 'writing'16, and thus subject to the same types of linguistic opacity, 
rhetorical flourishes, differential meanings and conceptual foundations as any 
other writings. If Clifford Geertz's recourse to hermeneutics (2000, ch. 1) treated 
the intersubjective experiences of anthropologists and informants as a series of 
overlapping 'texts' to be interpreted, then the 'writing culture' debate treated the 
reSUlting ethnographies as a series of complex cultural objects to be analysed. The 
relationship between these two understandings echoes John Mowitt's (1992, fn. 2, 
pp. 223-224) discussion of two of the conventional ways in which text has been 
understood (Le. the phenomenological text and the tradition of 'textual criticism'). 
Geertz (via Ricoeur) adopts the former model, and the 'writing culture' debate the 
latter. Hermeneutics allowed Geertz to read culture 'as text' analogically (Le. 
culture 'as' or 'like' published alphabetical script), a move which was held to 
challenge the stranglehold of anthropological positivism: from data to meaning (cf. 
Mowitt, 1992, p. 11). The 'writing culture' debate. simply turned this idea on its 
head by reading-the resultant ethnographic 'texts' (in the narrow or conventional 
literary sense) as culture, similarly challenging anthropological positivism. 
Anthropology's understanding of 'text' derives in no small part·from this moment, 
15 Obviously echoing Derrida's reading of Freud (2001, ch. 7), this is also the subtitle of the 
introduction to Clifford Geertz's important early foray into debates about anthropology and 
writing, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author (1988a). 
16 Again, this is meant in the narrow sense of alphabetical script subject to literary analysis. 
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largely bypassing the radically expanded meanings it comes to acquire within the 
Tel Quel group for example (cf. Mowitt, 1992). 
Nonetheless, bearing these caveats in mind, such an approach has borne 
considerable fruit over the years. However, this is in spite of spirited attempts by 
some authors (past and present) to adhere to the illusion of immediate, self and co-
present experience and transparent communication, and in spite of a predictable 
wave of disgruntled nay-saying from within the inner sanctum of the discipline. 
Indeed, anyone trained within the often stuffy, empiricist confines of the British 
tradition of social anthropology in the last twenty five years or so will undoubtedly 
have encountered at least some irascible, world-weary reactionaries intent on 
dismissing such debates as so much (,continental') stuff and nonsense 
('acontextual, lacking empirical rigour, self-indulgent and pretentious'). They may 
well be right in some respects, but what is striking about such figures is that this 
denunciation of the 'writing culture' debate is so often accompanied by an 
unerring and usually uncritical compulsion to write, albeit as a culminating 
'outcome' of ethnographic fieldwork. Because this compulsion is often concealed 
by an unquestioned sense of entitlement, or an evangelical zeal (not fortuitously 
bound to a certain coterie of unreformed colonials in the discipline), such figures 
usually heave a weary sigh at the prospect of the kinds of questions that rise to the 
fore for any reader of Writing Culture or its aftermath: for whom do you write? To 
whom? By what authority? 
It is obviously the case that countless anthropologists have diligently agonized 
OVer precisely these questions, but there remains a lingering desire by some to 
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brush them aside as so much reactionary, u~dergraduate polemicism. 'Yes yes, but 
let's get on with the real work of ethnographic, field-based research and writing'. 
Indeed, such a response might well tempt one to play the infantile gadfly by 
repeating the question 'but why?' to every unsatisfactory answer. However, 
beyond such school-yard theatrics, a series of important, lingering questions 
remains, questions whIch animate this thesis and which resolve themselves 
around a core problematic: the relationship between inscription and loss in 
anthropology. Why are some anthropologists so resistant to so-called 'literary' 
readings of their work whilst still so preoccupied with 'doing anthropology', an 
integral part of which is writing? Accepting that the answer to this is not naIve 
positivism, what residual desire or anxiety does this diagnose vis-a.-vis realism, 
'truth', phonocentrism and loss, and (how) is this related to the way in which their 
discipline has historically constructed its object as threatened or lost? 
At first glance, the connection seems reasonably obvious and historically 
grounded: between the high noon of European imperialism. in the late nineteenth 
century and the collapse of such empires in the mid twentieth century, 
anthropological research and writing was, to a greater or lesser degree, treated as 
a means of partially indemnifying against the cultural losses wrought by the forces 
of colonial modernity (colonialism, capitalism, Christianity, etc.). As noted before, 
this is characterized as anthropology's 'salvage motif or 'salvage paradigm' -
anthropology as a redeemer of lost worlds (Gruber, 1959). We will explore this 
motif or paradigm in more detail in part III, but suffice to say at this'point that the 
discipline's founding, tragic predicament is the anxiety that it has come of age too 
late: 
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Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position that at the 
very moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its 
proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material 
of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity. Just now, when the 
methods and aims of scientific field ethnology have taken shape, when 
men fully trained for the work have begun to travel into savage 
countries and study their inhabitants - these die away under our very 
eyes (Malinowski, 1992 [1922], p. xv). 
Just at the precise moment that the discipline casts off its pre-scientific, speculative 
shackles and comes of age as a modern, ethnographic human science, its object of 
study is threatened or lost. As mentioned earlier, the tragedy is not merely that 
anthropology has come of age too late, but that the conditions of possibility for 
both the disCipline itself and the destruction of its object of study are one and the 
same. 
However, this simple formulation is rendered more" complex by a series of 
necessary qualifications: (1) the compulsion to 'write' during this period 
incorporated a much wider range of modes of inscription (photography, 
phonography, cinematography, drawing, etc.) and was accompanied by a desire to 
simultaneously efface such inscriptions or to treat them as transparent vehicles to 
the cultural traditions they were representing (a core part of anthropology's 
phonocentrism seemingly lies here); and (2) the cultural losses wrought" by 
colonial modernity_were allegorically and metonymically bound to the cultural 
losses wrought by the supposed absence of writing and history. Anthropology's 
objects were thus constructed as being threatened or lost twice: 'not only by the 
forces of capitalism, colonialism, and Christianity which wiped clean the 
Indigenous slate, but by a presumed lack of history and writing (cf. Grimshaw, 
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2001, p. 29). Forever on the brink, such objects were conjured forth as phantoms 
which cast shadows but left no traces. 
However, it is precisely because such a sense of loss is doubled that the 
relationship between inscription and loss arguably leaves a much deeper trace in 
the discipline which expands beyond this historical moment. As James Clifford 
(1986b) suggests, even contemporary anthropology enacts a broader, redemptive 
allegory: ethnography as a redeemer of unwritten worlds, thereby allegorizing the 
shift from speech to writing.17 In her study of the relationship between 
deconstruction and anthropology, Rosalind Morris (2007, p. 6) links this idea to 
the perception that 'populations without writing possess an authenticity and a 
proximity to nature (an immediacy) that mark their historical priority and their 
vulnerability to corruption'. On this basis, the relationship betwee~ ethno-graphy's 
'-graphic' technologies and its 'ethnic' objects is a 'supplementary' one, and we will 
return to this theme in more detail later. Suffice to say at this point that ethno-
graphy poses itself as a vast (and ostensibly 'exterior') written supplement to its 
own speech-bound and moribund objects. Ethnography's -graphic technologies 
simultaneously add to a 'non-literate' plenitude - precariously positioned between 
a death that is at once imminent and immanent - whilst compensating for a 
devastating spectral deficit: such objects cast shadows but leave no traces, and it is 
these shadows that need to be 'fixed' by external representation, how~ver ghastly, 
inadequate or violent such a process turns out to be. 
17 As Clifford makes clear (1986b, pp. 117-119), the idea that anthropology's objects are somehow 
'outSide' writing is utterly blown apart by Derrida's reversal and displacement of the 
speech/writing dichotomy. 
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What role then might this allegory - of saving speech in.a transparent writing -
play in contributing to a (residual) phonocentric or realist resistance to treating 
writing as literature, and (how) can we examine the relationship between the 
historical phenomenon of salvage anthropology and contemporary practice 
without falling prey to a simple minded anachronism? It is part of the aim of this 
thesis to explore both strands (i.e. to examine the earlier historical moment whilst 
also staking wider claims about the discipline as a whole). To this extent, A.C. 
Haddon is an exemplar (of a problematic) not an historical footnote (to a 
discipline ). 
Such an overlapping analysis provides an opportunity to take some of the critical 
insights of the so-called 'writing culture' debate and to focus their intensity on an 
'expanded' field of inscription that I am calling the 'writing-machine'.18 By this I 
mean not only an abstract collection of different and complexly overlapping modes 
of inscription (phonetic writing, drawing, lithography, photography, phonography, 
cinematography, etc.), but their material means of inscription (pen, stylus, camera, 
phonograph, cinematograph), their surfaces of inscription (paper, glass, wax, 
celluloid), and the historically contingent archivization and dissemination of the 
results. Published writings are not the same as field notes and journals, and both 
are different from indexical technologies such as photography, phonography and 
18 It is important to stress here that this reading of inscription i~ 'expanded' only insofar as the 
'writing culture' debate in anthropology is concerned (i.e. where 'writing' is understood as 
alphabetical script subject to literary analysis). That is my staring point I hope to make clear 
from my clarifications that - in this instance at least - references to the 'writing-machine' or to 
an 'expanded field of inscription' are po'inting to a field that is substantially narrower than that 
contained in, for example, Derrida's reading of writing or arche-writing (despite the allusions to 
'Signature, Event, Context' [1982, p. 316]) or, say, Barthes' reading of text (cf. Mowitt, 1992, ch. . 
5). This is for reasons of economy and focus, and it is not intended to be registered here in an 
uncritical way. It is hoped that the specific contexts in which these ideas are developed will 
e~pose the complexity of this basic schematic outline, thereby collapsing its provisional 
sImplicity or seeming instrumentality. 
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cinematography, but all are (and produce) culturally .mediated and socially 
disseminated material objects. The task of this thesis, therefore, will be to consider 
how such an expanded focus impacts on how one might read the overlapping of 
different modes of inscription in anyone instance. At times, such an analysis will 
focus on the 'horizontal' relationships between different media (e.g. photography, 
cinematography and alphabetical script), and at others it will focus on the 'vertical' 
relationships between the constituent elements of one medium (e.g. camera, 
photographic plate, paper print, etc.). In practice, however, they will often overlap. 
For example, chapter one explores the ways in which photographs of racial and 
cultural 'types' (printed from glass plates) become embedded in - and reinforced 
by - ethnographic writings. Chapter two attempts to unravel the significance of a . 
series of photographic stills which have been produced from Haddon's 
ethnographic films, modified with line drawings and paint, lodged in the archives 
and published as part of a popular and widely disseminated travelogue. Chapter 
three examines the attempt to convert 'noise' into mean~ngful sound and 
meaningful sound into alphabetical script and graphical notation. As such, part of 
my argument here is a methodological or sociological one: a call for a 'thick 
description' of writing machines and their inscriptions (cf. Geertz, 2000, ch. 1). 
Anthropological writings in gene~al, and fin-de-siecle writings in particular, are 
rarely composed solely of alphabetical script. They are, for example, routinely 
studded with other embedded modes of inscription: photographs, drawings, film 
stills, graphs, maps, etc. Whilst a growing body of extremely valuable work has 
been engaged in the analysis of these media as relatively discrete forms (visual 
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anthropology's engagement with photography and film, for example [e.g. Edwards, 
1990; 1998; 2000; 2001; Griffiths, 2001; Poole, 2005]), considerably less work has 
been done on the interactions between these different media. Therefore, if my 
starting point here is with the conventional post Writing Culture gesture of reading 
anthropology as a kind of writing (Le. a series of literary texts in the narrow sense), 
then it treats such writings a·s embedded, multimedia objects which are more than 
the sum of their parts and more than their respective disciplinary or 
methodological associations. My object thus shifts from a narrowly defined 
anthropological writing (qua alphabetical script) to a broadly defined multimedia 
object. 
Photographs, film stills, drawings and maps 'mean' differently when embedded 
Within a piece of writing. This is an obvious point perhaps, and it has received 
plenty of attention in literary criticism (e.g. Rabb, 1995); but I would argue that 
this embeddedness works differently in anthropology, and fin-de-siecle 
anthropology in particular. Unlike twentieth century anthropological writings, 
where photographs, drawings and maps often appear, but usually as mere 
illustrations to a centralized, authoritative text (successfully or not), fin-de-siecle 
anthropological writings often give far greater weight to these other modes of 
inscription. The reasons for this are complex and, in part at least, are the subject of 
this thesis, but the result is a series of works which masquerade as unified objects 
. composed of different but mutually compatible fields, but which, on closer 
inspection, come nearer to the ruins' of inscription. The medium sp·ecificity which 
these writings attempt to submerge, and which has quite understandably 
exercised the minds of visual anthropologists, film theorists and photographic 
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scholars, cracks through the pages creating fracture lines and fragments which 
undermine - or, perhaps, render more complex - any claim to positivist certainty. 
Tensions emerge across indexical inscriptions, and between them and their others, 
via a series of complex lines of intersection or entanglement. 
We will have cause to expand on this in greater detail in the coming chapters, but 
suffice to say at this point that such lines of intersection or entanglement can be 
provisionally and tentatively dubbed supplementary and intermedial. The former 
obviously owes a heavy debt to Jacques Derrida's reading on Rousseau in Of 
Grammatology (1997, pp. 141-316), where it becomes part of a chain of non-
synonymous terms which diagnose the speech-writing nexus. However, in this 
context it becomes a convenient shorthand for thinking through the unresolved 
play between plenitude and lack in Haddon's medial relationships. For example, 
when Haddon deploys 'type' photographs - as we will consider in chapter one - he 
poses photography as an ostensibly independent and self-complete medium for 
extrapolating racial 'truths' (photographic surfaces peeled off the 'real') only to 
find that such 'truths' are hidden below the visible surface of the photograph; a 
limit pOint has been reached. The photograph must therefore be folded back onto 
an ostensibly 'exterior' written commentary for mutual reinforcement: the 
photographs give the commentary extra scientific weight; the commentary 
penetrates beneath the photograph's visible surface. However, when a similar limit 
point is reached within the commentary, Haddon will fold it back again onto the 
photograph, and so on. In each case', Haddon poses his media as si.m~ltaneously 
self-complete and lacking, thereby creating an unfinished chain of 
supplementarity. Each medium adds to each other medium whilst simultaneously 
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exposing their limit points; the circle is never complete. and each medium is 
radically changed and challenged by the process. This means that such a 
supplementary bond between Haddon's different media is also - by extension - an 
intermedial bond. Each medium penetrates each other medium, but in such a way 
that neither dissolves medium specificity nor conceals the divisions between 
indexical and non-indexical modes of inscription. Instead, we become caught in the 
interstitial space between medium specificity and intermediality and between 
indexicality and non-indexicality, and much of this thesis will inhabit precisely 
such a space. 
As such, this is not only a call for an 'expanded' field of inscription in general 
(reading inscriptions in a material and social context, for example), but also a call 
for an 'ontological' reading of modes of inscription. This is in opposition - or 
addition - to the semiotic readings of specific forms of in.scription (e.g. phonetic 
writings, paintings, photographs or films, etc.) which tend to dominate in colonial 
discourse studies or postcolonial critique. In short, I am interested in photography 
as well as photographs, cinema as well as films, and so on (cf. Mowitt, 2005). This 
is of significance methodologically - shaping the way in which the material is 
analysed - and theoretically - shaping the kinds of questions asked and arguments 
raised. Most notably, it will be part of my argument throughout this thesis to 
suggest that it is only by attending to such an expanded, 'ontological' reading that 
one can begin to prise open a space between the positivistic deployment of such 
technologies and the anti-positivistic'import of their ontology, and one of the most 
fundamental means of doing so is to attend to the simple observation that haunts 
[in-de-siecle anthropology whilst being co~tinually occulted within it: inscription 
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and loss both lessen and deepen one other. 
Inscription and Loss 
Indeed, inscription - even if abstracted to the creation of differential marks - has 
always been suffused with a sense of loss. As the predicament of Plato's Phaedrus 
suggests (cf. Derrida, 1981), the price of posterity is the externalization of memory 
in matter, which, for contemporary thinkers of technicity, such as Bernard Stiegler 
(e.g. 1998), re-enacts the more originary material externalization that constitutes 
the human as such. In Stiegler's terms (1998, passim), such an entry into matter19 -
whether through the manufacture of tools or the inscription of differential marks -
destabilizes the sovereignty of human consciousness as self-presence, subjecting 
the human to the effects of material contingency and chance, to unknown futures 
and uncertain outcomes. On such a view, the 'entry into' mnemotechnical 
inscriptions20 - is there an outside? - simultaneously exacerbates los's and 
indemnifies against it. This is the first stratum of loss. The second stratum is that 
such inscriptions are not wholly adequate to that which they inscribe. The latter 
exceeds the former. Thus in abstract terms, inscription and loss both lessen and 
deepen each other. Loss - imminent or posterior - often implies inscription and 
vice versa. 
If we start to historicize this inscription-loss nexus, we see that the relationship is 
19 I won't rehearse the debate between Derrida and Stiegler here (for which se'e Stiegler, 1998 
inter alia), but suffice to say at this point that the reference to materiality produces a narrower 
focus than that implied by Derrida's arche-writing for example. This is in part because of 
different readings of Andre Leroi-Gourhan. " 
20 Stiegler considers even stone tools to be mnemotechnical in some sense, but here I am thinking 
more narrowly of phonetic and non-phonetic writing systems, etc. 
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particularly pronounced within nineteenth century indexical technologies, such as 
photography, phonography and cinematography. Such inscriptions promise an 
existential bond with their referents, making them ideal partners to both the 
mournful desire of the memento mori tradition and the scientific positivism of 
disciplines like anthropology - and there is more than a hint of overlap between 
the two (cf. Mulvey, 2005, p. 54). However, as with mnemotechnical inscriptions in 
general, such inscriptions are never wholly adequate to that which they inscribe. 
As a result they become, in part at least, a record of that which they cannot 
inscribe, of that which exceeds them, hence their poignancy. They seem to touch 
the referent whilst highlighting what has been left uninscribed, what has been left 
behind. For mourner and scientist alike, each indexical inscription is a broken 
promise to bring back the dead. Inscriptions are a record of their failings as much 
as an indemnification against loss, and this duality means that the process of 
inscription is often caught between the twin forces of desire-and fear. 
This is especially the case when modern indexical technologies. are pressed into 
the service of positive sciences like Victorian anthropology, and its fin-de-siec1e 
ethnographic incarnation in particular. Here the play between desire and fear -
shielded behind a positivist surface - is mapped onto an epistemological desire to 
record and a deeply ingrained anxiety that it is either too late to do so or - worse 
still - that it was 'always already' too late to do so. On this reading - as we will 
consider in the coming chapters - a crucial fissure opens up between the 
positivistic use of such technologies and the anti-positivistic power of a media 
apparatus marked by excess and lack and a methodology marked by desire and 
fear. 
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However, if inscription and loss form an indissociable bond, as I have been arguing 
here, then expanding the field of inscription - which we have considered in part I -
is not enough. We also need to attend to the broader contexts within which the 
associated figure of loss is embedded and expanded - which we will consider in 
part II. Expanding both fields ~ inscription and loss - will ultimately press them 
back together - which we will consider in part III. This will afford an opportunity 
to bring together hitherto separate discourses, such as debates about modernity 
and technology (which often neglect questions of colonialism and loss) and 
debates about colonialism and loss (which often neglect questions of modernity 
and technology). In this sense, the choice of the Torres Strait expedition is once 
again a strategic one: less a footnote to the disciplinary history of anthropology 
and more an examination of a complex nodal point at the intersection of several 
historical discourses on technology and modernity and inscription and loss under 
conditions of imperialism and colonialism. It will therefore restate our original 
questions by asking what is at stake in the relationship between .colonialloss and 
modern technologies of inscription, such as photography, cinematography and 
phonography? What binds these modes of inscription together in such a context 
and what separates them? Ultimately, what sort of cultural legacies does this 
engender? These are our broader questions. However, establishing the framework 
for an answer requires that one first weave more narrowly between 
theoretical/cultural-historical accounts of modernity and its unresolved 
antinomies and theoretical/cultural-historical accounts of imperialism and its 
discourse(s) of extinction; these are the dual contexts within which modern 
anthropology emerges and within which anthropological loss becomes meaningful 
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and expanded. 
II. Contexts of Loss: The Antinomies of Modernity 
If there is any consensus within the vast and now canonical corpus of theoretical 
literature on European modernity - and this is far from certain - it is that it21 is a 
thing of contradictions and antinomies, a formulation of space and time or society 
and culture wherein exhilarating dynamism and boundless destruction form two 
sides of the same coin. New worlds spring forth whilst apparently 'archaic' ways of 
life and well-worn conceptual frameworks are swept aside with breathless 
rapidity. Such a process often opens out a range of dichotomous pairings and 
associations that still resonate in certain circles today (e.g. modernity/tradition, 
history/structure, etc.). Amongst the minimal markers of such a process are a 
number of seismic shifts in politics, economics and culture (e.g. the shift from a 
feudalistic political-economy to capitalism; from rural to urban; from 
comparatively homogeneous and static communities to vast population growth 
and movements; from old to radically new technologies of industry, transport and 
communication; and from 'tradition' to cultural forms which shatter the mould, etc. 
[cf. Hall, 1992a]), all of which match the forces of construction with those of 
destruction, or, indeed, which pitch the one against the other. 
Such a tension is often read in the mode of tragedy, wherein frag~entary and 
contradictory parts do not resolve themselves into a dialectical whole (cf. Berman, 
21 It/they, depending on whether one views it as singular or plural, process or outcome (cf. Hall, 
1992a, p. 9). 
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1983; Scott, 2004). On such a view, the tragedy of modernity is not so much its 
fated hurtling towards destruction - the flip side of the more familiar progress 
narrative - but rather its relationship to the unresolved contradictions between 
dynamism and destruction. 
However, the available literature on these processes often remains remarkably 
silent on the particular and obvious significance that this unresolved dialectic of 
construction and destruction - this tragedy of modernity - might have to that most 
prevalent of modern enterprises, European imperialism and colonialism, or 
expansion and settlement, if we are to follow Edward Said's useful gloss (1993, p. 
8). Modernity is apparently something that happens in the European or American 
metropolis and the fact that its restless energy globalizes these effects is left to 
others to address (cf. Hall, 1998): 
The project of provincialising 'Europe' has to include certain other 
additional moves: 1) The recognition that Europe's acquisition of the 
adjective modern for itself is a piece of global history of which an 
integral part is the story of European imperialism [ ... ]. The idea is to 
write into the history of modernity the ambivalences, contradictions, 
the use of force, and the tragedies22 and the ironies that attend it. 
(Chakrabarty, 1998, p. 386, emphasis in original). 
In what seems to be a step backwards from what we can call the high 
modern era, interest in the social and political subordination of blacks 
and other non-European peoples does not generally feature. in 
contemporary debates around the philosophical, ideological, or cultural 
content and cc,-nsequences of modernity. Instead, an innocent 
modernity emerges from the apparently happy social relations that 
graced post-Enlightenment life in Paris, Berlin, and London. These 
European locations are readily' purged of any traces of the. people 
Without history whose degraded lives might raise awkward questIons 
about the limits of bourgeois humanism (Gilroy, 1993, p. 44). 
22 The motif of tragedy pops up again here. We will return to this in part III. 
~ UNlVtHSI ry UBRARY 
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That European imperialism and colonialism, and everything that goes along with 
them (plantation slavery, scientific racism, etc.), were embedded in a capitalist 
European modernity should hardly be contentious, and not just as a pre-capitalist 
vestigial hangover which could somehow be disentangled after the fact, but, at the 
very least, an intrinsic and integral part of modernity, and, at most, its very 
condition of possibility (cf. Hall, 1998; Gilroy, 1993, pp. 54-55). On this view, the 
neglect of such topics in debates on modernity is not only entirely unconscionable, 
but obscures the fact that the aforementioned tragic play between dynamism and 
destruction was and is a resolutely global one. 
Nevertheless, despite the relative paucity of discussions on the global reach of such 
a tension in theoretical accounts of modernity and modernism, such a discourse 
does exist as a contemporary adjunct to the forces of European imperialism and 
colonialism themselves. Indeed, what is remarkable is that even though more 
recent theorists often neglect the imperial contexts of modernity, nineteenth 
century writers and politicians often remained keenly attuned to the parallels 
between home and abroad, where both were regarded as sites which balanced 
growth and renewal with transience, change and loss, albeit in very different ways. 
However, if the pendulum swings between dynamism and destruction, then it was 
regarded as tilting towards the latter under conditions of imperialism and 
colonialism, and those to bear the full brunt of such an imbalance would invariably 
be the world's 'colonial' (Le. 'Indigen'~us' rather than 'settler') populations. The 
.' . 
motto of such a view would be that (colonial) contact equals (Indigenous) death. In 
his Useful account of the phenomenon, Patrick B~antlinger (2003, passim) dubs this 
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contact talk an 'extinction discourse'. In its most streamlined form, two 
countervailing forces are perilously pitched against each other: the top down, 
monolithic singularity of colonial modernity and the bottom up, fragile multiplicity 
of pre-colonial Indigeneity or 'tradition'. In some versions, this is posed as a 
biological or 'racial' phenomenon, whereby contact between modern Europe and 
the colonies leads to disease, ·death, miscegenation and destruction. In other 
versions, it is a posed as a socio-cultural phenomenon, whereby contact between 
modern Europe and the colonies leads to a too rapid shift up the 'ladder of 
civilization' leading to contamination, apathy and/or socio-cultural obliteration. In 
both cases, the pendulum swings between celebration, characterized as the 
colonial order of things, and mournful condemnation, characterized as 'proleptic 
elegy' (Brantlinger, 2003, passim) or 'imperialist nostalgia' (Rosaldo, 1993, ch. 3), 
but the net effect of both is more or less the same: resignation in the face of the 
inevitable. This is a pitched battle and there can only be one winner. However, this 
battle bears the tell-tale signs of a fractured temporality that will pervade the 
coming debate: the world's Indigenous populations are simultanepusly moribund 
~nd dead, vanishing and vanished, departing and departed, or, to put it another 
way, their cultural and/or biological extinction is simultaneously imminent and 
immanent, which is one of the main reasons why such a discourse is both so 
prevalent and so long lasting. There is no beginning a~d no end and affected 
populations thus appear as so many phantoms and ghosts, wisps of smoke in the 
endless storm of colonial modernity (cf. Hoyt, 2001).23 
23 Following Clifford (1986b, pp. 112-113), this type of analysis is in no way intended to detract 
from the fact that such a sense of loss was often entirely justified. It is merely to point out that it 
is also a rhetorical strategy, and, moreover, a rhetorical strategy wherein its celebrants and 
critics both appear to further its concrete outcomes ~hrough their sense of the inevitable. This is 
one of the ways in which Brantlinger (2003) undercuts the various colonial apologists who 
point to contemporary contrary voices as proof that imperialist ideologies were not all-
encompassing. The resignation of celebrants and critics alike renders them both entangled, 
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The briefest perusal of coffee table exploitations of the trope of Indigeneity 
suggests that such a discourse is alive and well (from Leni Riefenstahl's Vanishing 
Africa [1982] to National Geographic's Vanishing Peoples of the Earth [1968]). 
Indeed, given its fragmented temporality, one of the core features of such a 
discourse is that each generation poses itself as being just on the cusp, thereby 
justifying its excessive and nostalgic preoccupation, as Marshall Berman has said of 
modernity more generally: 
People who find themselves in the midst of this maelstrom are apt to 
feel that they are the first ones, and maybe the only ones, to be going 
through it; this feeling has engendered numerous nostalgic myths of 
pre-modern Paradise Lost. In fact, however, great and ever increasing 
numbers of people have been going through it for close to five hundred 
years (1983, pp. 15-16). 
James Clifford uses Raymond William's analysis of the European pastoral tradition 
to make a similar point in relation to ethnographic writings: 
[E]ach time one finds a writer looking back to a happier place, to a lost, 
"organic" moment, one finds another writer of that earlier period 
lamenting a similar, previous disappearance. The ultimate referent is, of 
course, Eden (1986b, p. 113). 
Indeed, one might well regard the discourse of colonial extinction, in both its 
negative and positive forms, as merely a variation on the European pastoral 
tradition. In Williams' analysis (Clifford, 1986b, pp. 113-114), the spatial division 
culpable and complicit, albeit in different ways, and this is of particular importance in that the 
discipline of anthropology - and A.C. Haddon in particular - are firmly rooted in the latter camp 
and like to use this as a lever to dissociate themselves from the worst excesses of 
colonialism/imperialism. The arguments that will be developed here will call for a more subtle 
series of links between anthropology and imperialism. 
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between rural and urban, to choose one pa"rticularly prevalent example, often 
takes on an ambivalently marked temporal or developmental hue: the urban might 
be rushing headlong into the future, but such dynamism is a catalyst for both 
civilized progress and ruinous immorality; the rural might harken the past, but 
such a call represents both a pastoral idyll and a harbinger of primitive survivals. 
Therefore, just as the home countries might match civilized progress with ruinous 
immorality and pristine pastoral idylls with primitive survivals, so too might the 
colonies; both remain sites of modern dynamism and destruction and both remain 
pervaded by a sense of loss. Such loss might be expressed ambivalently, but it is 
felt no less keenly for all that allowing parallels to be drawn between the two. 
It is within the fin-de-siecle context of this discourse of loss that the modern (Le. 
ethnographic24) discipline of anthropology emerges an? - as a consequence -
emerges as a science of loss. This is not simply because anthropology's objects 
were almost exclusively drawn from colonial populations regarded as becoming 
extinct, but most crucially because - as mentioned earlier - such populations were 
also regarded as being outside the fold of historical time and thus outside the fold 
of writing (cf. Grimshaw, 2001, p. 29). If the blow of rapid change was softened by 
historical inscription at home, then the sense of loss for Indigenous colonial 
populations was doubled: not only were they regarded as being moribun'd but also 
lacking in the means to record their own destruction. Their time was constructed 
as being regenerative, with past, pr~sent and future as part of a continuum. 
CUltural and social forms were regenerated through repetition with evolutionary 
24 Whilst one could obviously regard the discipline of'anthropology as having deep roots pushing it 
back at least into the Enlightenment, most historians regard the late nineteenth century Jearly 
twentieth century emergence of anthropology qua ethnography as the beginnings of the modern 
discipline. "" 
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change only gradually folded into the temporaI"mix and no graphic record left in its 
wake. Rapid historical change in the absence of historical inscription was perceived 
as pure unmediated loss, a loss doubled and thus keenly felt by the burgeoning 
discipline of anthropology. In this sense, colonialism was regarded as giving 
Indigenous populations all the worst aspects of historical change with none of the 
redemptive qualities of historical inscription. Thus, if anthropology could not stop 
the first, it could at least provide the means of the second: composing elegies for 
the lost. 'Salvation' lay, therefore, not in being saved per se, but in representational 
salvage, the enabling and archetypal motif or paradigm of the jin-de-siecle 
discipline, and this is where our lines of analysis - loss and inscription, colonialism 
and modernity - begin to cross. 
III. From Salvage to Salvation: The Tragedy of CC?lonial Modernity 
Each generation of anthropologists has its own version of the. salvage motif C cf. 
Berman, 1983, p. 15), but through the points of contextual and/or thematic 
rupture, there is a remarkable consistency, at least in terms of tone and tenor. 
Indeed, one cannot help but be impressed and dismayed in equal measure by the 
sheer resilience of a discourse repeatedly cast into the anthropological long grass 
as an embarrassing anachronism. Arguably the most famous exemplification of this 
motif or paradigm is drawn from one of the self-styled 'fathers' of British 
anthropology, Bronislaw Malinowski CUrry, 1993, p. 14), and we have "encountered 
it before: 
Ethnology is in the sadly ludicrous, not to say tragic, position that at the 
43 
very moment when it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its 
proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material 
of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity. Just now, when the 
methods and aims of scientific field ethnology have taken shape, when 
men fully trained for the work have begun to travel into savage 
countries and study their inhabitants - these die away under our very 
eyes (Malinowski, 1992 [1922]: p. xv). 
Such a motif has seared the anthropological imagination, and I invoke it here less 
as an historical marker - for it neither begins nor ends here - and more as an 
exemplary moment of a refrain which can be heard repeatedly on the frontiers of 
European imperialism. It opens one of the most famous monographs in 
anthropological history, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, and is held to mark both 
a beginning and an end: the beginning of a 'scientific field ethnology' based on the 
participant observation of a lone anthropologist, and thus the end of the split 
between the armchair theorist and the amateur collector. Indeed, this is a shift that 
James Clifford (1988, pp. 26-32) establishes as the emergence of a new form of 
anthropological authority. This shift is almost literalized by the epigraph's 
appearance in the preface, wedged somewhere between the new ethnography, 
Written by the anthropological apprentice, and the foreword, written by one of its 
old masters, Sir James Frazer, author of The Golden Bough - an already antiquated 
encyclopedic catch-all of anthropological synthesis. In the mythographic, 
retrospective narrative, which we will have much cause to question over the 
COurse of this thesis25, this is the moment when the guard changes hands, from 
stuffy armchair evolutionism to modernist synchronism, from distant height to 
level depth (cf. Hoyt, 2001). 
Mali~owski pinpoints a tragic tear - a caesura - in the fabric of a burgeoning 
25 Part of the significance of the Haddon expedition is that it sits between these two moments. 
44 
Ethnology, one that will extend back and forth in time: Ethnology, as a grand 
comparative science in the spirit of the Enlightenment philosophes, is a resolute 
product of modernity - one of the great human sciences to emerge out of the 
Enlightenment and to triumphantly render the 'Human' as simultaneously subject 
and object of knowledge (cf. Foucault, 1970, pp. 344-387). However, this victory is 
in danger of being rendered pyrrhic by the fact that the nascent field's object of 
study is rapidly becoming washed away as (or by) that very modernity's post-
diluvian detritus. 
That the figure of tragedy should be used by Malinowski to mark these 
contradictions (aporias, limits, antinomies, caesuras, etc.) is by no means 
incidental, not least because as a young student, Malinowski was a keen reader of 
Nietzsche in general, and The Birth of Tragedy in particular. Indeed, as Joan Vincent 
(1994, p. 686) is keen to point out, '[Argonauts of the Western Pacific] must now 
[given the publication in English translation of his early writings] most certainly be 
reread in the light of Malinowski's Nietzschean roots'. Tragedy has long held a 
.. source of fascination for scholars, but in recent years it has become something of a 
cause celebres for a certain poststructuralism. One scholar in particular has sought 
to bind this type of analysis to a thinking of the overlapping strands of anti-
colonialism and postcolonialism in the work of the Trin{dadian Marxist historian 
C.L.R. James. In his exp-ansive account of James' The Black Jacobins, the American 
anthropologist, David Scott, diagnoses James' attendance to the histor~cal moment 
of tragedy in the following terms: 
[T]hose moments of large historical conflict in which new forms of 
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thought and action are struggling relentles·sly with the old: Aeschylus in 
fifth-century Athens, Shakespeare in early modern England, Melville in 
nineteenth century America. They all wrote in a time of historical 
upheaval or civilizational rupture. For James, these were moments not 
merely of transition, but moments when great historical forces were at 
irreconcilable odds with each other, in which tensions between 
competing historical directions were at a particularly high pitch, and in 
which new kinds of subjects (James would have said new kinds of 
"personalities") were being thrown upon the historical stage, 
individuals embodying within their single selves the mighty 
conundrums and divisions of their age (2004, p. 12). 
Scott (2004, ch. 2) sees this, and James' reconstruction of The Black Jacobins as a 
tragic rather than romantic narrative, as an important means with which to shift 
from the (failed) teleological (romantic) yearnings of the anti-colonial movements 
towards a more complexly rendered postcolonial re-reading that neither affirms 
nor rejects that tradition in any straightforward sense. 
In this light, jin-de-siecle ethnology could be said to mark one such site of tension, 
metonymically diagnosing a moment of tragic historical transition under 
modernity. The crucial point is that the consequent contradictory tensions of such 
a transition do not give way or buckle, but rather are held together in suspension 
Without resolution. Hence the forces of modernity can be simultaneously 
productive and destructive. The same modernity which produces the field of 
scientific ethnology can simultaneously kill its object, for instance. However, this is 
not merely a matter o! holding contradictions in suspension. Tragedy suggests a 
partial puncturing of the instrumental mastery of the rational subject through its 
inexorable susceptibility to the forces ~f contingency and chance, and ·in this there 
is an important parallel between the tragedy of the pre-Socratics and its modern or 
modernist re-animations: 
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In short, tragedy sets before us the image of a man or woman obliged to 
act in a world in which values are unstable and ambiguous. And 
consequently, for tragedy the relation between past, present and future 
is never a Romantic one in which history rides a triumphant and 
seamlessly progressive rhythm, but a broken series of paradoxes and 
reversals in which human action is ever open to unaccountable 
contingencies - and luck (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 13). 
This is important for us not only in that the progressivist time-line of colonial 
modernity is held in check by a figuration of tragedy, but also in that we are thrust 
into a thinking of the postcolonial futures implied by the losses of colonial 
modernity, and the consequent forms of inscription attendant upon those losses. In 
short, it is significant in enabling us to think through our triad of inscription, loss 
and archival inheritance. 
Drawing on the work of Hayden White, Scott suggests that" one therefore needs to 
distinguish between 'romantic' and 'tragic' modes of emplotment: 
[T]he Romantic mode of historical emplotment rides a rhythm of 
progressive overcoming and ultimate victory over the world's 
misfortunes, the tragic mode offers an agonic confrontation that holds 
no necessary promise of rescue or reconciliation (2004, p. 135). 
The key point from our perspective is that the former adopts a redemptive-
approach towards its s~fferings whereas the latter does not, and here we start to 
move from salvage to salvation. On this reading, the salvage motif could be said to 
(attempt to) enact a shift betwee~ the 'tragic' and the 'rom~ntic', from 
susceptibility to chance, contingency and the aleatory demands of modernity, 
towards the (partial) redemption of inscription (thereby enabling a legacy, an 
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inheritance). In other words, ethnology - in its salvage mode - negotiates its own 
sense of tragedy by using the tools it has forged to enact a shift from the tragic to 
the romantic, to redeem tragic loss through ethnographic inscription. As 
mentioned before, James Clifford (1986b, p. 118) considers this aspect of salvage 
to be a kind of allegory, allegorizing the shift from speech to writing, damnation to 
salvation, thus expanding the sense of loss engendered by modernist flux to the 
loss engendered by a (supposedly) pre-literate, memorial society. Of course, this 
attempt to shift from the tragic to the romantic via inscription is ill conceived on 
the grounds that the latter is precisely one of the key means by which chance 
enters the fray. 
Perhaps acknowledging this predicament, Malinowski's Argonauts - which began 
in tragedy - ends in an interrogative sigh: 
Alas! the time is short for Ethnology, and will this truth of its real 
meaning and importance [as 'one of the most deeply philosophic, 
enlightening and elevating disciplines of scientific research'] dawn 
before it is too late (1992 [1922], p. S18)? 
Ethnology has come of age too late (the very mark of tragedy). However, there is 
also a mirror implication or flip side to Malinowski's declamation, i.e. that prior 
cultural encounters - before the perceived melting away of the world's Indigenous 
populations - would have came too early, for science that is. Cultural encounters 
prior to the melting away of anthropology's object may have been, fruitful but 
would have remained inexplicable or insufficiently scientific to be of worth, which 
is part and parcel of the pre-anthropological writings which anthropology likes to 
ritually dissociate itself from (e.g. missionaries' accounts, travel writing, etc. [cf. 
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Rosaldo, 1986; Pratt, 1986]). Indeed, it is this aspect of the refrain that will be 
developed later by one of anthropology's other 'founding fathers', Claude Levi-
Strauss. 
Levi-Strauss's formulation of the problem of loss lies buried within one of the great 
travelogues of twentieth century anthropology, Tristes Tropiques (1976), a book 
that will later catch the eye of a certain Jacques Derrida and acquire a position of 
especial - if often overlooked - importance in Of Grammatology (1997, pp. 101-
140). It is also a book that will become (retrospectively discovered as) one of the 
cause celebres of anthropology's 'experimental moment' (cf. Geertz, 1988b; 
Richards, 1994, ch. 6): 
After an enchanting trip up-river, I had certainly found my savages. 
Alas! They were only too savage [ ... J They were as"close to me as a 
reflection in a mirror; I could touch them, but I could not understand 
them [ ... J I had only to succeed in guessing what they were like for them 
to be deprived of their strangeness: in which case, I might as well have 
stayed in my village. Or if, as was the case here, they retained their 
strangeness, I could not make use of it, since I was incapable of even 
grasping what it consisted of (Levi-Strauss, 1976, p. 436). 
Using the same exclamatory sigh as Malinowski, Levi-Strauss is caught between an 
encounter with the Amazonians in a moribund state but with all the 
anthropological knowledge to hand,- knowledgeably sifting through the 'ruins, or 
fragments, so to speak:' and an ante-diluvian encounter with the Amazonians but 
in the absence of such knowledge. These are seemingly the horns of ~he dilemma 
With which anthropology is faced: a 'pristine' encounter with cultural alterity 
which remains inexplicable due to an absence of scientific understanding, or a 
'ruined' encounter which, although animated by a mature anthropological 
I 
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discourse, remains fragmentary and partial due' to an absence of scientific data. 
Indeed, this circular pattern, a pattern from which Levi-Strauss can neither escape 
from nor choose, is precisely the pattern that will follow him in his encounters 
(albeit in a spatialized version of his temporal circle): the outer Amazonians who 
are explicable but ruined and the inner Amazonians (the 'Nambikwara') who are 
pristine but inexplicable (Levi-Strauss, 1976, pp. 323-416). 
Thus, roughly outlined, stand Malinowski and Levi-Strauss's variations on the 
theme of representational salvage. However, despite sporadic forays into other 
forms of inscription (cf. Clifford, 1986a; Prosser, 2005, ch. 2) both Malinowski and 
Levi-Strauss tended to respond to such loss by squeezing ephemeral experience 
through the 'bottleneck of the [written] signifier' (Kittler, 1999, p. 4) in a bid to fix 
its shadows and to tame its unwieldy excess. Loss was redeemed through phonetic 
writing and excess was supposedly curbed. As a consequence, those interested in 
treating anthropology as a 'kind of writing' have tended to neglect or 
underestimate other forms of inscription, and for two key reasons: one, because -
., despite critical readings - they often tacitly accept the foundation myth that poses 
figures such as Malinowski and Levi-Strauss as the self-styled fathers of 
anthropology, and, two, because - despite their indebtedness to the broader field 
of British cultural studies - their, main source of inspiration is from' literary 
criticism leading them ta focus on published alphabetical script rather than on an 
'expanded' field of inscription. However, without wishing to labour the, criticism, it 
is worth stressing that this was not the first generation of ethnographers, nor was 
it the first generation to experience such a sense of loss, nor was their response to 
it so narrowly focused on phonetic writing. 
I 
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Indeed, even by the time Alfred Cort Haddon enters the fray (circa 1888-1898), the 
modern incarnation of the discipline was already sufficiently well-worn for 
synthesizing academic text books and histories, and it is here that he outlines his 
technologically mediated variation on the motif of Indigenous loss: 
Now is the time to record. An infinitude has been· irrevocably lost, a 
very great deal is now rapidly disappearing thanks to colonisation, 
trade, and missionary enterprise. The change that has come over the 
uttermost parts of the world during the last fifty years is almost 
incredible. The same can be said of Europe and of our own country. 
Emigration and migration, the railway, the newspaper, and the Board 
School - all have contributed to destroy the ancient landmarks of 
backward culture. The most interesting materials for study are 
becoming lost to us, not only by their disappearance, but by the apathy 
of those who should delight in recording them before they have become 
lost to sight and memory (1898a, p. XX).26 
We need to attend to Haddon's variation of the refrain ..:: a variation which, of 
course, precedes and, in some senses, paves the way for Malinowski's in terms of 
both its continuity with and rupture of prior and proceeding manifestations - as it 
will neatly summarize much of what this thesis will attempt to elicit. The refrain 
opens with an appeal to the intertwining of temporality and inscription, 'now is the 
time to record'. This appeal is more complex than it appears, firstly because -
unlike Malinowski and Levi-Strauss - the concept of 'recording' covers a 
considerably expanded_ field, as we have examined, and secondly because its 
26 There are interesting - if somewhat ironic - parallels between this passage and § I of The 
Communist Manifesto: '[The world] market has given an immense development to commerce, to 
navigation, to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, reacted on the 
extension of industry; and in proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, 
. in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed,. increased its capital, and pushed into the 
background every class handed down from the Middle Ages [ ... ] The bourgeoisie [ ... ] draws all, 
even I the most barbarian, nations into civilization [ ... ] It compels all nations, on pain of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls 
civilization into its midst [ .. .]' (cited in Mowitt, 2005, p. 6-7; citation modified). 
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invocation of the present is split by what follows: 'An infinitude has been 
irrevocably lost, a very great deal is now rapidly disappearing thanks to 
colonisation, trade, and missionary enterprise' (Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). In a blaze of 
rhetoric, the ensuing passage resonates on a number of levels: it invokes the 
temporal discrepancy between immanence with 'a' ('an infinitude has been 
irrevocably lost') and imminence with an 'i' ('a very great deal is now rapidly 
disappearing'); the three Cs of colonialist, capitalist and Christian modernity (or 
'colonisation, trade, and missionary enterprise'); and ultimately an appeal to tun~ 
to technology as a response to such loss ('those who should delight in recording 
before they have become lost to sight and memory') (Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). The 
reference to sight and memory will take on a particular and enduring significance 
throughout Haddon's writings. This is because the division between an immanent 
and an imminent loss often becomes blurred forcing Haddon to reconstruct newly 
extinct cultural traditions by converting memory into vision and sound. It is also 
important to note that, as per our discussion of the antinomies of modernity at 
home and abroad, Haddon explicitly makes the link between both strands of loss 
.. (cf. Urry, 1993, p. 3): 
The change that has come over the uttermost parts of the world during 
the last fifty years is almost incredible. The same can be said of Europe 
and of our own country (1898a, p. xx). . 
In this context, modernity is poison and cure. Whilst producing the means with 
which to redeem lost worlds, '[e]migration and migration, the railway, the 
newspaper, and the Board School - all have contributed to destroy the ancient 
landmarks of backward culture' (Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). In formulating such 
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destruction, Haddon finally goes on to explicitly register the theme of double loss 
that we encountered earlier: 
The most interesting materials for study are becoming lost to us, not 
only by their disappearance, but by the apathy of those who should 
delight in recording them [ ... ] (1898a, p. xx). 
The Indigenous populations of the world are lost once (empirically) to a colonial 
modernity and twice (representationally) to a perceived lack of history and 
literacy. This means that shadowed behind each of the variations on the theme of 
salvage lies an important implication: the most immediate sense of loss (empirical 
loss) is merely a modulation of a more basic sense of loss enshrined within the 
very foundations of the discipline itself: cultures which (apparently) do not write 
are (apparently) lost to posterity, whether or not they are threatened by 
colonialism (cf. Clifford, 1986b, p. 118). Therefore, we are ""dealing here with two 
initial registers of loss that manifest themselves differently and at different levels 
of intensity: empirical loss (of men and women and the cultural forms which they 
embody) and representational loss (where such men and women and the cultural 
forms which they embody evade or exceed inscription). We have already alluded to 
this doubleness earlier, but to this we might add a third category of conceptual loss 
(of 'Man') as early anthropological data was ultimately collected in the name of-
reconstructing the orig!ns and histories of 'Man', the universalist fig leaf over a 
European particularity. Rather than see such concepts as their a priori conditions 
of possibility, anthropologists often thought they could somehow reconstruct them 
after the fact. In what Johannes Fabian (2002 [1983]) has famously dubbed an 
'allochronic' discourse, space was converted into time allowing contemporary 
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Indigenous populations to shed light on ancient Europe. Thus, the ensuing loss of 
such 'data' was a serious blow to these transcendental ambitions (cf. Derrida, 
2001, ch. 10; Urry, 1993, p. 3). There are thus three senses of loss at work here: 
empirical (men), representational ('men') and conceptual (Man). Each of these 
registers is archaic but takes on a specific hue in the context of the emergence of a 
scientific field ethnology. 
These registers of loss have a number of important consequences for the 
discussion to follow: most notably, they exacerbate the imperialistic import of 
what I will be calling the epistemological (and/or archival) impulse of the 
discipline and the concomitant use of the new technologies of inscription therein. 
A sense of humanistic urgency often became - and, I would suggest, often still is - a 
veil draped over an opportunistic sense of unquestioned and arrogant entitlement. 
Nonetheless, beyond the ideological justification such loss creates, the tensions it 
engenders remain unresolved and, most crucially, remain so of necessity. This is 
anthropology's predicament, which - as we have seen - is in turn metonymically 
.. bound to the predicaments of modernity more broadly, predicaments also located 
at an empirical level - the huge pace of change, the destruction, etc. - at a 
representational level - ushered in by the new technologies of inscription - and at 
a conceptual level - the 'closure'. of metaphysics. In this instance, ethnology 
becomes a nodal or crO"ssing point, a point at which the antinomies of modernity 
meet. Thus the stakes of the following ~iscussion are very high indeed, and rather 
more significant than the usual footnote to a disciplinary history would seem to 
suggest. 
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In what follows, such tensions will play out in an extension of our original 
questions: why do anthropologists feel so compelled to write in and out of the 
'field', and how does this relate to their use of other modes of inscription, such as 
photography, drawing, phonography and film? Where and how do these media 
intersect? Where do they diverge? How is this taste for inscription related to the 
way in which their discipline has historically constructed its object (Le. as 
threatened or lost)? What, ultimately, is the relationship between inscription and 
loss? Each of the following chapters is an attempt to focus the intensity of these 
questions on a series of singular sites or tightly focused moments: the margins-
turned-pivot-points of Haddon's writing. Chapter one focuses on a small and 
marginal sample of Haddon's racial 'type' photographs, but considers the more 
central question of how their embedded ness on the page undoes Haddon's 
positivistic and racialist logic. Chapter two examines the relationship between 
movement and stillness on the margins of Haddon's ethnographic cinema, but 
explores the extent to which an emergent tension between movement and stillness 
and indexicality and non-indexicality pulls at the seam between rationality and 
" fantasy, and chapter three focuses on the extent to which a peripheral attempt to 
render sound meaningful and representable exposes a much larger chasm between 
experience and representation; each folds the margins back into the centre with a 
view to exposing the irreducible gaps, fissures and logical fault-lines inherent 
Within Haddon's overall project, and - by extension - within anthropology as a 
whole.27 
27 Echoing our other engagements with the figure of supplementarity, such a relationship (in this 
case/between, margins and centres) is also bound up with the 'logic of the supplement' as 
Nicholas Royle (2003, p. 57) has made clear. 
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PART I: PHOTOGRAPHY 
The Coming of the light28: Contingency, Rationalization 
and A.C. Haddon's Photographic Surfaces 
[P]hotography [ ... ] is concerned with the staging of a struggle against the loss of memory, 
an attempt to archive and preserve what is about to disappear for good. 
Gerhard Richter, Copy, Archive, Signature (in Derrida, 2010, p. xxx) 
Categorical Gestures 
Roland Barthes (2000a, p. 4) opens his influential late study of photography, 
Camera Lucida, with a pressing desire to know what photography is 'in itself.29 His 
first faltering steps lead him to attempt to classify his object via a series of 
categorical distinctions which, for him, are ultimately external to photography's 
'essence': 'empirical (Professionals / Amateurs), or rhetorical (Landscapes / 
Objects / Portraits / Nudes), or else aesthetic (Realism / Pictorialism)' (Barthes, 
2000a, p. 4). As with Barthes, the momentum of this chapter does not stem from 
such conventional categorical gestures, but they nonetheless provide a useful 
platform on which to stage the argument to come, not least because few disciplines 
set more store by classificatory schemas than anthropology, and the use of 
28 The 'Coming of the Light' is how Torres Strait Islanders refer to and commemorate the bringing 
of Christianity to the Islands. Christian missionaries from the London Missionary Society landed 
on 'Oarnley Island' (Erub Island, see fig. 4) on July 1, 1871, and every year the Islanders 
._. celebrate the 'Coming of the Light' festival on that day (Beckett, 1987, p. 87). It is here that the 
salvation of religion and the salvation (salvage, redemption) of science come together. 
29 The ·fact that this desire is never fulfilled is an indication of the limitations of the 
phenomenological method. In part at least, that is one of the underlying - or implied - themes of 
Camera Lucida. 
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photography within anthropology is no exception. 
However, if this is a chapter about the role of photography in Haddon's 1898 
Torres Strait expedition, it is only so with a number of key qualifications or 
caveats: firstly, photography is not read here as a discrete medium, but rather, as I 
set out in the introduction, as one part of an intermedial constellation (or set of 
shifting constellations). In other words, I have artificially foregrounded what is not 
so in the writings. Secondly, photography is not read systematically. In other 
words, this is not a comprehensive study of photography in the expedition, but is, 
rather, read symptomatically or marginally vis-a-vis the discourses of inscription 
and loss that I set out in the introduction. Thirdly, photography is not read 
chronologically (tracing its rise and fall from Haddon's beginnings through to his 
later work). It is, rather, read thematically pushing back towards influences and 
forward towards legacies. 
Unlike cinematography, which was beset by considerable technical difficulties, 
··photography forined one of the intellectual and methodological mainstays of the 
expedition's visualist agenda, with over 300 monochrome photographs taken 
using two Newman and Guardia 3Smm cameras as well as an experimental (albeit 
unsuccessful) Ives and loly process for developing colour plates (cf. Edwards, 
1998, pp. 106-7; Griffiths, 2002, p. 128). Most of these photographs were taken by 
Haddon's undergraduate assistant, Anthony Wilkin - a young and gif~ed amateur 
who published photographic accounts of his trips to Egypt, Libya and Algeria (On 
The Nile With a Camera, Libyan Notes and Among the Berbers of Algeria [Haddon, 
1901, p. 28]). Nonetheless, almost all of these photographs were orchestrated or 
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directed by Haddon, a point which foregrounds the unclear line between 
professional and amateur in anthropology, science, art and photography in fin-de-
siecIe Britain. Indeed, this was a source of considerable anxiety in a discipline 
attempting to lever itself into the pantheon of existing sciences at this time (cf. 
Grimshaw, 2001, p. 29). 
Haddon's photographic 'corpus' ('we must classify, verify by samples, if we want to 
constitute a corpus' [Barthes, 2000a, p. 4]) breaks down along lines strikingly 
similar to Barthes' rhetorical categories (landscapes/objects/portraits/nudes). 
Haddon would undoubtedly agree with Baudelaire's suggestion (cited in Benjamin, 
1999 [1931], p. 527) that photography's 'proper duty' is to 'serve as the 
handmaiden of science and the arts'. However, there is something of an irony in 
the fact that although his first duty was to science, his photographic genres are 
drawn almost entirely from the arts. Indeed, this is one of the reasons, Barthes 
argues (2000a, p. 4), why such categories do not enable us to distil the 'essence' of 
photography: because they could be applied to pre-photographic media. 
With certain notable exceptions30, Haddon's photographic output could 
comfortably be gathered under Barthes' rhetorical categories, comprised as it is 
mainly of landscapes (panoramas and picturesque vistas), material objects (from 
the profane to the sacred: amulets, carvings, masks, etc.), cultural activities 
(dancing, cooking, hunting, etc.) and individual portraits (formal an.d informal) 
(see fig. 1 below). 
30 One of the more interesting exceptions to this model is the use of photography to reconstruct 
now defunct cultural traditions (cf. Edwards, 2001, ch. 8). This is a theme that I will return to 
later in this chapter and explore in more detail in the chapter on Haddon's ethnographic films. 
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Figure 1, Selections from the Reports on the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres 
Straits Islands (Vol. V, Haddon et ai, 1904, Plate XX, no pagination; Vol. VI, Haddon et ai, 1908, Plates 
IX and II, no pagination) 
However, it is significant that such categories are deployed by a nascent discipline 
which did not yet make professional or institutional distinctions between material 
culture, social anthropology and physical anthropology. In short, beyond the 
shared rhetorical framework, these differences matter. Inde~d, perhaps because of 
this lack of definit ion, one of the most persistent and perpl xing of these genres 
(persistent and perplexing because at once so simple and empty and yet so 
complex and resonant) is that of the 'type ' photograph, anthropology's bastard 
. child of classical portraiture, phrenology and race science. Each of these forms 
(portraiture, phrenology, race science and 'type ' photography) shares a visual 
economy which views the body, and more particularly the face, as a legible surface 
full of deeper meaning and waiting to be deciphered (cf. Davis, 2004, p. 25). 'Every 
human face' , Schopenhauer suggests (cited in Davis, 2004, p. 25), 'is a hieroglyph 
which can be deciphered, indeed whose key we bear ready-made within us'. Such 
photographs represent one end of a spectrum of representations used to codify 
cultural, ethnic and/or racial typologies (cf. Edwards, 1990, p. 236). 
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Here subjects are usually extracted from 
discernible cultural contexts and positioned 
frontally and in profile against a blank 
background. Culture, ethnicity and race are 
often registered but conflated and 
comparisons between types are usually 
implied but qualitative and idiosyncratic (see 
fig. 2 opposite). The looseness of this 
photographic genre meant that it acquired a 
Figure 2, 'Portraits of natives of Mer', 
Reports, Vol I (Haddon et ai, 1935, Plate X, 
no pagination) 
certain popular currency, moving from the 
pages of specialist anthropological 
publications into widely distributed publications and cheap and popular cartes-de-
visite reproductions of national or ethnic 'types' (Edwards, 1990, p. 238). 
At the other end of the spectrum is the full 
anthropometric photograph. Here subjects 
. are usually positioned frontally and/or in 
profile against a standatdiZed and 
measurable background with a view to 
quantitatively comparing and contrasting 
specifically 'racial' types (see fig. 3 opposite). 
This became an important site of pow~r and 
fantasy in mid to late nineteenth century 
anthropology, a place where racial politics 
Figure 3, From a series of anthropometric 
photographs of the Oayak (Borneo), Jean 
Demmeni (from Roodenburg, n.d., p. 22) 
were played out and cultural longings and anxieties expressed, a place where 
60 
racial and cultural difference was made and unmade. In practice, there was often 
an overlap between the two modes, but in both cases the literal machinery of 
photographic portraiture, which held subjects immobile (cf. Barthes, 2000a, p. 13; 
Benjamin, 1999 [1931], p. 515), was here replaced by a discursive machinery of 
colonial power. The 'funereal immobility' (Barthes, 2000a, p. 6) of the sitter was 
converted into a static metonymy; each individual became a fly in the amber of 
their 'race'. 
Up until recently, the dominant mode of reading such photographs has been a 
broadly discursive one that examines the knowledge/power nexus by drawing 
together the links between surveillance, colonialism, criminality and madness (cf. 
Edwards, 2001, p. 131). This approach owes much to the importation of Foucault 
into photography studies via analysts such as John Tagg (e.g. 1988) and others. 
Indeed, there is much to commend in such an approach, and the analysis that 
follows owes much to it, but there has in recent years been a trend towards 
addressing the specificity of the photographic image (as a meaningfully material 
.. surface, a sociological object and/or an historical artefact, etc.) (cf. Edwards, 2001). 
This focus on specificity has been conducted in part to challenge the top-down 
homogeneity of some of the discursive readings of photography, but also - and, 
perhaps, more importantly - with a view to prising open spaces where individual 
photographs might nuance or challenge the totalizing homogeneity of the grids of 
knowledge and power in which they were and are embedded (Edwards, 2001, p. 
131; Thomas, 1994). In other words, both approaches could usefully be ~egarded 
as complementary rather than oppositional, and it is in this spirit that I will 
attempt to conduct the following analysis. 
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Conducting such an analysis therefore involves shifting between what might 
hitherto have been regarded as 'formal' and 'social' registers, the former 
addressing the photograph as both a material surface and a conveyor/purveyor of 
meanings; the latter addressing the photograph and its associated apparatus in 
terms of their role within colonial knowledge production. This offers a number of 
overlapping methodological approaches. Firstly, one might analyse such 
photographs as examples of 'colonial discourse(s)' which deploy, challenge or 
negotiate with colonially resonant concepts such as race, culture, loss, etc. This is 
arguably the more conventional approach and although often masquerading as a 
form of 'discourse analysis', is often more accurately viewed as a type of 
hermetically sealed formalism at one remove. Nonetheless, no meanings produced 
in this context can be regarded as historically fixed or divorced from differences in 
reception. To conduct such an analysis is perhaps a necessary but not sufficient 
condition. It is in some ways to look 'through' the image. However, photographs 
might also be analysed as material artefacts in their own right, providing part of 
·,the material substrata of colonial knowledge production. To do so is in some ways 
to look 'at' the image, which is to extend rather than contradict the first approach. 
Finally, one might analyse photographs, along with the photographic apparatus 
itself, in terms of the power/knowledge networks in which they - as 'material 
artefacts - were and are embedded. To do so is in some ways to look 'around' the 
image, with a view to producing the l<inds of social-semiotic and/o~ discursive 
readings which not only contextualize photography but open it up to a broader 
range. of questions. Different aspects of these approaches will be deployed 
depending on, the context, but in practice all three are often intertwined and 
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difficult to dissociate or clearly differentiate. Inde'ed, in some ways, they each say 
the same thing, but all three offer a shifting focus between the contexts of the 
image's original production and the unpredictable material and cultural legacies 
which issue from them. 
Opening up the medium of photography (and the genre of 'type' photography in 
particular) to such questions brings us much closer to the nub of the problem -
and this is the question which precedes all the others and brings us back to Roland 
Barthes: is there a relationship (direct or otherwise) between the way in which an 
individual might represent a 'type' and an individual photograph might evoke 
photography? And if each (singular) photograph also evokes photography as such 
(cf. Richter in Derrida, 2010, pp. xxiv-xxv), then what do Haddon's 'type' 
photographs say about the contradictions and aporias of the medium of 
photography itself and vice versa? More simply, why does Haddon's project place 
such an emphasis on the medium of photography (and 'type' photography in 
particular) and how might a mutual investigation expose the epistemological fault-
',lines and cracks that inhere in both? 
I. Indexicality, Contingency, Excess 
Haddon's enthusiastic penchant for photography - borne out in a number of 
popular and scientific articles advocating its use (e.g. Stocking, 1993, p. 13; 
Haddon, 1912; cf. Griffiths, 2002, pp. 132-133) - stems from a range of important 
,factors, some of which dovetail with his u~e of cinematography (such as the 
visualist agenda of the project), some of which deviate (as we shall consider in the 
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next chapter). However, the crux of his enthusiasm for photography brings us back 
to Barthes' famous opening gambit in Camera Lucida, a deceptively simple premise 
which (along with the work of C.S. Peirce and others [cf. Mulvey, 2006, p. 54]) 
virtually launched a genre of photographic criticism: 
A specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent 
(from what it represents) [ ... ] (2000a, p. 5). 
Just as there can be no empty consciousness for Husserl - there is only 
'consciousness of something (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 16-17) - there can be no empty 
photograph for Barthes (2000a, pp. 28, 6) - there is only photography of 
something, some point of reference which 'adheres' to the photographic surface 
like 'that class of laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated without 
destroying them both'. Such a process of adhesion obviously explains the appeal of 
photography to a positive science looking to the surface of social, cultural and 
biological life for a reliable stream of data seemingly unencumbered by subjective 
whims and human error (Edwards, 1990, p. 237). As Christopher Pinney argues: 
This relationship of physical contiguity between image and referent 
certainly played a central role in the truth claims of the colonial archive: 
photography was seen to surpass and eradicate the subjectivity and 
unreliability of earlier technologies of representation (2003, p. 6). 
It also explains the appeal of photography to a discipline attempting to find an 
institutional foothold within the scienc,es by establishing its unique professional 
authority over the collection and interpretation of such ethnographic data, over 
and against the amateur pursuits of missionaries, travellers and colonialists (cf. 
Grimshaw, 2001, p. 29). This is particularly marked when one compares the 
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typological photographs of a proto-modern arithropology to other forms of 
representation or, indeed, to the idiosyncratic snapshots of interested amateurs. 
More than all of this, however, such a process explains the appeal of photography 
to a science which fears an imminent loss of referent, due to the combined forces of 
Christianity, capitalism and colonialism. In this context, photographic portraiture 
becomes a death mask taken from the not-yet-dead, a process which conflates the 
immanence and imminence of death: 
In this way, the photographic portrait prepares the self for its own 
death; it is a form of mnemonic mortification that commemorates a 
passing that already has occurred or that is yet to come (Richter in 
Derrida, 2010, pp. xxxiii). 
However, this also means that every photograph contains within it a painful 
tension: a promise to indemnify against loss by bonding with a dying referent, and 
an acknowledgement that no such bond - no matter how close - can ever allow 
one (the photograph) to replace the other (the referent) . 
.. Nonetheless, the perception that photography could promise objectivity, authority 
and an indemnification against loss contributed to its (albeit brief) popularity and 
success within an emergent modern anthropology. However, this is also why it -
and visual methods more generally -:- rapidly fell out of fav'our within the discipline 
as it moved away from' - what was perceived to be - a positivist preoccupation 
with surface towards interpretation, depth and other sources of (usu~lly) written 
authority (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 128). This is the conventional narrative of the 
history of British social anthropology: modern'anthropology begins in the rejection 
of Victorian positivism and evolutionism and in the casting aside of its associated 
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technology and all things visual (cf. Grimshaw, 2001). However, there is another 
way to read this narrative, one which argues that the rejection of indexical 
technologies is not merely a rejection of its positivist strictures but also of its 
untamed contingency, alterity and excess, and this move involves a closer 
examination of the adhesive bond between photograph and referent. As 
Christopher Pinney and Siegfried Kracauer suggest: 
No matter how precautionary and punctilious the photographer is in 
arranging everything that is placed before the camera, the inability of 
the lens to discriminate will ensure a substrate or margin of excess, a 
subversive code present in every photographic image that makes it 
open and available to other readings and uses [ ... ] [H]owever hard the 
photographer tries to exclude, the camera always includes. The 
photographer can never fully control the resulting photograph, and it is 
that lack of control and the resulting excess that permits recoding, 
"resurfacing," and "looking past" (Pinney, 2003, pp. 6-7, emphasis in 
original). 
[E]ven the most typical portraits must retain an accidental character -
as if they were plucked en route and still quivered with crude existence 
(Kracauer, 1997, p. 19). 
Just as photographs might provide too little to indemnify against loss, they also 
provide too much in the way of a contingent excess. Indeed, theorists of 
photography have long been aware of such a relationship between photography 
and contingency. For example, one might think of Benjamin's (1999 [1931], p. 510) -
'irresistible urge to sea!ch [ ... J a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of the 
here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject'. For Barthes 
(2000a, p. 4), the photograph 'is the ab~olute Particular, the sovereign Contingency 
[ ... ] in short, what Lacan calls Tuche, the Occasion, the Encounter, the Real, in its 
indefatigable expression' [ ... J 'In the Photograph, the event is never transcended 
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for the sake of something else'.31 However, there is a crucial tension between 
photography's susceptibility to contingency - and we must remind ourselves that 
this is not an external breach that can be mitigated, but rather an integral part of 
the ontology of the medium - and the forces of rationalization and control with 
which photography was often used.32 Indeed, for Mary Ann Doane (2002, p. 10), 
such an unresolved tension between contingency and rationalization could be 
thought to characterize the experience of modernity more generally. This tension 
becomes particularly marked when photography gets pressed into the service of 
an emergent positive science where it is precisely the point that the singular event 
(one photograph, one individual, one moment in time and space) should be 
transcended for the sake of something else (the general, the typical, the universal). 
Raw data distilled into theory; that is science, or at least one version of it. Indeed, 
Barthes (2000a, p. 28) notes the significance of this aspect of photographic 
contingency: '[ ... ] it immediately yields up those "details" which constitute the very 
raw material of ethnological knowledge'. However, the process of converting such 
data into theory is not as smooth or as clean as one might think, and a residue of 
-. contingency, alterity and excess ultimately inheres along with the traces of the 
referent. Therefore, what makes photography most effective as a collector of 'raw 
data' (i.e. its unflinching indexicality, its seeming ability to transcend itself as a sign 
and to masquerade as its own referent [Barthes, 2000a, p~ 45]) is also what makes 
it most suspect as a basis for scientific generalizations (i.e. its fleeting contingency, 
the fact that, although it may be of the 'real', it is passing). In other words, the very 
31 This reference to Tuche is an important reminder that the bond between photography and 
contingency is part of a much broader pattern of thought which combines technics and chance. 
._ For example, it evokes Aristotle's evocation of Agathon in the Nichomachean Ethics where he 
reminds us that, 'Art [techne] has a love for chance [tuche] and chance for art' (cf. Kilroy and 
Swiboda, 2007). 
32 This tension is also very much at the heart of the relationship between technics and chance 
more broadly. 
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thing that bestows scientific legitimacy also undermines it (cf. Pinney, 2003, p. 6). 
Event and Structure 
Therefore, if indexicality is. at the very heart of Haddon's choice to use 
photography, as I would argue, such indexical inscriptions nonetheless possess a 
number of overlapping peculiarities for the scientist. Firstly, they record both too 
much (a contingent excess which comes into conflict with the forces of 
rationalization) and too little (they are a poor substitute for a 'dying culture'). 
Secondly, they may serve well as raw data (of an event), but they must be 
transcended (as structure) to be science. Indeed, Barthes' enunciation of this 
tension takes on a peculiar literality in this context, as we shall consider later: 
Since every photograph is contingent (and thereby outside of meaning), 
Photography cannot signify (aim at a generality) except by assuming a 
mask (2000a, p. 34) . 
.. To that extent, they evoke the larger predicament that confronts anthropology: the 
tension between event and structure. As Derrida remarks: 
Perhaps .. something has occurred in the history of the concept. of 
structure that could be called' an "event," if this loaded word did not 
entail a meaning ··which it is precisely the function of structural - or 
structuralist - thought to reduce or to suspect (Derrida, 2001, p. 351). 
Within the history of anthropology, the concept of structure is implied rather than 
enun,ciated in the evolutionary paradigm Of Victorian anthropology precisely 
because it is not an historical model33; its preoccupations are with origins and 
33 In this case, history and (an implied) structure can be thought to oppose one another. However, 
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evolutionary scales rather than events. The concept of structure becomes explicitly 
registered only later in the functionalism of Malinowski (a variant reading of 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs), the structural-functionalism of Radcliffe-Brown (a 
variant reading of Durkheimian sociology) and the structuralism of Levi-Strauss (a 
variant reading of Saussure). It is because Haddon straddles such Victorian 
evolutionism and modern ethnographers like Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and 
Levi-Strauss (who weld together data collector and theorist) that the tension 
between event and structure becomes so pronounced. 
In relation to photography, this tension opens up at least three different temporal 
registers wherein the eventness of the event is diminished in favour of an abstract 
structuring principle. For example, some of Haddon's photographs are posed as 
being 'too late' (e.g. those which reconstruct 'extinct' cultural activities, cf. 
Edwards, 2001, ch. 8). Here the time of the event is converted into an amorphous 
and non-historical past time. Some of Haddon's photographs are posed as being 
'just in time' (e.g. photos which 'embalm' moribund cultural activities in time [cf. 
"Bazin in Mulvey; 2006, p. 56]). Here the time of the event is converted into a 
typical, ethnographic present. Other of Haddon's photographs are posed as being 
'outside time' (e.g. the photographic typologies with which we will be principally 
concerned). Here the time of the event is extracted from one flow of time' (e.g. the 
time of the referents) and is entered into another (e.g. the time of the photo or the 
'tfmeless' structuration of science). All three of these temporal register~ attempt to 
transcend the eventness of the event and to gather it under the structuring, 
rationalizing force of science. 
see Mowitt (2005, pp. 176-177, fn. 4) for a reminder that history and structure or history and 
structuralism cannot always be assumed to be oppositional. 
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In what follows I will examine how Haddon negotiates these conceptual and 
temporal tensions through a detailed exploration of two sets of 'type' photographs 
published in his popular account of the expedition, Head-Hunters: Black, White and 
Brown (1901), for it is in these photographs that the tensions between contingency 
and rationalization, particularity and universality or event and structure34, come to 
the fore most prominently. The importance of such a tension and such an analysis 
lies in the fact that it is not confined to photography, or any other indexical 
technologies. Indeed, this tension sits at the very heart of the ethnographic 
enterprise more generally. If modern anthropology is constructed as an 
ethnographic discipline, then this tension forms its foundation stone. In Elizabeth 
Edwards' succinct phrase (2001, p. 157), anthropological representations are 
'extracted from real time' but 'authenticated through real-time observation'. In 
Haddon's case, the resulting - and, I would argue, symptomatically unsuccessful -
attempts to negotiate this tension not only involve a complex set of intermedial 
relatio~ships between photography, phonetic writing, drawing and film (wherein 
'each is used to 'supplement' the other - and we will come back to this question of 
supplementarity later), but such attempts ultimately expose the sheer rawness, 
power and anti-positivist import of indexical technologies (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 10), 
which is arguably what contributed to their expulsion from the discipline in the 
first place. 
34 These pairs are obviously not strictly synonymous. 
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Europe and its Others: Grids of Intelligibility 
However, these tensions have important historical antecedents which will help to 
place Haddon's work in general, and Head-Hunters in particular, into context. Prior 
to the emergence of a professionalized field of anthropology, the cultural 
encounters between Europe and its others (by travellers, missionaries, colonialists, 
etc.) were complex, contingent and schematic affairs, embedded in a range of 
different discursive constellations. The attempt to systematize such encounters in 
the name of an emergent science led to the imposition of a range of theoretical (a 
priori) categories which were used to establish a comparative framework and, in 
their later form, to ritually debase any knowledge produced by travellers, 
missionaries and colonialists. Prior to the emergence of later anthropological 
paradigms (such as functionalism, structural-functionalism .and structuralism, for 
example), the relationships or patterns between individual customs were of little 
concern. The point was to gather together a body of comparative data with a view 
to comparing individual customs across different cultural milieus (religion here or 
there, etc.) and/or assessing the overall level of cultural development within 
particular cultural milieus. This created a core tension between the ethnographer 
who describes (phonetic writing/particularity is their modus operandi) and the, 
anthropologist who theorizes (in the interests of distilling a generalized human 
essence) (cf. Clifford, 1988, p. 28). This tension opens out onto a wider vista of 
others (particularity/universality, data/theory, experience/phoneti~ ~riting), 
which are hierarchically ordered, the former feeding into the latter: particular data 
'. 
drawn from the experience of 'travellers or residents in uncivilized lands'35 feeding 
1 
35 Thiswas the tag-line of the Notes and Queries on Anthropology series, which ran for much of the 
late nineteenth- and early to mid twentieth-century (Urry, 1993, ch. 1). 
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into the universalizing theory of anthropological writings, and so on. 
Therefore, immediately prior to Haddon, the division of labour between 
anthropologist and collector, theory and raw data, clipped writings and unruly 
experience, was unidirectional and deductive. The most obvious case in point in 
the first wave of professionalization of the discipline as a science was the 
emergence of the anthropological questionnaire, where a grid of universal 
categories (e.g. religion, politics, economics, etc.) were superimposed over 
experience in a bid to establish a comparative framework through which a human 
essence could be distilled. In the first instance, then, anthropology is predicated on 
the paradox of collecting instances of cultural difference with a view to 
transcending them (cf. Clifford, 1986b, p. 99). '[E]thnography's narrative of specific 
differences presupposes, and always refers to, an abstract plane of similarity' 
(Clifford, 1986b, p. 101). To that extent, the discipline's philosophical 
preoccupations are inherited from the Enlightenment. 
'Haddon's earliest forays into ethnography (e.g. his 1888 trip to the Torres Strait 
Islands) are precisely predicated on the imposition of such a deductive grid, 
loosely narrativized. Indeed, Haddon (1912, pp. 267-271) would later contribute to 
an edition of the same Notes and Queries which had earlier animated his own work. 
On the basis of the above distinction, therefore, Haddon would be very much in the 
mould of the ethnographer rather than the anthropologist at thi~ time. The 
complexity emerges as his conversion to anthropology starts to collapse the gap 
between anthropologist and ethnographer, theory and raw data, clipped writings 
and unruly experience, thereby highlighting something of their discrepant 
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registers. The space between them dissolves both' the unidirectional nature of the 
relationships and their deductive qualities, producing streams of contingency, 
alterity and excess. The paradox is that whilst narratives of personal experience 
are required to establish professional authority, they simultaneously undermine 
scientific validity. As Mary Louise Pratt describes it: 
[P]ersonal narrative persists alongside objectifying description in 
ethnographic writing because it mediates a contradiction within the 
discipline between personal and scientific authority, a contradiction 
that has become especially acute since the advent of fieldwork as a 
methodological norm. James Clifford speaks of it as "the discipline's 
impossible attempt to fuse objective and subjective practices" (1986, p. 
32). 
The solution is to place oneself within the work in order to establish authority ('I 
was there'), whilst also rendering oneself a transcendental viewer· from above. 
This is anthropology's broader dialectic, i.e. that betwee'n the particular (the 
ethnographic encounter in all its eventness and contingency, etc.) and the 
universal (the general concepts which animate that encounter and its subsequent 
representation: the human, religion, economics, politics, etc., but which cannot be 
accessed empirically). 
One of the things that makes Haddon's work significant in this regard i~ that it 
marks a trend toward_such a tension. His work heralds a certain rupture in 
a~thropology between the ethnographic encounter and its representation, 
between 'unruly experience' and 'authoritative written account' (Clifford, '1988, p. 
25). Once established as the ethnographic norm, this mode created 
representations which were authenticated by the above-mentioned paradoxical 
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double move: revealing the presence of the anthropologist in all his or her 
contingency ('I was there at that point in time') whilst transcendentalizing that 
position with a view to converting event into structure. Such a move is particularly 
complicated when one focuses on technologies of inscription like photography. In 
this context, the deictic function of the photograph, so important to Barthes, points 
a finger in two directions at once: towards and away from the image, indexing both 
subject and photographer. As with ethnographic writings, it certifies the 
authoritative presence of the anthropologist ('I was there and took this 
photograph') whilst also subsuming that presence under an abstract structure 
('this photograph means more than this moment, this event'). However, this 
process of certification and control is rendered unwieldy by unwittingly levering 
an opening to that which challenges it, and it is this opening that I will try to widen 
in the following reading of Head-Hunters. 
II. Head-Hunters - Mise-en-Scene 
Based very closely on his personal journal of the expedition36, Haddon (1901) 
published a popular travelogue of the trip, Head-Hunters: Black, White and Brown, 
three years after his return from the Torres Strait. This book was intended as a 
brief and self-consciously popular taster for the six volumes of scientific reports 
which would be published under Haddon's editorship before his death in 1940 
(Haddon et aI, 1901; 1904; 1907; 1908; 1912; 1935), and it was p~bl~shed in 
response to an intense public curiosity about all things colonial. In this sense, 
Haddon was caught between two significant and contradictory forces (forces 
36 This is now in the manuscripts section of Cambridge University Library (Haddon, 1898b). 
Indeed, some sections of Head-Hunters are taken almost verbatim from the journal. 
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which I will later come to align with the tension between contingency and 
rationalization, event and structure, etc.): a desire to publicize a nascent discipline 
by deploying some of the popular idioms of travel writing, and a desire to establish 
a foothold in the sciences by deploying some of the idioms of the natural sciences 
(cf. Herle, 1998b, p. 93). The ~ormer renders the book explicable to a readership 
used to travellers' tales and missionary accounts; the latter attempts to extricate 
itself from such representations and to establish a unique profeSSional authority 
over ethnographic data (a point which has as much to do with institutional 
positioning and funding as with epistemology). Indeed, this tension between 
narrative and science, popularity and rigour, which fundamentally structures the 
whole of Head-Hunters and becomes the impasse with which future ethnographic 
writings will struggle, is also fundamentally present in the space· between 
Haddon's popular and scientific writings. To that extent, Head-Hunters can be read 
as a convenient condensation of Haddon's project more generally. 
As Haddon's work is transitional between Victorian and 'modern' modes of 
'anthropological representation, it (and Head-Hunters in particular) arguably 
renders these tensions more evident than in later work, where, in Clifford Geertz's 
terms (1988b, p. 29), '[t]he devices, the construction scars, the brush strokes are 
all more or less invisible, at least to the unwary eye'. Revealing such brush 'strokes, 
Head-Hunters opens with what would become the classic opening gesture for 
future ethnographic writings: Geertz's 'I-Witnessing' model (1988a, ch. 4), where 
the journey and the writer are situated in a very specific moment in time, thereby 
setting the scene and authenticating the narrative to come: 
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We arrived at Torres Straits37 early in the morning of April 22nd, 1898, 
and dropped anchor off Friday Island, as the steamers of the Ducal Line 
are not allowed now to tie up at the hulk at Thursday Island. Shortly 
afterwards we were met by the Hon. John Douglas, the Resident 
Magistrate, and Dr. Salter, both of whom were old friends who had 
shown me much kindness during my previous expedition [ ... ] 
The township of Thursday Island, or Port Kennedy, as it is officially 
termed, had increased considerably during the past decade. This was 
partly due to the natural growth of the frontier town of North 
Queensland, and partly to the fact that it has become a fortified port 
which commands the only safe passage for large vessels through these 
dangerous straits (Haddon, 1901, p. 1). 
Such a manoeuvre immediately establishes authorial and professional authority, 
clearly situated and embedded within a specific colonial administrative 
framework. Indeed, this is the source of much of Haddon's access and resources.38 
This move simultaneously poses the book as an explicitly narrative account; it is 
the non-fiction equivalent of 'once upon a time' (cf. Crapanzano, 1986, p. 53). In 
Mary Louise Pratt's terms, such openings: 
[P]lay the crucial role of anchoring that description in the intense and 
authority-giving personal experience of fieldwork [ ... ] Always they are 
responsible for setting up the initial positionings of the subjects of the 
ethnographic text: the ethnographer, the native and the reader (1986, p. 
32). 
However, it also makes clear that Thursday Island, the administrative centre of the , 
Islands, just north of the tip of Queensland (see fig. 4 below), is an extension of a 
frontier. It is, to use Christopher Bracken's39 phrase (1997, p: 12), 'an appendage 
sewn to the empire's flank', or, to re-use Haddon's phrase, an 'outlier[oo.] of the 
37 At the time that Haddon was writing (circa 1888-1898), the Torres Strait Islands were known as 
the Torres Straits. 
38 In his personal journal for the 1888 expedition, Haddon (1888, p. 3) notes with approval that 
one of the chief colonial officials on the Island, H ugh Milman, puts the resources of Empire (such 
as a boat launch) at his disposal, whilst also allowing Haddon to accompany him on his 'rounds' 
of the Islands in order to question the 'natives'. 
39 Many thanks to John Mowitt for directing me towards Christopher Bracken's work. 
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empire'.40 Sitting at the centre of a 
'-\ 
\ 
global trade in pearl shell and beche-de-
mer since the 1860s41, the Islands were 
settled by missionaries from the 
London Missionary Society in 1871 (see 
Utv,b;'i 
fn. 1) and 'annexed' by the Crown in Jiiu;~~,' 
&.El:ub 
1877.42 These are the three Cs of 
colonial modernity that we encountered 
in the introduction: capitalism, ", 
Christianity and colonialism, or 
'pearlers, pastors and protectors' as the 
anthropologist Jeremy Beckett (1987, 
pp. 24-60) would have it. The Strait Figure 4, 'Map of Torres Straits' (Haddon, 1901, 
, p. 13) 
thus became an important frontier 
along a both a 'vertical' north-south axis (between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea) and along a 'horizontal' east-west axis (between Europe and Asia). Indeed, 
'although anthropologists often choose islands because of their perceived 
boundedness, the sea (like a hyphen) joins as much at it separates; it is both bridge 
40 This is in reference to the text of a lecture on the 'Western Isles of Ireland' (of which, more 
below) in a manuscript in the Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (Box 98, 
W06j1j6). 
41 Pearl shell was principally used for the decorative buttons in such demand in Europe, and 
beche-de-mer - a type of sea cucumber - was treated as a sought-after delicacy in Asia. 
Therefore, the Strait was very much at the centre of 'horizontal' and 'vertical' flows of trade. 
42 It is worth stressing parenthetically that the part-whole relations implied by Bracken's and 
, Haddon's phrases and by the notion of 'annexation' may also be read in supplementary terms. 
'Additions' to the empire - particularly islands (and we might remember that Australia was 
'added' to Britain just as the Torres Strait Islands were 'added' to Australia; to that ex tent, the 
Islands are a supplement to a supplement) - may equally create forms of displacement, not least 
in this context because the Islands would later playa pivotal role in Indigenous land rights by 
undermining the concept of 'terra nullius' in Australia (in part at least, the legal basis for the 
colonization of the continent, of which more later). This was a 'tale wagging the dog' moment. A 
landmark ruling (the so-called 'Mabo' case) had ramifications across the whole continent of 
Australia simply because the Islands had been annexed. Otherwise, its implications would have 
been minimal and locally defined. 
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and barrier (cf. Kuklick, 1996).43 Such a situatedn~ss sets the Islands between two 
cultural flows, two socio-economic systems, two sets of histories, two modes of 
hybridity and change. Haddon is interested in one (e.g. the 'vertical' cultural flows 
between Papua New Guinea and Australia), but not in the other (e.g. the 
. 'horizontal' cultural flows bet.ween Euro-Australian-Asian capitalism/colonialism 
and the Islands). In this light, Thursday Island - as the Island's administrative 
centre - becomes a place where lines are drawn and crossed at the same time: 
Europe at its limit point. As Christopher Bracken argues: 
In the colonial text the limit marks the line, or set of lines, where Europe 
attempts to trace a clean boundary between itself and its exterior. Yet 
the limit invariably fails to establish itself because it is crossed by the 
very movement that draws it. The limit occupies a textual zone where 
the marking of limits is impossible (1997, p. 5). 
Such flows and transgressions are coded by Haddon as corrupted authenticity: the 
place where, in Bracken's terms (1997, p. 5), Europe meets a pale reflection of 
itself. Rather than cast colonialism and industry to the margins, as with later 
ethnographies, they are incorporated so as to work the tropes of loss and decay 
into the book. To this extent, the book is closer to Levi-Strauss's melancholia than 
Malinowski's romanticism44: 
Although the town. has increased in size its character has not altered to 
any considerable extent. It is still the same assemblage of corrugated 
iron and wooden buildings which garishly broil under a tropical sun, 
unrelieved by that vegetation which renders beautiful so many tropical 
towns. It is true a little planting has been done, but the character of the 
soil, or perhaps the absence of sufficient water, . render those efforts 
melancholy rather than successful [ ... J T~e characteristic mountains of 
43 Again, there is something of a supplementary logic in how the Islands are bound to one another 
and bound to the landmasses of Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
44 See the introduction. 
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eviscerated tins, kerosene cases, and innumerable empty bottles which 
betoken a thirsty land, have been removed and cast into the sea 
(Haddon, 1901, pp. 1-2). 
The implied juxtaposition here is not between two socio-economic systems, two 
sets of histories or two cultures, but between one of these sets and nature. The sea 
is filled with detritus, corrugated iron 'broils' under the tropical sun and the land is 
posed as being corrupted to the extent that the very soil is no longer capable of 
supporting life. This is an affront to his aesthetic sensibilities (cf. Geertz, 1988b, p. 
40), a stance which conveniently masks the fact that he is an integral part of that 
very system and process. However, once the motif of rupture is established, this 
passage, and the ensuing descriptions of colonial types on Thursday Island, 
become a prelude to the 'journey into the interior'45; a spatial readjustment is 
required (from 'Thursday Island to Murray Island'). This is another classic motif in 
anthropological writings. Otherness is posed as a series of concentric rings and one 
must press on inwards to gradually peel away the European influences (cf. 
Bracken, 1997, p. 9). Therefore, the colonial context is invoked less as an integral 
part of the analysis and more as a means of heightening the sense of urgency for 
collection, a point which Haddon had been stressing since his first visit in 1888: 
I found, even then, that the opportunities of learning about the pagan 
past of the natives were limited, and that it would become increasingly 
more difficult, as the younger men knew comparatively little of the 
former customs and beliefs, and the old men were dying off (Haddon, 
1901, p. vii). 
Each new visit - even if punctuated by a ten year gap - positions the subjects of 
eth-riography as simultaneously lost and 'on the brink'. This is a well established 
45 This is not a literal interior in this case. His destination, 'Murray Island' or 'Mer', is on the 
eastern fringes ofthe Torres Strait (see fig. 4). 
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scene-setting narrative device, and in so doing it implicitly situates the microscopic 
world of ethnography within the macroscopic world of global, political-economic 
systems. As George Marcus (1986, p. 165, fn. 1) argues, there have historically 
been two main ways of doing so: the redemptive mode of ethnography and the 
salvage mode. In the former, the ethnographer 'demonstrates the survival of 
distinctive and authentic cultural systems despite undeniable changes' (Marcus, 
1986, p. 165, fn. 1). In the latter, the ethnographer 'portrays himself as "before the 
deluge," so to speak. Signs of fundamental change are apparent, but the 
ethnographer is able to salvage a cultural state on the verge of transformation' 
(Marcus, 1986, p. 165, fn. 1). Haddon often switches erratically between the two 
modes, but it is in the metaphorical spatial shift between periphery and centre that 
he hopes to be able to stress the primacy of the latter over the former46; to ward off 
an immanent death in favour of an imminent one, and one way to begin to do so is 
to re-frame the Islands historically, geographically and racially. 
Discursive Frames 
Indeed, if the first chapter of Head-Hunters implicitly places the Islands within a 
contemporary world system, then the second chapter begins by historicizing that -
system. However, history is presented here as the outside, as the Islands' other: the 
point where they break through the surface of European cartography and history. 
'Our' time is not 'their' time (cf. Fabian;' 2002). This is done merely to' situate the 
Islands within a range of external disciplinary or disc'ursive frames: geography, 
46 As mentioned before, this is not a literal or geographical centre, but rather a conceptual or 
cultural centre where he spent more of his time than anywhere else (Mer or Murray Island), and 
this is on the eastern fringes ofthe Island group (see fig. 4). 
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natural history, biology, anthropology, etc. These frames act as prostheses to a 
landscape which cannot otherwise 'speak' to him, and their ordering is significant. 
The Islands are briefly placed within a European historical frame and then emptied 
and re-situated within a timeless, primal, geographical and climatic emptiness. 
Rather than the corrupt nature of chapter one, nature is here the allegorical 
bedrock to biological life and culture. This is an allegory of origins, reconstructing 
an empty, natural or primal landscape that is then peopled by biological beings, or 
racial 'types', who, in turn, create culture (the 'natural foundations of society', 
Geertz, 1988b, p. 38). In other words, the Islands are posed as a backdrop for the 
playing out of European history, an empty landscape rendered meaningful via the 
discourse of geography, a natural landscape of flora and fauna and biologically 
rendered humans, and only then a peopled, cultural landscape. Such a manoeuvre, 
whilst at several removes from the brute force of colonial e~pansionism, arguably 
inhabits the same rhetorical and conceptual space, wherein Indigenous modes of 
emplacement are wiped clean. 
'Indeed, it is worth reminding ourselves that land (whether we it read as 'place', 
'space', 'property' or a combination of all these things at different times) is not a 
simple given, despite its brute materiality. It has to be made or constructed as 
meaningful through a complex range of discourses and practices, such as mapping, 
exploration, law and settlement for example, and this can obviously lead different 
structures of meaning to come into conflict. In the case of Australia. - and to a 
lesser extent, the Torres Strait Islands - a combination of ignorance and hubris led 
colo-nial cartographers, geographers and explorers to wipe clean the 'New World' 
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of Indigenous modes of emplacement, or making place47 - of Indigenous 
cartography, geography and property, for example (and anyone even vaguely 
versed in Australian Aboriginal art will know how complexly these modes of 
emplacement are figured48). In other words, they wiped clean the meaningful 
inhabitation of the land, the p~enomenology of land if you will, leaving nothing but 
empty space, returning it to a certain brute materiality, a blank slate to be filled 
with colonial modes of cartography, geography and private property under the 
law.49 
In other words, one mode of emplacement became replaced by another - under the 
guise of filling an emptiness - and never was the truistic relationship between 
knowledge and power more apt. Indeed, knowledge is often at its most 
epistemologically, psychologically and politically powerful ~hen it is constructed 
as a site of desire, a site of emptiness to be filled, when one knows (the parameters 
of) what one does not know. This is almost literalized in the case of Australia, or, as 
it was known in the seventeenth century, terra australis incognita, the 'unknown 
land of the south', or later, 'New Holland' as Dutch imperialism reached its height. 
This is the first step in rendering the unknown knowable. However, in this case, 
mapping this unknown land, beginning to fill the spaces, beginning to render the 
knowable known, bringing it under the conceptual grip of knowledge,' merely 
brought it one step closer to being materially appropriated as property. Indeed, 
47 The name itself, 'New World', implies this very cleansing process, as does the fact that the New 
World came to be largely named after the Old Word (e.g. New South Wales, and so on). This is an 
attempt to blindly read these worlds as blank canvases upon which to recreate the 'Old' World. 
48 I use the category of 'art' advisedly. Much of what has been considered narrowly under the 
. category of 'art' is just as much about mapping, geography and cosmology, for example. 
49 This notion of Australia as a vast and sometimes threatening emptiness - a desert or wilderness 
- is a trope often either uncritically repeated or critically negotiated in a wide range of 
Australian films and literature (cf. Walkabout, Mad Max, Rabbit-Proof Fence, Japanese Story, Ten 
Canoes, The White Earth, etc.). 
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this might be read as a form of ex-propriation, as what was posed as the rightful 
imposition of property into a propertyless society is more accurately the 
obliteration of one mode of property ownership by another. 
A considerable amount of c<?nceptual labour has to be conducted for such a 
manoeuvre to be enacted and to appear both rational and just, and in Australia the 
concept of terra nullius (or 'empty land') played a key role in doing just this, in 
emptying out the land, nullifying it in a sense, readying it to be legally and morally 
converted into private property. Such a concept is rarely explicitly evoked in 
colonial writings, acting more as a background assumption, what goes without 
saying, which makes it all the more difficult to rout out and challenge. Indeed, the 
Torres Strait Islands were never explicitly colonized on this basis, but the 
annexation of the Islands in 1877, whilst Australia was still considered a British 
colony, means that the effects of such a system were imported into the Islands at 
one remove, and this suggests that Haddon's move to read the Islands through 
comparable frames was both meaningful and explicable. 
In this light, it is significant that Haddon's first-person narrative voice is excised 
from the book at this point and the temporal register shifts from the present (a 
narrative of discontinuous events) to the past (at both historical and geographical 
registers). This is an important fold in the book between the authenticating first-
person narrative of specific events in "the first chapter and the transcendental 
viewpoint of the second. Indeed, one could easily have written the second chapter 
having never visited the Islands, but the reade'r is positioned to lend the chapter's 
descriptions greater credence because they are anchored by the first. 
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Therefore, it is significant that it is here that we are first introduced to Haddon's 
biological 'natives' and their photographic types, foisted upon an empty landscape, 
outside of history and without culture. Indeed, we go from barographic readings 
and climatic conditions to race.theory in one paragraph; the foundations are set: 
Like the other natives of Torres Straits, the Murray Islanders belong to 
the Melanesian race, the dark-skinned people of the West Pacific who 
are characterised by their black frizzly or woolly hair. They are a 
decidedly narrow-headed people. The colour of the skin is dark 
chocolate, often burning to almost black in the exposed portions. The 
accompanying illustrations give a far better impression of the 
appearance and expression of the people than can be conveyed by any 
verbal description (Haddon, 1901, p. 18, emphasis added). 
There are two key points to stress here. The first is that this description precisely 
represents the first plank of what Tzvetan Todorov (2006, p. 213, emphasis in 
original) refers to as 'racialist propositions [ ... ], [t]he existence of races': 
The first thesis obviously consists in affirming that there are such 
things as races, that is, human groupings whose members possess 
physical characteristics; or rather (for the differences themselves are 
self-evident) it consists in affirming the relevance and significance of 
that notion (2006, p. 213). 
This is significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, because - as we shall consider 
in a moment - the ensuing passages follow Todorov's other racialist propositions 
ahp.ost exactly (albeit with two meaningful exceptions), and, secondly, because 
such differences are manifest as visual, surface phenomena, which- therefore 
ac:.?rd well with the positivist and visual agen?a of the project. Indeed, it is within 
this latter point that we encounter one of the most important folds in the book 
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(which is our second point to stress): the 'self-evidence' and specificity of racial 
difference cannot be made manifest via the written commentary. The commentary 
here meets its visual limit point, acknowledges its lacunae and requires 
supplementation by a diptych of type photographs (see fig. 5 below), which 
Haddon refers to rather coyly as 'accompanying illustrations'.' This question of 
supplementarity is important. As I set out in the introduction, it is the mode with 
which Haddon's media most often interact with one another. Just as in Derrida's 
reading of Rousseau, for example (1997, pp. 141-164), writing might 
simultaneously add to a supposed plenitude (e.g. speech) and make up for its 
deficiencies (e.g. external storage) in such a way that both are radically altered, so 
too Haddon's photographs in this context add to the supposed plenitude of his 
writingsSO whilst also highlighting their visual and indexical deficiencies. The play 
between plenitude and lack remains unresolved. Racial diff.erence might be 'self-
evident', but such self-evidence must be more than demonstrated; it must be made 
manifest, traced like a footstep in the sand or the contours of a death mask. In this 
sense, the frontal and profile poses of these photographs are significant in that 
they are an attempt to add dimensionality, to push beyond the limited flatness of 
the photographic plate and to touch the contours of the human face. Such 
photographs are not merely peeled off the face, they are wrapped around it like a 
shroud.S1 
50 These photographs and the reference to them were removed from the abridged version of the 
book (Haddon, 1932). . 
51 As an aside, it may be interesting to note the embossed Leeds Public Libraries stamp at the 
bottom of the following image (fig. 5), taken from a first edition of Head-Hunters still available 
from Leeds Public Libraries (it is also present at the top of figs. 10 and 13). Although not directly 
tied to the analysis which follows, this is a small material trace of what I am calling the 'writing-
machine'. Amongst other things, it is a literal index of the complex bonds between, for example, 
ink, paper, glass plates, printing technologies, cameras, etc. and the networks of distribution and 
reception between, in this case, Cambridge and Leeds. 
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Figure 5, 'Ari, The Mamoose52 of Mer; Pasi, The Mamoose of Dauar', Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, 
Plate I., A. and 8., facing p. 18) 
The first rhetorical manoeuvre of these photographs - in this context at least - is to 
replicate the process of emptying out which began the chapter, extracting 
biological bodies from their cultural milieus. As Eleanor Hight and Gary Sampson 
point out in their volume on Colonialist Photography: 
[T]he native body has been repeatedly partitioned from its own culture, 
history, and geography as it is inscribed with typifying marks of 
difference in photographs (2004, p. 10). 
This is the classic motif of the type photograph, where race is centred not merely in 
the body, but on the (sur)face as the visible seat of difference. Such a motif can be 
traced back to looser and more transitional manifestations in earlier periods of 
Haddon's career. After his 1888 trip to the Torres Strait, and frustrated by his 
inability to acquire funding for a return visit, Haddon set about organizing an 
S2 The 'Mamoose' is a community leader, 'chief and/or intermediary between the local population 
and the colonial officials. 
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anthropological survey of Ireland, where he had been living and working on and 
off since the early 1880s (Griffiths, 2002, p. 129). Such a project would include 
ethnography, folklore and physical anthropology, an integral part of which was the 
use of photography. Indeed, in many ways, Haddon's time in Ireland - rather than 
his earlier expedition to the ~orres Strait in 1888 - represents 'a key shift in his 
work towards a more racialist approach to the subject. Although interested in the 
whole of Ireland, it is significant that Haddon would choose the western islands of 
Aran as his main anthropological focus in the early 1890s (e.g. Haddon, 1893; 
Haddon and Browne, 1893). This was for two main reasons. Firstly, because 
anthropology's microscopic focus has always lent itself to seemingly discrete units 
of study, islands often became the location of choice, thereby creating a fantasy of 
boundedness and fixity (cf. Kuklick, 1996). Secondly, and most significantly, 
Haddon became convinced that the inhabitants of the Aran .. Islands represented a 
distinct racial branch, or set of branches. Indeed, this work was undertaken as part 
of a larger project with a view to 'unravel[ing] the tangled skein of the so-called 
Irish "race'" (Cunningham and Haddon, 1892, p. 36). 
It was in Ireland that Haddon began to experiment with the kinds of racial profiling 
that would later come to fruition in his second expedition to the Torres Strait 
Islands, and it is here that he would deploy a looser, transitional version of the type 
photograph which included the profile and frontal poses, 'but which did not 
actively attempt to extract its subjects from their cultural and historical contexts 
(see fig. 6 below). 
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Figure 6, 'Aran Islanders' (Haddon, 1893, p. 303) 
To that extent, they may be regarded as apprentice pieces for what was to come. 
However, a rigorous process of recontextualizing was nonetheless at work, and the 
~ame process of naturalizing that we have seen in Head-Hunters could be seen 
here, in this case by explicitly treating the study of the Aran Islanders as an 
extension of natural history: 
[T]here must be a large number of persons in Ireland who do not take 
any special interest in anyone group of animals or plants, and have no 
taste or opportunity for making collections, but who, nevertheless, 
would like to occupy their leis'ure with something that is both 
interesting and worth doing. To such I would commend the study of the 
Irish Man (Haddon, 1893, p. 303). 
Such is the all too familiar conceptual conflation of biology, animality and raciality: 
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the 'Irish Man' as a species of interest for the gentleman amateur (indeed, this 
article was published in The Irish Naturalist). Using the precise logic that he had 
used in the Torres Strait in 1888 and would use again in 1898, such a species was 
at risk: 
Owing to migration and emigration, the mingling of peoples has become 
more intimate, and the newspaper and the school-board have been 
potent in sweeping away local customs and in levelling up the less 
advanced folk. All we can now do is to record the little that remains of 
old-time custom and thought (Haddon, 1893, p. 303). 
All is not lost, however, as beneath the surface of the 'civilisation of the British 
Islands' there remain 'relics of the previous millenniums of savagery and 
barbarism' (Haddon, 1893, p. 304). Ireland - and, by extension, the Torres Strait 
Islands - would allow Britain a glimpse at its own past. The circle is complete; 
space is converted into time and the 'time of the other' is n·ot the time of the self 
(cf. Fabian, 2002). 
By the time he came to publish his more complete ethnography of the Aran Islands 
(Haddon and Browne, 1893), Haddon's methods and racialist logic had hardened 
or found fuller form. The ethnography came complete with extensive and detailed 
tables of anthropometric recordings which attempted to establish the Is!anders' 
relative positionings on.the so-called 'index of nigrescence', a notorious scale that 
had been developed by the influential race theorist John Bedoe, whose Races of 
Britain (1885) attempted to measure hair, eye and skin colour with· a view to 
es~~~~ishing measurable racial scales and distri.butions. 
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Both sets of photographs - each in different ways 
- are suffused with such a logic and attempt to 
feed the cultural and biological complexities of the body and face through a 
totalizing, racializing and temporalizing grid, just as was previously the case with 
the anthropological questionnaire. In both cases, alterity (excess, contingency, etc.) 
is being reduced to the same (uniformity, universality, etc.). Therefore, if the first 
rhetorical move of such photographs is to empty out context ~nd meaning, then the 
second move is to re-import new contexts and new meanings through the 
imposition of a conceptual grid (akin to the more literal grids of anthropometric 
photographs). In other words, Haddon floods an ostensible (biological) emptiness 
with (cultural) meaning (cf. Barthes, 2000a, p. 35). However, it might be more 
accurate to describe the process in reverse. Strictly speaking, Haddon does not 
import new meanings 'after the fact', allowing neutral, empirical data to be 
interpreted. Such impositions are the a priori condition of possibility for the 
meaningfulness of the images in the first place, and it is precisely for this reason 
that Haddon's photographs look so stilted, so 'mortiferous' in Barthes' phrase 
(2000a, p. 15). '[T]he image [ ... ] is heavy, motionless, stubborn [ ... ] Photography 
transformed subject into object, and even, one might say, into a museum object 
[ .. .]' (Barthes, 2000a, pp. 12-13). Those photographed sit between subject and 
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object like a spectre, and the photographer tries and fails to keep death at bay 
(Barthes, 2000a, p. 14): 
[H]owever "lifelike" we strive to make it (and this frenzy to be lifelike 
can only be our mythic denial of an apprehension of death), 
Photography is a kind of primitive theater, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a 
figuration of the motionless and made-up face beneath which we see 
the dead (Barthes, 2000a, pp. 31-32). 
Indeed, it is perhaps ironic that Haddon (1912) was the first to admonish the 
lifeless immobility of anthropological photographs in his contribution to the Notes 
and Queries guide on the use of anthropological photography. Here he argues that 
the containment and fixity of posed photographs should be accompanied by a 
more relaxed, naturalistic approach to photography (Haddon, 1912, p. 270). 
However, neither keeps the 'apprehension of death' at bay, and it is invariably the 
latter which takes precedence in 'type' photography. 
Such a process of containment and fixity also has a very concrete disciplinary 
corollary, as Martin Nakata makes clear: 
Islanders were not only inscribed into the textual world beyond them; 
Islanders' bodies were also regulated and disciplined by an array of 
bureaucratic, regulatory and discursive mechanisms associated with 
government, church and commercial interests which was premised on 
and circumscribed.by particular ways of thinking about 'natives' (2007, 
p.129). 
The truistic relationship between knowledge and power, whilst obviously never 
lin~_ar, causal or clear-cut, takes on a brutal ~oncreteness in this - and perhaps 
every -, case. However, this process is not so without residue and excess, and this 
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brings us back to the core tensions with which we have been concerned up to this 
point. The visible surface 'skin' of Haddon's type photographs has been peeled off 
entirely contingent events (multiple moments, multiple spaces, multiple bodies, 
multiple named individuals53). That is what we see; that is what is being indexed 
here. Indeed, this aspect of photographic contingency is precisely what enables 
photographs to be so easily repositioned, re-framed and re-read, as Christopher 
Pinney argues: 
The photographer can never fully control the resulting photograph, and 
it is that lack of control and the resulting excess that permits recoding, 
"resurfacing," and "looking past" (2003, pp. 6-7). 
This point is made extremely forcefully by observing 
the simple fact that the photograph of Pasi, for 
example (fig. 5, on the right) - one of Haddon's main 
informants and seemingly close friends - was 
literally and conceptually re-framed by Haddon for a 
personal photograph album of the journey (now in 
the Cambridge University Museum of Archaeology 
Figure 7, 'Sunny Memories' and Anthropology) entitled 'Sunny Memories' (see 
(Museum of Archaeology and 
Anthropology,20tOb) fig. 7 opposite). 
The photograph is cast into an oval frame - meaningfully re-inscribing the image 
as singular, contingent and personal - and set amidst a photographic collage of 
representative images from the expedition. Interestingly, this photograph - rather 
S3 Two of the men (Ari and Pasi) are named in the captions and the other two men (Thomas 
Colman Flaherty and John Michael O'Donnell) are named in the footnotes. This fact is rather 
unusual for type photographs, but highlights all the more starkly the discrepancy between 
specific and general registers. 
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than the one from Head-Hunters - was used in a recent exhibition at the Cambridge 
University Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology entitled 'Assembling Bodies' 
(Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2010a). The argument behind the 
inclusion was that the Torres Strait expedition marked a shift from anthropometric 
photography to portraiture (~useum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2010b). 
However, such an argument takes no account of the tension between this 'portrait' 
and the version in Head-Hunters, nor between both and the overtly racialist logic of 
the book. Indeed, what remains striking here is the extent to which this 
recontextualizing does nothing to soften the disconcerting intensity of Pasi's gaze. 
The fact that Haddon can switch between such contexts with apparent ease is 
precisely the problem, and it is this code-switching which also contributes to the 
conceptual tensions within his use of photography. This represents something of a 
fracture line in the photographs, a tiny chink of light streami~g through a totalizing 
system, and we will have cause to lever open that space later in the chapter (cf. 
Edwards, 200t p. 132). 
However, such a multiplicity of meanings and contexts (the fact that the still 
photograph will not remain still) also opens it up to being used in ways which 
endorse totalizing systems. For example, the twentieth century Australian novelist, 
Ion L. Idriess, made liberal use of Haddon's photographs and illustrations in a 
series of novels set in or around the Torres Strait Islands (e.g. Drums of Mer, 1938; 
Isles of Despair, 1947 and The Wild White Man of Badu, 1950). In Drums of Mer (a 
breathless colonial fantasy of exotica, violence and a white man's attempts to 
become culturally incorporated on the Islan'd of Mer), fiction and non-fiction, 
specific and general are welded together in rather uneasy ways, with photography 
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playing a key part in this process. 
Idriess buries the novel in the literary architecture of a non-fiction book: maps, 
illustrations, a professional foreword (from a 'Mission Priest' on the Strait) and an 
'Author's Note' in which he attempts to lever the scientific legitimacy of Haddon's 
Reports - and the 'historical fact[ s]' upon which the story is based - into his 
fictional world of exotic colonial stereotypes (Idriess, 1938, pp. ix-xiii). Indeed, 
there are even sections of the book where Idriess quotes Haddon verbatim in the 
middle of the narrative. Once established as an ideologically legitimating strategy, 
Idriess has no problem importing photographs from entirely different contexts 
(e.g. from Haddon's Reports) directly into the novel. 
Indeed, the tensions which mark Haddon's 
use of these photographs (e.g. that 
between specific and general, named 
informant and type) come quite forcefully 
to the surface of the book here. For 
example, towards the end of the novel, in a 
chapter titled 'The Virgins of Waiat' 
(Idriess, 1938, pp. 329-345), we find 
another portrait of Pasi along with two 
other Islander men (see fig. 8 opposite). 
Figure 8, 'Three Head Men of Mer' (Idriess, 
1938, facing p. 334) This time the photograph is coded less as a 
'type' photograph and more as a cultural illustration of 'traditional' Indigenous 
head-dresses and adornments. However, what makes the use of this image so 
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peculiar in this context is that text and image appear to exist in an almost entirely 
parallel relationship: they simply hang together, as if in mid-air, without any 
mutual reference. The only purpose of the image appears to be to root the novel's 
fantastical narrative in a non-fictional context. The other peculiarity of its use in 
this context is that our gaze. is constantly drawn back and forth, to and fro, 
between representations (of named individuals - remarkably Idriess actually 
leaves a variation of the original caption in place, which names Pasi ['Passi'] and 
now has almost no specific meaning in the context of the narrative of the novel) 
and typifications (of ethnicity or race). 
Such a shift of focus is particularly problematic in this context, because what in 
Haddon's hands might be a shift between named individual and anonymous, 
racialist type, in Idriess' hands becomes a shift between named individual and 
racist, colonial stereotype. The difference between the two might be regarded as 
inconsequential, of course, but the conceptual apparatus being deployed is 
different in each case. For Idriess, the tension between specific and general - and 
the contingency which precipitates it - is an aesthetic opportunity for exploitative 
self-justification. For Haddon, it is a scientific threat to the photographs' ambitions 
to transcend themselves: the point for him is precisely not to represent, but to use 
such representations to typify. 
Visible (Sur)face, Invisible Depth 
, 
Returning to Haddon's type photographs in Head-Hunters, we see that such a 
threat of contingency is mitigated by an attempt to erase everything that would 
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situate the photographs in a specific place or time. These photographs admittedly 
remain ambivalent in this regard in that the subjects are still wearing their own 
clothing, but the tight focus on the body and face and the blank background render 
these photographs culturally and historically indistinct. It is the (sur)face which 
acts as these photographs' ce~tre of gravity, a point which enables Haddon (1901, 
p. 18) to say of his informants and friends, now transformed into anonymous, 
biological types: 'the features are somewhat coarse, but by no means bestial'. This 
is a implicit reference to an earlier book by Haddon (The Study of Man, 1898a, p. 
79), where 'coarse' and 'fine' form an implied ladder of 'development', and this 
replicates the allegorical development of the second chapter of Head-Hunters: from 
nature, to animal to a 'lower' level of humanity. 
In general terms then, the central aim remains clear: the vi~ible surface (indexing 
specific moments in time and specific individuals) is being used to scientifically 
authenticate an invisible depth (typifying a general racial or ethnic trait). This is 
very much a sleight of hand, and - as we shall consider in a moment - Haddon will 
.. 
'do the same thing in the ensuing passages. This is an ideological conjurer's trick 
that we must remain on our guard for. What it occults is the uneasy relationship 
between surface and depth, visible and invisible, specific and general, etc., and this 
means that the anthropological tensions that we have set up thus far are becoming 
extended further. 
Such a relationship between surface and depth, visible and invisible, etc. is 
obViously not unique to Haddon, and, indeed, 'an attempt was made to render the 
invisible visible by Haddon's colleague and mentor, Francis Galton (1822-1911). 
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Galton is well-known as Darwin's cousin and one of the forerunners of the 
eugenics movement, but he also set up an anthropometric laboratory in London in 
order to measure and compare racial/ethnic 'types'. Haddon himself attempted to 
set up a similar anthropometric laboratory in Dublin, where, as I mentioned 
earlier, he had endeavoured to 'unravel the tangled skein of the so-called Irish 
"race"', albeit with limited success (Cunningham and Haddon, 1892, p. 36). Galton's 
response to the relationship between surface and depth, visible and invisible, 
specific and general, etc. was to produce a series of composite photographs, where 
several specific photographs of characteristic 'racial types' would be superimposed 
upon one another producing a blurred, ghostly composite designed to collapse the 
space between specific and general and to reach at the essentials of racial 
difference (see fig. 9 below). 
Figure 9, Francis Galton, 'The Jewish Type' circa 1885 (from Maguire, 2009, p. 11) . 
Importantly for us, however, Haddon's response to such invisible depths of the 
photograph is not to produce a composite photograph but to retreat back into the 
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written commentary. In other words, what we are starting to see here is a loop of 
supplementarity. Phonetic writing supplemented by photographs, photographs by 
phonetic writing, and so on. In each case, the medium is posed as simultaneously 
complete and lacking, wherein another medium enters the fray, and so on; there is 
no end point and each mediu!ll is radically altered in the process. In this context, 
we discover another important fold in the book, replicating the sleight of hand 
practiced by the photographs (Le. where an indexical visible surface authenticates 
and conjures an invisible depth), and it is here where we reach Todorov's second 
racialist proposition (2006, p. 214, emphasis in original), 'Continuity between 
physical type and character': 
The racialist postulates, in the second place, that physical and moral 
characteristics are interdependent; in other words, the segmentation of 
the world along racial lines has as its corollary an equally definitive 
segmentation along cultural lines (2006, p. 214). .. 
This is precisely the invisible depth that Haddon is unable to visualize on the 
surface, but which he nonetheless attempts to smuggle in under the umbrella of 
'. indexical visuality. To this extent, Haddon's type photographs can be mapped onto 
Bhabha's discussion of the colonial stereotype. For Bhabha (1994, p. 6), the 
colonial stereotype is caught in an ambivalent tension between self-evidence 
(where it is obvious and does not need to established) and anxious r"epetition 
(where such so-called 'self-evidence' is anything but, and requires constant re-
affirmation): 
, For it is the force of ambivalence that gives the colonial stereotype its 
currency: ensures it repeatability in changing historical and discursive 
conjunctures; informs its strategies of individuation and 
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marginalization; produces that effect of' probabilistic truth and 
predictability which, for the stereotype, must always be in excess of 
what can be empirically proved or logically construed (1994, p. 66, 
emphasis in original). 
The reference to excess is crucial in this context, because it is precisely such excess 
which leads Haddon to shift registers between the photograph and the written 
commentary in a bid to conceal the rift between what can be shown (Le. peeled off 
a visible surface) and what can be proved (Le. the invisible and unprovable depths 
of 'racial' characteristics). Such a move is one of occultation, and it enables our 
allegorical ladder of development (European history, nature, biology, etc.) to 
finally reach culture qua psychology and morality: 
Their mental and moral character will be incidentally illustrated in the 
following pages, and considering the isolation and favourable 
conditions of existence with the consequent lack of example and 
stimulus to exertion, we must admit that they have proved themselves 
to be very creditable specimens of savage humanity (Haddon, 1901, pp. 
18-19). 
Now that we have moved under the indexical surface, we have to remain satisfied 
'with written 'illustrations' of 'mental and moral character', illustrations which are 
nonetheless concealed under the authenticating cover of the type photographs. 
Indeed, such a sleight of hand not only covers over the manoeuvre by which the 
visible can conjure the invisible, but by which the individual can conjure the type, 
~ 
and this is Todorov's third racialist proposition (2006, p. 215, emphasis in 
original), 'The action of the group on .the individual [ ... ] [T]he behaviour of the 
individual depends to a very large extent, on the racio-cultural (or 'ethnic') group 
to-which he or she belongs'. This is the crux df Haddon's use of photography. Just 
as a photograph is pliable enough to conjure photography, so too is the individual 
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pliable enough to typify a 'race'. 
However, the meaning of that racial difference has yet to be established. For 
Todorov (2006, p. 215), this meaning is clear: 'The racialist is not content to assert 
that races differ: he also beli.eves that some are superior to others'. This is his 
fourth racialist proposition, 'Unique hierarchy of values' (Todorov, 2006, p. 215, 
emphasis in original). This is significantly the point at which Haddon's logic begins 
to waver, which opens up an unresolved rift in his work and in Victorian 
anthropology more generally, between the difference posited by race theory and 
the identity posited by the so-called 'psychic unity of mankind'. The former claims 
multiple human lineages wherein differences are rooted in biology. The latter, 
attributed to the nineteenth century German anthropologist, Adolf Bastian (1826-
1905), claims one human lineage wherein differences stem from different 
environmental stimuli, and this is precisely the logic that Haddon follows in the 
ensuing passages. However, to do this he must remove the racial logic from the 
final link in the chain: racial existence, mental and moral character, group 
~behaviour and stereotypically detrimental character traits (such as avarice, 
laziness or ingratitude): 
The natives certainly do not like to be made to work [ ... ] but after ·all, 
this is pretty much the same with everybody. Nature deals so bountifully 
with the people that circumstances have not forced them into the 
discipline of work [ ... ]. 
As to ingratitude. They take all they can get and, it is true, rarely appear 
as grateful as the white man expects; but this is by no means confined to 
these people. How often do we find exactly the same trait amongst our 
" . '[ ] , own acquamtances. .. .. 
[I]t is not. beyond the savage mind for the argument thus to present 
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itself. I did not ask the white man to come here. I don't particularly want 
him. I certainly don't want him to interfere with my customs. He comes 
here to please himself. If he gives me medicines and presents that is his 
look-out, that is his fashion. I will take all I can get. I will give as little as 
I can. If he goes away I don't care (Haddon, 1901, p. 19, emphasis 
added). 
Either through disingenuousn~ss or naivety, Haddon wavers at the final point: the 
occluded slide between racialism and racism, a distinction arguably of greater 
historical than conceptual significance. This is Todorov's final racialist proposition, 
'Knowledge-based politics', 'where racialism rejoins racism: the theory is put into 
practice' (2006, p. 215). Indeed, in his discussion of laziness, avarice and 
ingratitude - obviously informed by discussions with colonialists on the Islandss4 -
Haddon appears acutely aware of the fact that precisely such a shift is being made 
on a daily basis. However, he appears blind to the relationship between his 
racialism and their racism. Instead, he falls back on a rather thin blend of 
humanism, relativism and reformism: these negative traits can be observed but 
attributed to environmental and cultural factors - up to and including mild anti-
imperial sentiment - rather than racial typologies. The thrust of this is an appeal to 
'the 'psychic unity' doctrine. 'We', Haddon repeatedly reminds us, would behave the 
same way under the same circumstances. 
This blend of humanism, relativism and reformism explains much of Haddon's 
world-view of imperialism, whilst simultaneously exposing the acute tensions 
between humanism and racialism that would later take root in his work. Like other 
ideological justifications for imperialism, such as scientific racialism and the 
54 Prior to his return trip to the Torres Strait Islands, Haddon (1993 [1891], p. 8) writes that '[i]t is 
hardly possible for those who have not visited the Colonies to realize how very deep, bitter & 
undisguised this contempt is'. 
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'civilizing mission', such a blend is intimately· bound to post-Enlightenment 
histories of humanism and in practice often overlaps with them (cf. Young, 1990, 
partic. ch. 7). However, in principle, it conflicts with racialism by adhering to the 
'psychic unity' doctrine (one human line, not many), and from the 'civilizing 
mission' in resisting calls to expedite the 'evolution' of subject populations through 
education, missionization and 'civilization', etc. Indeed, as we have considered with 
Haddon's evocation of loss, this blend often wears the superficial mask of an anti-
imperial critique, challenging the destructive violence and cultural coercion of 
imperial policies and practices. In his most outspoken document on the subject, an 
unpublished plea to the newly formed Imperial Institute for an Imperial Bureau of 
Ethnology (circa 1891), Haddon (cited in Stocking, 1993, pp. 3-4, 8) imagines the 
map of the globe being spattered with the 'red-paint of British aggression' and 
castigates aspects of imperial policy and practice as often being little more than 
'legalised murder': 
The result of this policy is that we exterminate slowly or rapidly, 
unintentionally or by force, the inhabitants of the countries we annex. 
The story of our Colonial administration is sad & humiliating. If an 
impartial foreigner were to write the true history of our dependencies, 
he would be branded as inaccurate & prejudiced. The blame lies alike 
with the general public, the legislators & the executive. Ignorance 
engenders callousness, which is the fertile mother of injustice, cruelty, 
& legalised murder (Haddon cited in Stocking, 1993, p. 8). 
However, crucially for Haddon and despite appearances, such flaming rhetoric is 
actually in the name of a reformed,,, humanitarian imperialism of. benign and 
paternalistic ascendancy and not in the name of an anti-imperialist critique. In the 
same document, Haddon (cited in Stocking, 1993, pp. 13, 8) - clearly pushing for 
anthropological funding from the Imperial Institute - explicitly refers to such 
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reformism as reducing the 'cost of maintaining our ascendency' [ ... ] 'The more we 
know about a people, the easier it will be to trade with them'., This humanist 
reformism is, therefore, all the more difficult to rout out because its justification 
and support of imperialism is not explicitly based on racism or forced 'civilization', 
but rests, rather, on humanistic 'sciences of the human', such as the newly 
professional discipline of anthropology. Indeed, whilst scientific rac(ial)ism and 
the 'civilizing mission' might be regarded as having withered away for the most 
part today, contemporary humanistic and/or humanitarian engagements with the 
history of imperialism, and its neo-imperialist counterparts, often continue to 
insist that imperialism remains at heart a corrupted idea rather than an inherently 
iniquitous one. 
However, Haddon appears unaware, at this point at least, of the extent to which 
such a tension between liberal humanism and racialism pulls radically at the seam 
of his project and racial logic. He would, nonetheless, come to realize this in his 
later work - particularly with the the rise of Nazi raciology (e.g. Haddon and 
~ Huxley, 1936) - and the Torres Strait expedition can, to some extent at least, be 
regarded as the beginning of the end of race theory in both his work and in British 
social anthropology in general. In the tension between race theory and 'psychic 
unity', the latter would very much come to hold sway. 
III. Colonial Mimicry 
" 
If I have been attempting thus far to create a space within totalizing systems in 
, , 
order· to make room for their conceptual undoing, then the photographs that we 
103 
have been looking at can be usefully juxtaposed' against a series of later 'type' 
photographs which appear towards the end of Head-Hunters (ch. XVI: 'Port 
Moresby and the Astrolabe Range'). These photographs (see fig. 10 below) afford a 
greater opportunity to expose fracture lines within totalizing systems, in no small 
part because they are posed as an explicit failure of such systems, albeit read 
through the frame of colonial farce. This is a common trope in colonial travel 
writing, and read through such a frame, failure is figured as a source of amusement 
in the face of the 'native's' truculence or lack of understanding. Such a figure is 
complicated in this case by the fact that the source of the amusement is an act of 
colonial mimicry, with all the complex ambivalence that inheres (Bhabha, 1994, ch. 
4). Nevertheless, whilst there is little doubt about the basis of the inclusion of such 
material, such a decision also renders Head-Hunters a far more resonant source for 
our purposes than Haddon's scientific Reports, where such gaps, discontinuities 
and methodological failures were more likely to be expelled or concealed.55 
55 One of the most astute readers of the Reports from the perspective of its gaps, discontinuities 
and failures is the Sydney based academic Martin Nakata, himself a Torres Strait Islander. In 
Disciplining the Savages, Savaging the Disciplines (2007), Nakata reads Haddon's Reports through 
a broadly Foucauldian frame, patiently working through the texts and exposing their circular 
arguments, non-sequiturs and blind alleys. 
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Figure 10, 'Gewe, Chief of Agi, when deprived of his hat; Gewe, with his hat restored to him', Head-
Hunters (Haddon, 1901, Plate XIX., A. and B., facing p. 245) 
Figure 11, 'British New Guinea', Head-
Hunters (Haddon, 1901, p. 237) 
Given Haddon's interest in the 'vertical' 
cultural flows between Australia, the 
Torres Strait and Papua New Guinea, it is 
significant that these photographs were 
taken along the coas t of what was then 
British New Guinea (now Papua N w 
Guinea; see fig. 11 opposite). 
Indeed, Haddon was not simply interested 
in cultural flows, but in establishing 'racial' 
flows and links from Melanesia to the 
Torres Strait. As before, photography 
played a vital role in this process, and this becomes more important than ever as 
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Haddon moves between the Torres Strait and Papua New Guinea attempting to 
plot racial similarities and differences. 
The chapter in which these photographs appear (ch. XVI: 'Port Moresby and the 
Astrolabe Range') begins with the type of colonial contextualization which began 
the first chapter on Thursday Island (ch. I: 'From Thursday Island to Murray 
Island'). The ubiquitous Government House and Mission Station, two of the most 
obvious signs of colonial power, are juxtaposed against an aestheticized nature: 
'[t]he double bay is surrounded by thinly wooded hills, and when these are 
brightened in places by the rising sun the effect is very beautiful' (Haddon, 1901, p. 
235). The tone is neither overtly mournful nor melancholic, but the presence of a 
powerful colonial infrastructure and influence (representing colonialism and 
Christianity) is clearly invoked, a point which will be of crucial significance to the 
photographs which follow. The third key institutional influence (after colonialism 
and Christianity) is capitalism and this is invoked through the trade networks of 
the 'Burns Philp's Trading Company', which will also feature in the story behind 
" the photographs: 'This great trading company has ramifications all over 
Queensland and British New Guinea, and Port Moresby is naturally an important 
centre for their trade' (Haddon, 1901, p. 235). We therefore encounter three forces 
then (colonialism, Christianity and capitalism), each of which will' have an 
-. 
important role to play, not least because they are the three forces which Haddon 
had for many years associated with, the decay and destruction o~ Indigenous 
culture (cf. introduction; Haddon, 1898a, p. xx). Nonetheless, Haddon (1901, p. 
236) has no difficulty in accepting the benefits of access and resources which he 
acquires through his relationship to such forces (in this case five horses borrowed 
106 
from 'the Government and the Vaigana Company' in order to trek through the 
Astrolabe range of mountains to access his subjects). 
It is significant for what follows that the focus of the chapter at this point is on 
narrative and events rather .than on scientific generalization and structure, not 
least because behind that focus is a clear and explicitly registered tension between 
the two. This is Haddon at his most specific and writerly - perhaps even painterly -
and we have a return here of the 'journey into the interior' motif: the trek through 
the mountains to heighten the sense of interiority and isolation of the destination 
(an aim that will only be met in part). Descriptions of nature, of which there are 
many, have the quality of poetic anecdote rather than science. This is an echo of 
the aestheticized nature of the beginning of the chapter: 
An occasional wallaby hopping in the grass and small flocks of white 
cockatoos that screeched as they flew, gave a further Australian colour 
to the scene [ ... ] After the coast hills had been passed we saw looming in 
front of us the precipitous Astrolabe Range, rising abruptly from hilly 
ground and forming a huge rampart stretching away to the south-east, 
occasional peaks rising higher than the general level of the fairly 
uniform edge (Haddon, 1901, p. 237). 
After a brief attempt to locate this landscape within a scientific rather than 
aesthetic frame, Haddon (1901, p. 240) goes on to. thematize the obvious 
discrepancy between narrative and science by informing us that 'a rapid horse-
ride through a wooded country is not favourable for geological observations'. This 
theme is continued in a more dramatic, painterly and discrepant vein a page later: 
A haze pervaded the lower landscape, owing to the vapour-laden south-
east breeze and the widely drifting smoke of numerous bush fires made 
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by natives who were clearing the scrub for their gardens. This haze 
gave a softness to the view, and painted the shades with various shades 
of blue, but a little less "atmosphere" would, on the whole, have been 
better from a topographical point of view (Haddon, 1901, p. 241, 
emphasis added). 
Each of the succeeding passages follows in like manner: poetic description 
followed by an attempt at geological or geographical generalization, but the overall 
effect is to heighten rather than smooth over the discrepancies. However, it is 
notably at this point, amidst these discrepancies, that Haddon attempts to lodge 
the Indigenous population within the chapter, and he does so whilst deploying one 
of the most virulent and long-standing of Victorian anthropological tropes: that of 
temporal distantiation, or what Johannes Fabian (2002, passim) refers to as 
'allochronic discourse'. More simply, the time of the ethnographer and the time of 
his or her subjects do not match. What had hitherto been a shared space and time 
becomes split into the present of the ethnographer (and the reader) and the 
'prehistoric' past which his subjects are now made to represent: 
It is characteristic of these bush tribes to build their villages on the top 
of hills for the sake of safety from attack. Many of the villages formerly 
had tree-houses, but there are now very few of these left, as the country 
has been pacified [ ... ] It might strike the reader that it would be very 
easy to chop down the tree and so destroy the refugees at one fell blow, 
but it must be remembered that these were designed by men still in 
their Stone Age, and it is by no means an easy or rapid matter to cut 
down a large tree with stone axes, especially when overhead foes· are 
hurling down stones and spears (Haddon, 1901, p. 242). 
Just as racialism uses surface differences to justify racist depths, so too allochronic 
discourse uses superficial differences (e.g. stone tools) to make larger claims about 
mental, moral and cultural development:. If contemporary Islanders and 
prehistoric Britons both use stone tools, then surely they must think and act in the 
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same way. However, this point requires some nuance in this context, as it will 
impact upon the reading of the photographs to come. Although Haddon was clearly 
an evolutionist in the biological science - he started out as a zoologist after all - he 
was not strictly speaking an evolutionist in the cultural sense. In other words, his 
avowed aim was not to use the Torres Strait data to establish evolutionary or 
developmental scales whereby two groups separated in time (e.g. nineteenth 
century Papua New Guinea and Stone Age Britain) could be compared on a scale of 
savagery, barbarism and civilization.56 His evolutionism was often more literally 
Darwinian (e.g. tracing evolutionary patterns in art production across a region, as 
Darwin traced the beaks of finches in the Galapagos Islands). Nevertheless, such an 
'allochronic' logic often works its way into his writings (cf. Edwards, 2000, pp. 113-
114; Haddon, 1901, p. 220), and when it does, it heightens the effect and makes us 
all the more critically aware in that it is for him a trope divorced from any 
meaningful theoretical project, a point which makes it all the more disjointed and 
incoherent. 
" At first glance, such 'Stone Age' people appear to bring Haddon far closer to his 
goal to locate the 'interior' and peel back the layers of European influence: 'It was 
interesting getting a glimpse, for it was nothing more, of a real Papuan village, 
entirely unchristianised and scarcely at all affected by European civilisation' 
(1901, p. 243). Here we have a switch between George Marcus's redemptive mode 
6f ethnography (1986, p. 165, fn. 1) - ,:where continuity is found through change -
and the salvage mode - where the ethnographer is positioned 'before the deluge'. 
Such an encounter, however brief, is immediately juxtaposed with a return to Port 
56 This was precisely the museological choice made by the Pitt Rivers Museum in Oxford, for 
example. 
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Moresby with all its hybrid complexity, a point which Haddon makes 
photographically by contrasting his mountain hosts - Udia and Daube (fig. 12 
below, top) - and a Port Moresby village with 'the London Missionary Society's 
Station in the background' (fig. 12 below, bottom). 
Indeed, it is precisely these kinds of tensions and juxtapositions which set up the 
'type' photographs that immediately follow. 
1'1.."11, ~1I11 
Back in Port Moresby, Haddon makes the 
acquaintance of Gewe, a 'chief of Agi, one of 
the inland Papuan villages. Haddon's 
1 '111 \ '''' 11 /' \ 111 '\I ,I" I! ~ I II \1:1 intermediary brings Gewe to Burn Philp's 
store - our core representative of capitalism 
and trade - where he is given 'some turkey-
red twill for a loin cloth, a belt, a cotton shirt, 
a secondhand guards-bandsman's tunic, and 
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an ancient top hat [in which] the old fellow 
strutted about mightily pleased with himself 
Figure 12, Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, 
Plate XVIII., B., facing p. 243) (Haddon, 1901, p. 245; see fig. 13 below). 
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Figure 13, 'Gewe, Chief of Agi, when deprived of his hat; Gewe, with his hat restored to him', Head-
Hunters (Haddon, 1901, Plate XIX., A. and B., facing p. 245) [this is a duplicate of fig. 10] 
Haddon then attempts to measure Gewe and take some type photographs, but with 
revealingly limited success. Consequently, Haddon's description of the events 
surrounding the production of these photographs warrants citation at some length, 
as it requires considerable conceptual unpacking and will contribute in no small 
way towards opening out the relationships between rationalization and it others. 
Ballantine brought the party round to the hotel, as I wanted to measure 
and photograph them. I began with Gewe, and it was ludicrous to see 
his expansive smile of self-content. First we took him as he was, then by 
dint of gentle persuasion we divested him of his regalia, and it was 
evident that parting from his hat was the sorest trial. It appeared to be 
quite hopeless to get a side view of his face, as he kept turning round to 
see what we were doing, till Ballantine suggested that I should show 
him some pictures; so I produced a coloured plate of Torres Straits 
dances which so fascinated him that he became comparatively still 
immediately. But even so we could not get a satisfactory side-face 
portrait of him. I then measured his height, span, and head, and it was 
with great relief and transparent joy that he resumed his hat. I did not 
take all the measurements I should have liked, as he became restive and 
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suddenly stalked off. I then measured a few other natives, who were 
duly photographed (Haddon, 1901, p. 245).57 
The first point to stress here is the complex relationships of colonial power 
between Ballantine - Haddon's colonial intermediary, power-broker and gate-
keeper - Haddon and Gewe (cf. Edwards, 2000, p. 118). The' opening sentence 
effectively marks an act of exchange between Ballantine (the 'energetic Treasurer 
and Collector of Customs') and Haddon (Haddon, 1901, p. x). Haddon's 
epistemological desire - to measure and photograph - is mapped onto Ballantine's 
colonial power to provide. Questions of permission or authority are simply not 
part of the equation. The biggest difficulty for Haddon is not how to acquire 
permission, but how to elicit sufficient understanding to achieve acquiescence. 
Such a lack of understanding, which in other parts of the book evokes a frustrated 
response, is here read through a thin veil of mocking humour. Gewe's self-
satisfaction is read as 'ludicrous' because of a misplaced belief in the magical 
power that his 'regalia' might bestow. Gewe is described as a 'chief or leader in his 
own community, and so the idea that he might transpose one set of power 
~ relations - and their associated insignia, particularly head-gear - onto another 
would not have been unusual. However, the choice of the word 'regalia' is not 
innocent and is intended to render ironic the type of official (ceremonial, royal, 
militaristic, class-based) status that 'a guards-bandsman's tunic, and an ancient top 
--
hat' might convey.58 Such are the fetishized insignia of colonial power - in this case 
cast-off commodities purchased at a colonial trading post - and they ~re here held 
up to its representatives like a broken and distorting mirror (cf. Bracken, 1997, pp. 
57 This is almost identical to the accompanying passage from Haddon's journal (1898b, p. 140) in 
Cambridge University Library. 
58 Haddon heightens this sense of irony by later getting Gewe to remove his hat when viewing a 
photograph of Queen Victoria (Haddon, 1901, p. 246). 
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8-9). 
Two of Homi Bhabha's processes (1994, chs. 3-4) are at work here: the so-called 
'self-evidence' and anxious repetition of a colonial stereotype (in this case, the 
colonial mimic) and the space between mimicry and mockery'wherein Europe's 
vision of itself through its others is both humorous and threatening, the former 
often concealing the effects of the latter. The first process is significant in this 
context because it marks a fold in the book between type and stereotype. The 
former fails in its aims and for two main reasons. Firstly, Gewe's refusal to remove 
his 'regalia' denies Haddon's attempt to extract the 'native body' from its cultural 
and historical context (which in this case is one of colonial hybridity). Indeed, 
Head-Hunters is littered with similar attempts by Haddon to literally peel away the 
layers of colonial influence. His failure to do so punctures Haddon's a priori 
assumption that there is somehow a pre-cultural body lurking behind the surface 
phenomena of culture. As a consequence, the photographs become resolutely tied 
to the contingencies of the event, to the specific time and place in which they were 
- produced and which they index, and Haddon's aims are thereby reduced from 
scientific generalization to anecdotal whimsy. In effect, Gewe holds the 
photographs in situ, and the process of typification fails. 
-. 
However, refusing to remove his 'regalia' is not the only way in which he achieves 
this. Gewe also holds the photographs in situ by resisting their stillness. It is 
significant that, although he will submit to a frontal portrait - where the gaze of 
photographer and photographed meet - he Will not submit to a profile view, where 
he will become an object to-be-Iooked-at but which does not see. In the absence of 
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a concrete photographic apparatus to enforce bodily discipline, he resists through 
motion, blurring the profile portraits taken of him. It then becomes doubly ironic 
that Haddon should not only show Gewe photographs to attempt to enforce the 
stillness of the photographed moment (by distracting his gaze), but photographs 
which are themselves attempts to still motion (Le. photographs of dance). 
Whatever Gewe's intentions, both manoeuvres - refusing to undress and refusing 
to sit still - effectively mean that the photographs cannot transcend themselves as 
racial types. However, it is precisely their failure as 'types' that opens a space for 
them to be read as a stereotype: the 'native' mimic man. Such a stereotype has a 
long and illustrious history which - in its various forms - marvels at the natives' 
capacity for mimicry and repetition, mocks their failed attempts to copy the 
colonialist and revels in their fascination with mimetic technologies (cf. Taussig, 
1993; Bracken, 1997, pp. 17-22). Not content with the photographs' status as 
indexes of a singular event, Haddon wants such representations to typify, and if 
they can't typify racially, then they will be made to typify culturally. 
This occurs in the process of narrative supplementation between written 
commentary and images. As with the first set of 'type' photographs, these 
photographs require narrative supplementation to become 'legible'. For the former 
~. 
photographs, the 'truth' or 'self-evidence' of race always exceeded its ability to be 
captured visually (cf. Bhabha, 1994, p .. 66). That is even more so with these latter 
photographs, and so rather than using a visible surface to conjure an invisible 
depth of racial types, a visible surface is being used to conjure forth a colonial 
stereotype. .. 
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The significance of such a move is that it is by shifting between failed racial type 
and colonial stereotype that Haddon once again lifts the photographs above the 
immediacy of their production, and this then becomes yet another means of 
attempting to fix the slidi~g position of the colonial subject. However, the 
stereotype is no less subject to ambiguity and rupture than the type. As Bhabha 
argues (1994, p. 66), the stereotype is an implicit acknowledgement of the 
ambivalent - or 'two-powered' - nature of colonial discourse. It is 'a form of 
knowledge that vacillates between what is always "in place," already known, and 
something that must be anxiously repeated', and such ambivalence suggests the 
weaknesses as well as the strengths of colonial discourse, its cracks as well as its . 
monumentality (Bhabha, 1994, p. 66). 
In this case, Haddon's 'anxious repetition' involves conjuring the most extreme 
form of juxtaposition that he can muster: 
In the afternoon I went to where the natives were camped and 
witnessed one of those extremes of culture that are rarely met with, 
even in frontier colonies. My friend Gewe, clad in his medley of 
nineteenth-century garments, was solemnly chipping a hole in a stone 
club-head with a piece of flint! Close by was another mountaineer clad 
in his native fringed belt and sporran, holding a cheap mirror before his 
face, and shaving himself with a fragment of a glass bottle (Haddon, 
1901, p. 245).59 -
There is an ocean of meaning in that exclamation mark. It evokes our previous 
" . 
discussion about 'allochronic' discourse. The stone tool and flint are obvious 
temporalizing gestures intended to place Gewe - Haddon's 'friend' - on a different 
I 
59 This is almost identical to the accompanying passage from Haddon's journal (1898b, pp. 139-
140) in Cambridge University Library. 
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temporal and developmental scale than himself. Such a gesture also attempts to 
anchor, fix and reinforce a particular cluster of photographic meanings wherein 
the complexities of colonial hybridity are read as tragedy and farce. The farce is 
that both Gewe and the other mountaineer are (almost literally) set up as pale 
reflections of European mod~rnity - deploying its very detritus: a cheap mirror, 
broken glass, an old top hap - and the tragedy is that, in so doing, they gesture 
towards their own destruction. 
However, another way of reading Haddon's scene of mimicry is to see it as a point 
of slippage between the strategies of colonial authorities and church leaders -
teaching English, reading the bible, providing European clothing, etc. - and the 
strategies of the Indigenous population. Mimicry had played a key role in Islander 
relations since at least 1871, when the London Missionary Society (LMS) stationed 
themselves on the Islands. The strategy for dealing with Islanders was less one of 
extermination and more one of colonial co-option, in no small part by controlling 
religious and secular education (Beckett, 1987, pp. 88-89). As with Lord 
Macaulay's early nineteenth century attempt to educate a stratum of Indian 
officials who were 'almost the same' as the English 'but not quite', or 'almost the 
same, but not white' (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 86-89, emphasis in original), the LMS 
wanted to bring the Islanders within the remit of 'European civilization' whilst 
making clear their inferiority. As Jeremy Beckett remarks: 
From the late nineteenth century, then, the Islanders were subjected to 
a steady barrage of indoctrination, the gist of which was that they were 
.. indebted to white people for the benefits of British rule, the Christian 
Gospel and the opportunity to earn the wherewithal for a 'civilized' way 
of life. At the same time, it was made clear to them that they were not 
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the equals of Europeans and could not expect to enjoy the same 
freedoms or material wellbeing [ ... ] Living and thinking with the ideas 
the Europeans gave them, the Islanders were coming to see themselves 
as reflections in a colonial mirror (1987, p. 90, 92). 
However, such an attempt to make the Islanders' almost the same' as Europeans 
(through mimicry) 'but not quite' is inherently fraught with internal tensions. As 
Bhabha argues (1994, pp. 86-89), colonial discourse is, of necessity, split between 
drawing the colonial other within the structures of Western knowledge (as 
versions of their colonial keepers) and keeping them outside those structures (as 
inferior, bizarre, eccentric objects). This is so because, although colonialism often 
perpetuates its power by getting colonial subjects to identify with and 'mimic' the 
subject positions of the colonisers, to do so totally successfully would puncture the 
ideological legitimacy of imperialism and the hierarchies upon which it is built. In a 
sense, the colonial subjects would become too like that which they were copying, 
two equal versions of the same thing rather than the hierarchical model of 
difference upon which imperialism depends. On that basis, imperialism would not 
be necessary as even by its own standards it had succeeded in its ideological aims 
.. (producing civilized subjects on a European model) and this would undermine the 
authority of the whole imperial enterprise. As Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and 
Helen Tiffin explain, this opens up a space between mimicry and mockery: 
The problem for colonial discourse is that it wants to produce 
compliant subjects who reproduce its assumptions, habits and values -
that is, 'mimic' the coloniser." But instead it produces am~ivalent 
subjects whose mimicry is never very far from mockery. Ambivalence 
describes the fluctuating relationship between mimicry and mockery, 
an ambivalence that is fundamentally unsettling to colonial dominance 
. (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1998, p. 1'3). 
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Therefore, what at first glance might be read as a straightforward act of complicity 
(e.g. copying the colonizer's behaviours, values, clothing, mannerisms, languages, 
etc.) might on closer inspection reveal the weaknesses of colonial authority as 
mimicry gives way to mockery, repetition to difference and farce to threat. 
Writing about the Aboriginal inhabitants of Victoria (BC), Canada, in the same 
period, Christopher Bracken explains the process and the logic behind it: 
They adopt a code of dress that signifies their proximity to Western 
civilization, yet by repeating that code they render it different from 
itself and distance it irretrievably from all things Western (Bracken, 
1997, p. 8). 
Bracken (1997, p. 17) argues that the 'offence' that this causes stems from the fact 
that their 'imitations actively destroy Europeanness by rendering it different from 
itself. This doubles the sense of loss: not merely the loss of an 'authentic', self-
present Indigeneity, but also the loss of an authentic and self-present Europe, and 
that is what cuts into its colonial authority. As Bhabha suggests (1994, p. 126), 
" '[t]he menace of mimicry is its double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence 
of colonial discourse also disrupts its authority'. Therefore, rather than affirming 
the power of mimicry for the establishment and maintenance of colonial discourse 
(like the LMS) or rejecting it outright (like Haddon), Bhabha wants to make the 
more subtle argument that colonial discourse is internally split, contradictory and 
only ever partially successful in its aims or goals. In this light, Haddo~'s attempt to 
fix Gewe by shifting between type and stereotype might be said to simultaneously 
open up another shifting space between mimicry and mockery. 
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The second (related) part of the stereotype shifts the focus to what Michael Taussig 
(1993, p. 198) refers to as 'the white man's fascination with their [colonial 
subjects'] fascination with these mimetically capacious machines [photography, 
cinematography, phonography, etc.]'. 
In the evening Ballantine gave his visitors a lantern show in the boat-
shed, interspersed with phonograph songs and tunes by Ray. I think 
they did not understand the latter, but the pictures were thoroughly 
appreciated by them. I sat on a box next to Gewe in order to watch him, 
and I had a great treat. He had his hat on, but the military tunic was 
absent. Most of the lantern-slides were local, and the natives recognised 
them immediately. One slide was of especial interest, as it was the 
photograph of a village that Gewe and others had subsequently sacked 
and burnt. One wonders what was passing in the mind of the warrior, as 
in front of him was the representation of the "before," and in his mind's 
eye he must have seen the "after" (Haddon, 1901, p. 246).60 
This performative dimension follows a familiar pattern across Head-Hunters, 
where magic lantern slideshows and phonograph perfO"rmances are regularly 
deployed as an entertainment and an opportunity for study (cf. Edwards, 1998). 
Indeed the realization that such technologies might in some sense 'pacify' the 
Indigenous population was· put to considerable use as a means of social 
observation and recording (as we saw with Haddon's attempts to photograph 
Gewe) (Edwards, 2000, p. 119). Of course, as with Taussig's observation, the 
fascination here is largely with their fascination with these technologies, and in 
both cases, the roots of such a fascination appear to lie in particular with their 
capacity for phonographic and photographic indexicality. Although Haddon often 
asked the Islanders and Papuans to draw for him - and often did so himself - he 
~Cl~ely displayed drawings, paintings, illustra~ions or any other form of inscription. 
60 This is almost identical to the accompanying passage from Haddon's journal (1898b, p. 141) in 
Cambridge University Library. 
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It was phonography and photography which really fascinated, and that fascination 
seemed to emerge from the bond between representation and referent, or, in 
particular, from considering whether the Islanders or Papuans would be able to 
conceptually prise them apart. What engages Haddon is not merely the peculiar or 
discrepant spectacle of Gewe in a top hat overflowing with excitement ('Gewe 
expressed wonder and admiration by a broad grin, glistening eyes, and by making 
various sucking and clicking noises with his lips' [Haddon, 1901, p. 24]), but with 
how such excitement suggests a relationship between the lantern-slides and the 
landscape. What is of particular interest is not merely the fact that the Papuans can 
recognize the landscape, a point which in itself does not determine whether a 
distinction has been made between representation and referent, but the fact that 
such a distinction is being forced upon Gewe through the temporal discrepancy 
between them. Just as Haddon's photographic oeuvre is caught up in the tension 
between visible surfaces and invisible depths, Haddon's ethnographic imagination 
is piqued by considering the relationship between observable social phenomena 
(e.g. Gewe's excitement in the face of the photographs) and unobservable 
.. psychological states (e.g. how Gewe might conceptualize the relationship between 
representation and referent, past and present). The implication in this scenario is 
that the distant past is represented by the photographic representation ('before'), 
the immediate past by Gewe's, memory ('after') and the present by the 
-
performative moment of the display ('now'). This temporal play between 
inscription, memory and display appears to be at the root of Haddon's fascination, 
and the implication is that Gewe will not be able to conceptualize the relationship 
between these registers. 
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Such a temporal play between inscription, memory and display is brought to the 
surface most forcefully elsewhere in Head-Hunters, in this case by explicitly 
thematizing the relationship between death and loss that is lodged within them: 
To their intense and hilarious delight I showed them some of the 
photographs I had taken during my last visit, not only of themselves, 
but also of other islands in the Straits. We had an immense time. The 
yells of delight, the laughter, clicking, flicking of the teeth, beaming faces 
and other expressions of joy as they beheld photographs of themselves 
or of friends would suddenly change to tears and wailing when they 
saw the portrait of someone since deceased (Haddon, 1901, pp. 9-10).61 
In this context of display - this 'now' - Haddon deliberately draws out the 
contingency at the heart of photographic indexicality, the fact that the photograph 
'reproduces to infinity' what 'has only happened once' (Barthes, 2000a, p. 4). In 
this case, the point is precisely to root these photographs in a particular point in 
space and time, and a point which is now long past (the Torres Strait Islands, 
1888). Such passing, and such poignancy of loss elicited by the adherent bond 
between representation and referent, is brought home most forcefully by 
confronting the now dead. This effect is heightened by the fact that many Torres 
Strait Islanders did and still do practice a prohibition on the representation of the 
dead. However, it is precisely the contingency of the this-has-been which 
contributes to the Islanders' enchantment with the photographed image in this 
context. These are nottype photographs or stereotypes, but photographs of known 
and named individuals and relatives taken at very specific times which are now 
past. This provides a powerful means of re-framing the images and flooding them 
~ith alternative meanings. 
61 This story is recounted in Haddon's journal ofthe expedition (1898b, pp. 63-64). 
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However, this is precisely the register that Haddon has been attempting to occlude 
or occult all along: the contingency at the heart of photographic indexicality, which 
not only roots such inscriptions in a particular place but, crucially, in a particular 
time. Indeed, both of the above examples draw out what has been lying dormant in 
the other 'type' photograph~ that I have been analysing throughout this chapter: 
the relationship between indexicality, contingency and temporality. In the 
temporal schema that I laid out earlier in the chapter (where Haddon's 
photographs are posed as being either 'too late', 'just in time' or 'out of time'), the 
photographs of a now despoiled village and a now deceased villager fall into the 
middle category. Haddon recorded them 'just in time', before they died or were 
destroyed. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it opens out the temporal 
relationship between representation and referent. If a referent has died or been 
destroyed and yet one can still see the representation, one can't help but see the 
difference between the two registers ('before' and 'after'), which is precisely why 
Haddon is so interested in the responses of the Islanders and Papuans ('now'). 
~ However, the second - and most important - point of significance about these 
images is that they undermine the process by which Haddon's 'just in time' 
photographs attempt to occlude their irreducible contingency. In order to erase the 
'eventness' of the event which they index, such photographs normally take a 
specific event and render it typical. A photograph of a specific individual at a 
specific time making a clay pot becomes a photograph of how clay po~s are made in 
general. Past becomes present and specific becomes general. This is the 
photographic version of what is more commonly known as the 'ethnographic 
present', the predominant post-Victorian model of ethnographic writing. However, 
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in the context of the photograph of the despoiled' village or deceased villager, and, 
crucially, in the more general context of recording a 'dying culture', the process of 
typification becomes fatally compromised. One can't argue that this is how this 
village is in general, or this is how pots are made in general, if both have been 
destroyed. Such destruction ,- imminent or immanent, assumed or actual - is the 
very reason for the production of the images in the first place and yet it serves to 
once again root such representations in a particular place and time, and it is this 
resistant strain of photographic contingency which keeps resurfacing to 
problematize, exceed or 'other' any attempt at controlled rationalization. 
This is no less the case when the photographs are posed as being 'too late', as with 
the reconstructions that we will consider in the coming chapter, or 'out of time', as 
we have seen with the decontextualized, photographic typologies that we have 
been principally concerned with throughout this chapter. In the case of the former, 
the time of the event is converted into an amorphous and non-historical past time, 
and in the case of the latter, it is extracted from the flow of time altogether. 
However, in each of the three temporal scenarios, Haddon's attempt at 
rationalization or totalization is fundamentally predicated on the indexicality of 
the photographic medium. Therefore, just as photography will always conjure the 
photograph and the type photograph the individual, so too the indexicality of the 
medium will always conjure types of contingency, alterity and excess which are 
irreducible rather than accidental parts of the process. 
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PART II: CINEMATOGRAPHY 
'A Fantasy in Red and Green': Indexicality, Motion 
and A.C. Haddon's 'Cinema of Attractions,62 
I had the satisfaction of being able to take a cinematograph picture of the processional 
dance. The grotesque masks worn by ruddled men, girt with leafy kilts, had a strange 
effect as they emerged from the jungle, and very weird was the dance in the mottled shade 
of the tropical foliage, a fantasy in red and green, lit up by spots of sunshine. 
A.C. Haddon, Head-Hunters: Black, White and Brown (1901, p. 47) 
From Photography to Cinematography 
The previous chapter examined Haddon's negotiations with and within the aporias 
of photography - and the medium's duplicitous capacity for indexicality - which 
simultaneously enables and disables any clear-cut positivist pretensions. Whilst 
seemingly the positivist tool par excellence, photographic indexicality is also, to use 
Mary Ann Doane's apt phrase (2002, p. 230), 'the privileged bearer of contingency', 
and this cuts against the grain of any positivist rationalization. In the context of 
Haddon's oeuvre at least, photographic indexicality becomes the pre-eminent site 
of tension between the types of contingency and rationalization which would later 
come to shape the broader field of anthropological representation, and which 
Doane (2002, p. 4) sees as shaping the cultures of modernity more g"enerally. This 
.~!tapter will explore the related convergences and divergences which emerge in 
62 Versions of this chapter were delivered at a research seminar in the School of Architecture and 
Art History at the University of Reading, and at a Film and Philosophy conference at the 
University of Bristol. The present chapter bears the traces of the feedback that I received from 
students, staff and colleagues. 
124 
the relationship between photography and cinematography, and between both and 
their others (e.g. phonography, phonetic writing and drawing, etc.). In terms of the 
convergences, we once again encounter the spectre of indexicality - albeit in this 
case inflected through C.S. Peirce's reading of the concept (cf. Metz, 2003). In terms 
of the divergences, the crucial question that we have yet to encounter is that of 
motion, movement or kineticism. What happens when the photochemical base of 
photography - the very basis of its indexicality - is set to motion and what new 
intermedial aporias arise? In turn, to what extent do the concepts of indexicality 
and motion allow us to gather Haddon's cinematographic oeuvre under the rubric 
of what Tom Gunning (1990; 1996) refers to as the 'cinema of attractions', and 
where does that analogy break down? These questions will be explored through an 
examination of Haddon's fin-de-siecle film fragments - the first of their kind in 
ethnography (Long and Laughren, 1993, p. 33) - and the analysis will shift in focus 
between questions of intermediality, referentiality and materiality. 
As we discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most basic premises 
.. underlying the expedition in general (and its use of indexical technologies in 
particular) was a certain turn-of-the-century visualist agenda which proposed that 
cultural depth could be read off a visually captured surface, much as a phrenologist 
might extrapolate from the morphology of one's skull, or a race theorist from the 
pigmentation of one's skin. For this purpose, the cinematograph seemed an ideal 
piece of apparatus with which to peel away the skin of culture. Ho~ever, despite 
Haddon's ambitions for the fledgling medium (i.e. that it would form part of a 
positivistic, visual continuum) and his enthusiastic recommendations to colleagues 
(e.g. Baldwin Spencer in Australia, to whom he recommended the 'cinematograph 
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as an indispensable piece of anthropological apparatus'), cinematography proved 
to be something of a technical disappointment (Griffiths, 2002, pp. 128, 147). 
Filming in the tropical heat of the Torres Strait climate, the camera - damaged 
from weeks of arduous travel - would regularly jam, and in a blinding flash of light, 
his subjects would vanish before his very eyes (see fig. 14 below) 63 : appearance 
and disappearance within three frames (Griffiths, 2002, p. 134; Long and 
Laughren, 1993, p. 34). 
However, for Haddon, this was not only an 
unwarranted intrusion of the camera upon the 
field of vision, but all the more frustrating 
insofar as his task was construed as an urgent 
one: to transparently inscribe on paper, wax and 
film stock - what were perceived to be - the last 
vestiges of a moribund culture. Therefore, the 
spectral play of appearance and disappearance 
evinced by the camera itself took on a new and 
increasingly urgent meaning: simply put, his 
subjects were disappearing both on and off 
screen. However, they were not " yet the 
disappeared, and so a ghostly inbetweenness 
wa~ being reflected on both sides: a failing 
technical apparatus that represented the space 
Figure 14, Film stills from shots two 
and three of Haddon's film (1898c) between presence and absence, and an 
63 Although a rather well-worn philosophical cliche, the idea that too much light blinds takes on a 
very concrete significance here. The overexposed frame becomes like a cinematic cataract 
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imminent cultural loss which did the same. Th'us, his medium and his subject 
matter each came to echo the other by registering (as) ephemeral fragments (cf. 
Doane, 2002, p. 3). As a result, his cinematic inscriptions became both witnesses of, 
and poor substitutes for, such loss: the fleeting ephemera of cinematic capture 
peeled off the reel/real. Ins.tead of continuous wholes - itself a fiction of the 
medium - Haddon was left with discontinuous fragments, which heightened the 
relationship between indexicality and contingency and between medium and 
object, and which made the process of converting representations into 
typifications all the more difficult. 
Such fragments were more often than not associated with Indigenous dances, a 
point which dovetails with Felicia McClaren's provocative thesis about the threads 
binding cinema to dance (and such links have been well documented in early 
cinema, e.g. the famous Serpentine Dance): 
[T]he camera does what dance - or to be more precise, a certain 
apprehension or reception of dance - had done previously: making 
liveness an image, taking the spectator into a different experience of 
time or space, bringing to the eye what was previously imperceptible 
(2003, p. 28). 
For Haddon, such a penchant for dance was most obviously linked to the fact that 
the body's fleeting combination of movement, duration and spatial arrangements 
is both difficult to visually grasp (and we will return to the metaphor of touch 
later) and difficult to represent in other ways (e.g. photography, drawing, phonetic 
~_r.i~ing, etc.). Consequently, dance on film ~olds an enduring appeal as a form of 
tangible and spectacular cinematic display. As Fatimah Tobing Rony argues: 
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Dance was almost always represented as spectacle: to be watched at a 
distance. The public as well as scientists were fascinated by the bodies 
of indigenous people, and dance film showed how those bodies moved, 
how masks were worn. Moreover, an iconography is formed: the native 
[ ... ] is identified with the body (1996, p. 65). 
However, Haddon's pencharit for dance is also linked to the fact that, in this 
context, dance is a cultural metonym, no mere empty ceremonial gesture or purely 
aesthetic formation, but capable of conjuring forth a socio-cultural whole, and, 
moreover, a socio-cultural whole ostensibly passing into oblivion. For Alison 
Griffiths: 
Haddon's choice of subject matter may therefore have been guided by 
three factors: his judgement of their ethnographic significance; their 
prior representation as photographs; and how well they embodied the 
medium's capacity for representing motion (2002, p. 146). 
Indeed, this not only suggests why Haddon may have chosen his particular subject 
matter, but why he may have chosen his particular medium or media, and it is this 
space between ethnographic significance, photographic indexicality and cinematic 
motion that will form the backdrop to this chapter. How do indexicality and motion 
come together in early cinema - and ethnographic cinema in particular - and what 
tensions and contradictions are consequently opened up both within the medium 
of cinematography its~lf and between it and its others? 
Stop Tricks: Indexicality and Motion 
One point of,departure for such questions is Friedrich Kittler's (1999) tour de force 
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of media history and theory, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. In the 'Film' chapter, 
Kittler (1999, ch. 3) suggests that the emergence of modern cinema qua cinema 
can be traced back - conceptually rather than historically - to the relationship 
between continuity and discontinuity, appearance and disappearance. 'Cinema, in 
contrast to sound recording, began with reels, cuts, and splices' (Kittler, 1999, p. 
115). This is most neatly and dramatically exemplified in the accidental discovery 
of the cinematic 'stop trick': 'the magical appearance and disappearance of figures 
against a fixed background' that Haddon had also unwittingly encountered. As 
Kittler recounts: 
Legend has it [ ... ] that George Melies, the great film pioneer, ran out of 
celluloid while shooting a street scene. He left the tripod and camera in 
position and loaded a new reel, but in the meantime so-called life 
naturally went on. Viewing the fully spliced film, its director was 
consequently surprised by the magical appearance and disappearance 
of figures against a fixed background. Melies, who as former director of 
the Theatre Robert Houdin had already projected many a magical trick 
onto the technological screen, had accidentally also stumbled upon the 
stop trick (1999, p. 115). 
For Kittler, the. 'stop trick' is first and foremost a conjurer's trick, echoing the 
magician's dialectic between appearance and disappearance ('now you see it, now 
you don't' [Gunning, 1996]). In Melies' case, it marks the appearance and 
disappearance of the - often female - body; in Haddon's case, it marks the 
appearance and disappearance of his anthropological object per se. For the one, it 
is a creative opportunity; for the other, it is a technical hindrance repeating a 
disciplinary loss; for both, it represents bodies in motion: fort/da. Such a play is no 
.9oubt imbued with archaic patterns of fascination or fear, patterns which, as Laura 
Mulvey (1985, p. 305) has remarked in a different context, are 'reinforced by pre-
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existing patterns of fascination already at work within the individual subject and 
the social formations that have moulded him'. From the 'fort/da' of Freud's 
ruminations (Gunning, 1996, p. 82), to Melies' magical tricks, to Haddon's spectres, 
these patterns take on many forms. However, once viewed within a specifically 
cinematic context, Kittler (1999, p. 115) argues that such a play between 
appearance and disappearance gives rise to cinema itself - as distinct from the 
mere technology of cinema - and this play is particularity heightened in this case 
by at least two of the crucial components of early cinema: its capacity for 
indexicality and its capacity for movement or kineticism (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 24; 
2007, p. 129). 
Indeed, it has perhaps become something of a commonplace to associate some of 
the fascination with cinematography - and early cinematography in particular -
with the fact that it is an indexical form of inscription. In this context, this 
interpretation owes a considerable debt to Charles Sanders Peirce's work on 
signification (a body of work whose light has often been dimmed by the glare of a 
~ certain Saussurian linguistics). As is well known, Peirce developed an immensely 
complex topography of the sign, one of the key underlying triads of which was his 
division of signs into symbols, icons and indices: the first, in which signifiers are 
bound to their referents by social convention (as wouid pertain in language, for 
~ 
example); the second, in which they are bound by some point of similarity (a 
pictorial representation perhaps); and the third in which they are bound by an 
'actual contiguity or connection to the world', in Christian Metz's phrase (2003, p. 
-139). 'The lightning is the index of the storm' or the footprint the index of the foot 
(Metz, 2003, p. 139). It is not so much that the viewer somehow 'confounds the 
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signifier and referent' as Metz (2003, p. 144) wO'uld have it (as was allegedly the 
case in the reaction to the Lumiere brothers' iconic film of an approaching train), 
but that the signifier accrues a 'strange feeling of reality', a fascination with the fact 
that it has somehow touched its referent, and we will come back to this question of 
touch later when discussing the materiality of the cinematic surface. 
I would suggest that this capacity for indexicality - this 'strange feeling of reality' -
is one the key reasons why early cinema - and its first decade in particular -
generated the kinds of visceral scopic thrill that the American film historian, Tom 
Gunning (1990; 1996), has come to associate with the phrase, the 'cinema of 
attractions'. Such a phrase invokes both the fairground attractions with which 
early cinema was associated and Eisenstein's 'montage of attractions'. Gunning 
(1990, p. 57) argues that, in its first decade, cinema was marked by certain key 
tendencies: an emphasis on display or exhibition over story or narrativity; a focus 
on short everyday 'actualities' (the banality of the social world made strange); a 
focus on cinematic tricks, rather than on elaborate fictions; and, crucially, a 
~ tendency towards direct spectatorial address of a kind that compromises, or at 
least renders more complex, one's voyeuristic anonymity. This, as Gunning 
suggests (1990, p. 57), is an 'exhibitionist cinema [ ... ] a cinema that displays its 
visibility, willing to rupture a self-enclosed fictional world for a chance to solicit 
-
the attention of the spectator'. 
However, this capacity for commanding visibility and soliciting its spectator was 
not only bound up with cinema's capacity for indexical display - the power to 
show, to make appear - but was often achieved through the very stop tricks 
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courted by Melies: the power to conceal or to make disappear, either directly or by 
implication (Gunning, 1990, p. 57). In this sense, Melies' 'magical transformations' 
become in Gunning's words (1996, p. 78), 'emblematic examples of the cinema of 
attractions, endlessly replaying the effect of surprise and appearance [or] the 
sudden appearance and then disappearance of the view itself, an effect made 
nonetheless all the more powerful by cinema's capacity for indexical inscription: 
The basic structure of attractions, then, revolves around either the act 
of display and the anticipations that can be heightened by delaying or 
announcing it (or both) and its inevitable disappearance (which can be 
gradual or sudden and dramatic) (Gunning, 1996, pp. 79-80). 
Collectively, these tendencies not only have the effect of rendering cinematic 
subjects and spectators spectacularly visible (or invisible), but of simultaneously 
rendering the cinematic apparatus itself visible ( or invisible), a desirable 
component of that very spectacle; cinema putting itself on show in a sense. 
The other key factor in the fascination wrought by the stop trick is, I would 
. suggest, its cap·acity for kineticism or movement, a movement which makes plain 
and literal the play of Melies' projected screen magic: bodies in motion appearing 
and disappearing in the blink of an eye. Such an attempt to unleash the dormant or 
latent temporality and dynamism of other forms of inscrIption (up to and including 
-
photography) has roots as ancient as the fascination with appearance and 
disappearance itself. However, its more recent proto-cinematic history swings 
from Eadweard Muybridge's locomotion photography (which Kittler [1999, p. 119] 
-describes as one step from cinema) and Etienne-Jules Marey's chronophotographic 
gun . (which. explores the dynamism of modernity via the relationships between 
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pictorial representation and war), to Ernst Mach's photodynamism, all of which 
negotiate with the dialectical fortjda of the coming technology. 
Indeed, such a dialectical play of appearance and disappearance is only the most 
overt manifestation of the underlying mechanism which makes cinema itself 
possible. For the blink of the eye which registers Melies' magical tricks conceals a 
play of appearance and disappearance speeded up to the point of invisibility, or 
Death at 24 X a Second, as Laura Mulvey (2005) would have it. Such a trick of 
motion conjures life out of death: 
Film gives back to the dead a semblance of life, a fragile semblance but 
one immediately strengthened by the wishful thinking of the viewer. 
Photography, on the contrary, by virtue of the objective suggestions of 
its signifier (stillness, again) maintains the memory of the dead as being 
dead (Metz, 2003, p. 141, emphasis in original). 
This is another film trick, the most basic and important of all, indeed, that which 
underlies all the others64: the optical illusion of motion through projected stillness. 
This optical illusion has most often been explained by the so-called 'persistence of 
vision' (Le. where one frame endures as an afterimage rendering the momentary 
disappearance between it and the next invisible) (Doane, 2002, p. 70). As Metz 
puts it (2003, pp. 139-140, emphasiS in original) 'eyen if each image is still, 
switching from one to the next creates a second movement, made out of successive 
. and different immobilities'. 
__ The problem with this theory for Doane (2002, p. 71) is that it suggests a 
deficiency of vision, a deficiency of the human body, thereby demonstrating an 
64 'The film trick preceding all film tricks' as Kittler (1999, p. 122) would have it. 
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anxiety surrounding the empirical surety of vision. In some quarters, such an 
approach has therefore been superseded by more recent cognitive theories which, 
according to Doane (2002, p. 71), posit a critical visual threshold 'beyond which 
the human eye is incapable of perceiving difference', sometimes referred to as the 
'stroboscopic effect' (e.g. the blurred spokes of a spinning wheel [cf. Kittler, 1999, 
pp. 119, 122]). Nonetheless, whether viewed as a deficiency or a critical threshold, 
the effect is much the same: that the visual experience of motion is an optical 
illusion, or that the eye perceives continuous motion or appearance where there is 
only discontinuous fragmentation. This is one of the main reasons why Kittler 
(1999, p. 119) associates film with the Lacanian 'imaginary' rather than the 
Lacanian 'real', the latter of which he allots to phonography. 
These kinds of shifts between appearance and disappearance are not, of course, 
restricted to cinema. Indeed, as Derrida has said of an expanded writing: 
To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that 
is in turn productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not 
prevent from functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, 
reading and rewriting (1982, p. 316, emphasis added). 
In principle at least, the instant of one's disappearance, absence or death becomes 
enshrined within the inscription at the very moment of its production, or as 
Derrida says during a filmed interview with Bernard Stiegler: 'we already know 
that death is here' (Derrida and ~tiegler, 2002, p. 39). Indeed, this point is 
especially marked and charged in indexical forms of inscription, particularly when 
-()ne perceives an imminent or recent loss of referent. In its more literal sense, one 
might think here of the memento mori tradition, or, indeed, Roland Barthes' 
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(2000a, p. 95) famous analysis of the simultaneously dead and dying prisoner in 
Camera Lucida ('he is dead and he is going to die'). (His) death is both imminent 
with an 'i' (Le. coming) and immanent with an 'a' (Le. already there). 
As we saw in the previous chapter with Haddon's use of photography, such a 
seeming temporal paradox between imminence and immanence - and such a play 
between appearance and disappearance - is precisely analogous to what has 
become known as the so-called 'vanishing primitive' motif or trope, an 
extraordinarily persistent belief in the calamitous fate awaiting the world's 
Indigenous populations in the face of the onrushing force of a monolithic 
modernity. From National Geographic's Vanishing Peoples of the Earth (1968) to. 
Leni Riefenstahl's Vanishing Africa (1982) such a fate is always both upon us and 
just around the corner (immanent and imminent), despite evidence of the 
emergence of a far more complex - if far from innocent - hybridity. 
Each of these pairs of concepts - indexicality and motion, appearance and 
" disappearance, and imminence and immanence - will come to playa key role in 
Haddon's cinematographic oeuvre, albeit in ways which not only challenge 
Haddon's positivist ambitions for the medium, but which open up the relationship 
between vision, memory and imagination within anthropological representation 
more generally. 
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I. Cinematography-Photography-Writh1g: Capturing the Present 
Haddon's famous four minutes of extant film are now regarded as the first pieces 
of ethnographic cinema made explicitly for that purpose (cf. Long and Laughren, 
1993, p. 33). There are five .distinct sections (or six shots) depicting Indigenous 
dances and technical processes, but the first and most significant (a fifty second 
single-shot) records the climax of the initiation ritual of the male children of Mer, 
one of the Eastern Torres Strait Islands: the point at which the identity of the 
mythical culture-heroes, Malu-Bomai, are revealed, represented by masks worn by 
the dancers or zogole (sacred men of Mer). This initiation marks a point of 
transition, a temporal shift or change of social status from childhood to adulthood 
- indeed, a social death as much as a social birth - and the process is thus locked 
away on the liminal, spatial margins of the social until tha~. transition is complete.65 
Underlining the difficulty of describing movement in film, Alison Griffiths 
schematizes the shot as follows: 
The brief single-take Malu-Bomai ceremony film features three dancers 
who shift their weight from one leg to another as they move in a tight 
circle in front of the camera. As the film begins, the three men stand 
behind one another (the third slightly off-frame right), slowly shifting 
their weight from foot to foot in a rocking motion with their arms at 
their sides and their hands extended at right angles from their bodies. 
The rhythmic movements intensify as the men lift their legs and shake 
their entire bodies, and the dancer in the foreground, followed by the 
other two, turns his body away from the camera in a counterclockwise 
direction and moves slowly round in a circle until he has resumed his 
starting position. This circular pattern is repeated twice in the 50-
second shot (2002, p. 135).66 
.. 65 ,We will return to this theme later, but it should b,e clear that such space is deeply gendered, and 
the secrets which are revealed therein to the Islands' boys-becoming-men are strictly guarded 
from the Islands' women of all ages. To that extent, the invidious gendering of sacred and 
profane has currency here. 
66 A clip of this film can be found on the following site: http://aso.gov.au/titles/historicaljtorres-
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What is significant about this description is that, although an accurate account of 
the shot, it tells us very little. On its own, neither the film nor the description are 
sufficient. Acutely aware of this problem, Haddon provides a rather different gloss 
on the pro-filmic event, one which adds elements which are not contained in either 
the event or the film: 
Suddenly the fearsome procession appeared [ ... ] and the three Zogole 
slowly marched with peculiar movements. They alone wore leafy 
girdles [ ... ] The head of the first zogole was covered with a ruddled 
turtle-shell mask [see fig. 15 below], representing a human face, which 
had a beard of human jaw-bones; above the face were leaves and 
feathers, and hanging from it behind was a painted carapace of a turtle, 
the latter supported by a long string by the second zogole (Haddon, 
1901, p. 48). 
Figure 15, Boma; Mask used in the first shot of Haddon's film (from Herle and Rouse, 1998, p. 91) 
Thus we learn from Haddon - not from the film - that this first mask represents 
the face and totemic allegiances of the mythical culture-hero whose secret and 
sacred name is Bomai. Haddon continues: . 
strait-islanders/clip1/ [accessed 15/12/11]. 
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The third zogole bore a turtle-shell mask [see fig. 16 below] 
representing a hammer-headed shark, on which was a human face; it 
was provided with human arms and hands, and decorated with leaves, 
feathers and turtle-shell figures of birds, frogs and centipedes (Haddon, 
1901, p. 48). 
Figure 16, 'Cardboard model of the Malu mask', Reports, Vol. VI (Haddon et ai, 1908, p. 291) 
This second mask, Haddon informs us, represents the face and totemic allegiances 
of the culture-hero Malu, who, although different from Bornai, masquerades as his 
profane alter-ego. As Haddon explains: 
There were some sacred words which they disliked mentioning: for 
example, the culture hero in the "Myth of Origin" of these ceremonies is 
always spoken of as Malu, and this name is known to women and 
children - it is, in fact, what they call an au ne, i.e. a "big" or "general 
name"; but his real name is Bornai - this is the zogo ne (sacred name) or 
gurnik ne (secret name), which only initiates may learn, and is one of 
those "unspeakable words which it is not lawful for a man to utter" 
(1901, p. 46). 
Therefore, the first shot ostensibly records the revelation of a secret - the sacred 
emerging out of the profane67 - a sacred visage and a secret name, known only to 
the initiated and protected from reiteration by strict prohibition. In some senses, 
67 Again, note the gendering of this division. 
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the name of 'Bomai' is a performative utterance, one which encodes and sets in 
motion a secret narrative as much as it denotes a real or mythical figure, one which 
has the power to breach sacred law, and one which - under circumstances of 
transgression - has the power to kill (Haddon, 1901, p. 49). Two provisional points 
suggest themselves at this stage: the first is the specific visual significance of the 
masks in the encoding/revelation of this secret (and we will come back to this in a 
moment) and the second is that this secret also has an aural dimension68 : not only 
a sacred visage shown but a secret name chanted amidst a theatrical performance 
staged. As Felicia McLaren (2003, p. 50) suggests, because' [e ]arly cinema relied on 
live performance as one subject for early films [it] was an ideal medium for 
presenting moving bodies dispossessed of their voices'. However, it is the 
combination of vision and sound which has such a powerfully affective impact on 
the initiates. Indeed, this latter aural dimension reminds us that so-called 'silent 
cinema' was far from silent - often being accompanied by live performances or 
phonographic recordings - and that is so in this case also (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 171; 
McLaren, 2003, p. 50). As we will consider in more detail in the next chapter, the 
expedition's two Edison 'Home' phonographs were pressed into considerable 
service recording a wide range of songs, stories and chants, including those 
associated with the Malu-Bomai ceremony recordings occasionally 
'synchronized' with the film on the few occasions that it was actually exhibited (cf. 
--
Griffiths, 2002, pp. 134, 148). 
Here we return to the kinds of supplementarity that we discussed in the previous 
-chapter. In this case, a seemingly 'self-conlplete' film reaches its limit point and 
68 This is a point that I will develop at greater length in the following chapter on phonography. 
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attempts to find resolution in another medium,here by way of 'synchronization'. 
However, the question of synchronization is itself significant or misleading in this 
context as the cinematographic and phonographic recordings were made at 
different times and in different places. In this sense, this is the filmic equivalent of 
the process we saw in the previous chapter, whereby specific representations 
were made to typify general racial types or broader cultural practices. Because 
rendered typical, the specificity of the representational context does not matter, 
and so a frontal and profile view of two different individuals can come to represent 
one racial 'type', or cinematographic and phonographic recordings from different 
contexts can be pressed together as one indexical and intermedial whole. In both 
cases, the specificity of the event is made to transcend itself as structure, and in 
both cases, the unwieldiness of the former breaches the self-assurance of the latter. 
However, the main point I want to stress at this stage is that, from the perspective 
of those not yersed in Island Custom ('Ai/an Kastom 1, this audio-visual secret -
however construed - still requires the addition of a provisional supplementary 
narrative for its revelation or audition. As Mary Ann Doane has suggested, 
'conditions of exhibition [of early cinema] were often grounded in an 
acknowledgement that the image was not self-sufficient': 
--
The spectator was often expected to have knowledge of another text 
[ ... ] Or, in many cases, the lecturer (a person hired to accompany the 
film with comments, explaining what was happening) would act as an 
external source, pointing out aspects of the image whose readability 
might be a function of external information (2002, p. 160). 
In Haddon's case, this cuts both ways: the image simultaneously lacks and exceeds 
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any narrative framework. Therefore, just as Haddon's photographs were forced 
beneath the surface of his written commentary in a bid to control their excessive 
and deficient meanings, so too Haddon's films remain simultaneously excessive 
and deficient: too much and too little. As Alison Griffiths makes clear, this is 'the 
enduring paradox in the history of visual anthropology': 
[A] tension between the apparent sufficiency of the ethnographic image 
- its excess of visual detail on the one hand versus its discursive 
insufficiency on the other, the fact that while it may appear to tell us a 
great deal about a particular social or cultural practice, it nevertheless 
remains "annoyingly mute" (in ethnographic filmmaker and theorist 
David MacDougall's words) about what these cultural forms and 
symbols might actually mean in broader anthropological terms (2002, 
p.129). 
However, such a paradox is doubled in this case because, as Felicia McLaren argues 
(2003, p. 51), it extends beyond cinematic representation and into dance 
performance itself: 'By suspending its meanings in signs, dance produces the 
simultaneous option of seeing "too much" and "not enough"'. Therefore, without 
supplying the kinds of narrative frame that Haddon was to produce voluminously 
over the rest of his life in hundreds of pages of manuscripts and published 
material, it remains particularly difficult to render his cinematic images of dance 
'legible', to penetrate beneath their surface. 
[L]acking intertitles and entirely dependent on expert contextualization 
in order to be made legible to both scientific and lay audiences, Haddon 
was left with the question of what exactly could be done with his films 
in the absence of an intellectual framework for ethnographic film 
(Griffiths, 2002, p. 145, first emphasis added). 
Indeed, I want to deliberately stress the reductive literary metaphor of legibility 
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here (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 142), as it is precisely the point for Haddon to attempt to 
curb visual excesses and deficiencies with what he takes to be the control offered 
by phonetic writing. Even to contemporary spectators/auditors, the images and 
sounds remain peculiarly resistant to reading (to legibility) without such frames, 
that is, beyond generalized, primitivist tropes of dance, 'native bodies' as spectacle, 
bodily expressivity as the colonial norm, and so forth. 
Of course, the flip side to this argument is that this so-called 'lack of legibility' is 
anything but for spectators with a knowledge of Torres Strait Islander 'Kastom '. 
Indeed, the masks and headdresses themselves can be read as forms of inscription, 
encoding historical, memorial and mythical narratives very much legible to those 
immersed in that particular cultural milieu (cf. Herle, 2004, p. 201). That is 
precisely why they wield such affective power in and out of initiations. Indeed, 
Haddon once unwittingly showed the central Bomai mask in the film to a group of 
uninitiated Islander women, and was severely rebuked for doing so on the basis 
that the secrets which it did and does encode should not be revealed, a point which 
reminds us of the gendering of secrecy, space and the sacred/profane nexus on the 
Islands (Haddon, 1901, p. 47). In a more recent documentary about Torres Strait 
material culture in European museums (Cracks in the Mask, Calvert, 1997), an 
Islander cultural historian (Ephraim Bani) is shown the same mask -: still intact 
_. 
and now in Cambridge - and he is clearly shaken by its continued affective power. 
However, the point to stress is that these masks and headdresses do not 
necessarily have a fixed historical, memorial or mythical content. They are, in a 
sense, recording machines themselves, just as capable of encoding the complexities 
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of colonial cultural hybridity as of being destroyed by them. Indeed, more recent 
versions - intriguingly known as 'dance machines', both because they are most 
often incorporated within dances and because they are often composed of several 
mechanically interacting components (cf. McLaren, 2003) - have exploited these 
open-ended mimetic qualities by encoding recent historical events. For example, 
the same documentary in which Ephraim Bani is confronted with the Haddon mask 
shows Bani and another contemporary Islander wearing a model-plane headdress 
'recording' the Islands' role in the Pacific portion of the Second World War 
(Calvert, 1997). Other artists have created similar headdresses, but with 
representations of more recent historical incursions, such as laptops and satellite 
dishes, etc. (Peacock, 2004, p. 48). In some senses then, what we are actually 
seeing in Haddon's film is a process by which one recording device faces another. 
Part of the accrued affective power of the Bomai mask today is precisely its role in 
the histories of colonial hybridity which led Haddon to the Islands in the first place. 
It 'records' - or becomes encrusted by - such histories rather than obscuring them. 
Indeed, this idea of a reciprocal interplay between recording devices and between 
gazes - like two mirrors repeating each other ad infinitum - has been explored 
explicitly in the work of the contemporary Islander artist, Janice Peacock. Peacock 
(2004, p. 59) recently created a series of headdresses (Movie Camera head-dress, 
2002) upon which she mounted abstract miniatures of Haddon's cinematographic 
camera. By implication, such headdresses look at the spectator as much as the 
spectator looks at them; the spectacular object also sees, and records; the gaze is 
reciprocated. As if to echo this point, Ephraim Bani suggests that his journey to 
Europe's museums with a camera will be like 'an eye from Torres Strait entering 
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into the museum itself to behold the things that have been taken away' (Calvert 
and Purser, 1998, p. 311). Recording becomes a form of substitute repatriation in 
this context, a practice which museums often rhetorically exploit as examples of 
community involvement. For example, the website of the Cambridge Museum of 
Archaeology and Anthropology used to display a photograph of contemporary 
Islander elders (including Bani) filming in the museum, without stressing Bani's 
criticism of museum practice in the film or, indeed, responding to his requests for 
the repatriation of such objects. Such a camera faces the spectator as much at its 
ostensible institutions and objects; a double vision is created, a point which Bani 
light-heartedly alludes to in the precursor to Cracks in the Mask, Talking Broken 
(1991): 
You're looking at me like someone in a zoo, but why don't you watch 
yourselves in a mirror and look at yourselves? Maybe one day I'll come 
around, get my camera and start studying you people (Bani cited in 
Calvert and Purser, 1998, p. 307). 
Indeed, just as Haddon's photographs point in two directions at once - towards 
and away from the camera - so too Haddon's films also point in two directions at 
once - recording and authenticating his presence, and by extension that of the 
colonial order, as much as that of the Islanders. Even more so than photography, 
Haddon's films thus produce the kind of paradoxical double manoeuvre that we 
witnessed in the previous chapter: a general, scientific narrative that is 
authenticated by a set of specific experiences. As Alison Griffiths (2002, p. 141) 
.. . 
suggests, 'Haddon's cinematic study of the Malu-Bomai ceremony provides a 
compelling sense of "being there" among the Islanders, a feeling of co-presence at 
an event which is absent in photographs of the same scene', and it is this sense of 
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'being there' which authenticates the larger sCientific generalizations. To that 
extent, Peacock's work does the same thing, albeit at a different register, recording 
both specific, experiential, personal and familial narratives as well as the broader 
and overlapping narratives of colonialism, memory, inheritance and legacy. 
Nonetheless, to those outside of this cultural milieu, Haddon's films remain 
stubbornly resistant to legibility. However, this resistance is precisely the point. 
This is show rather than tell cinema, harnessing the great twin powers of cinematic 
indexicality and kineticism in a bid to 'mak[ej images seen', in Tom Gunning's 
borrowed phrase (1990, p. 56, emphasis in original). This underscores the links 
that a number of scholars have made between the film and Gunning's 'cinema of 
attractions' (e.g. Griffiths, 2002, p. 143). In the first instance, 'it is precisely this 
harnessing of visibility', Gunning suggests (1990, p. 56), 'this act of showing and 
exhibition, which [ ... ] cinema before 1906 displays most intensely': 
[T]heatrical display dominates over narrative absorption emphasizing 
the direct stimulation of shock or surprise at the expense of unfolding a 
story or creating a diegetic universe (1990, p. 59). 
Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I - like Haddon - had to append the 
opening provisional narratives. In this case, Haddon's 'theatrical display' is 
enhanced by exploiti!lg the two key factors which we suggested were central to the 
. patterns of visual fascination in the Melies film: indexicality and motion or 
kineticism, both of which he had been grappling with separately in pre-. or perhaps 
even proto-cinematic forms. On his earlier trip to the islands in 1888, Haddon had 
not only taken a multitude of photographs, but - as a keen, scientifically trained 
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illustrator - had attempted to capture the kineticism of that most dynamic and 
temporal of forms of bodily expression, dance, in hand-drawn and painted 
illustrations accompanying letters home to his family (see fig. 17 below). 
These letters are interesting in the way in which 
they weave together commentary and image, 
image and movement, and memory and vision. 
Indeed, as with the 'loop of supplementarity' 
that we examined in the previous chapter, 
whereby a seemingly self-enclosed commentary 
gives way to another medium of necessity and 
vice versa, these letters switch between words 
and images in ways which reveal mutual 
fracture lines and weaknesses. The written 
commentary cannot convey the dynamism of 
Figure 17, letter home to son, 1888 
(from Herle and Rouse, 1998, p. 53) 
dance and so must be folded back intermedially onto the drawings - for example, 
as Haddon draws his son's attention to what the movements of dance actually look 
like and which he cannot convey in letters - but the drawings cannot capture th 
dynamism of dance either, which in turn opens up a space that will only be 
occupied by the invention of the cinematograph much lat r. 
However, one of the key differences between this instance of supplementarity and 
those which arose in the previous chapter is that what we are dealing with here 
are non-indexical inscriptions, or at least inscriptions which index differently. This 
heralds a theme that we will later see developed in a complex relationship with 
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indexicality and motion, and that is the attempt to render memory in a visual form. 
These drawings are not observations; they are Haddon's memories, materialized 
and set to an implied motion. Therefore, whilst it might be something of a push to 
consider the central triptych of images in this letter to be proto-cinematic in any 
direct or technical way, they - and a host of others like them in the Cambridge 
archives69 - nonetheless announce a certain preoccupation with visuality and 
movement or spectacle and display that would later come to fruition in his 
photographic and cinematic imagination (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 130). 
However, the relationship between indexicality and motion sometimes emerges as 
a tension in his cinematic work, particularly when that work comes to be drawn 
through the 'bottleneck of the [written] signifier', to adapt Kittler's apt phrase 
(1999, p. 4). In other words, when it comes time for publication, which in this case 
means a decomposition from cinematography back to photography and 
alphabetical script. Indeed, the ability to create the illusion of motion through the 
manipulated flux of still images (Metz's 'second movement, made out of successive 
and different immobilities' [2003, pp. 139-140, emphasis in original]), 
presupposes that one can reverse that trend, that one can still the stream and stop 
the motion for the purposes of - in this case - scientific analysis. In other words, to 
de- or re-compose cinematography back into its photographic constituents; to go 
-. 
from Lumiere back to Muybridge, from Kittler's 'fusion or flow in the imaginary' 
back to 'chopping or cutting in th~ real' (1999, p. 122). In Haddon's case, this 
process of medial conversion was necessitated in part because few audiences had . 
ready, direct access to his ethnographic films, but also - and more importantly -
69 See the Haddon Papers (HPJ, envelope 1029 in the Manuscripts section of the Cambridge 
University Library. 
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because, as we have seen, such films required a kind of complex narrativization 
which exceeded the technology of cinema at that time. 
'111 1': 1.I ,\:-"' l ' I': ()F 'I'll 1-: \I \ r l ' If II;, 'I.f,; 
Figure 18, 'The Dance of of the Malu logole', 
~ Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, Plate V., A., B. 
and C., facing p. 48)\ 
the supposed plenitude of the other. 
It is, therefore, precisely such a task of 
cinematic decomposition and narrativiz-
ation that Haddon attempts in some of his 
published writings, such as this example 
(fig. 18 opposite), drawn from the same 
book that we looked at in the previous 
chapter, Head-Hunters: Black, White and 
Brown. Indeed, these images are placed 
immediately adjacent to the earlier 
narrative account ~ gave of the Malu-Bomai 
ceremony, a point which highlights the 
bond of mutual supplementarity between 
them. The narrative is seemingly self-
contained but requires the authenticating 
seal of the indexical inscription. In turn, the 
indexical inscription stands alone as an 
index of the event, but also requires a 
narrative description to transcend itself as 
event; each requires and thereby cuts into 
However, Haddon's attempt to shift from cinematography to photography and 
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commentary harbours within it something of an' irony in terms of indexicality and 
motion: not only do Haddon's indexical inscriptions have to be squeezed through a 
non-indexical and supplementary commentary, but his hard fought motion has to 
be stilled for the sake of publication and analysis. The 'semblance of life' that Metz 
(2003, p. 141) suggests inheres in cinema has to be replaced with the 'stillness' of 
photography which 'maintains the memory of the dead as being dead'. 
Nevertheless, what is crucial for Haddon is that the shift between cinematography 
and photography is not complete. Like the Lumiere brothers' iconic film of an 
arriving train, where a seemingly still image suddenly gives way to movement 
(McLaren, 2003, p. 52), the sense of slippage between them is both meaningful and 
symptomatic (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 158). Indeed, these photographs bear the traces 
of at least three distinct photographic genres, two of which begin to transition into 
cinema: the conventional photographic portrait; the sequential photography of 
early pioneers like Eadweard Muybridge; and the 'chroriophotography' and 
'photodynamism' of figures like Etienne-Jules Marey and Arturo Bragaglia. 
Taken in isolation at least, these three photographs could provisionally be read as 
examples of an ethnographically inflected form of photographic portraiture of the 
kind we saw in the previous chapter. Here the process of typification is not about 
rendering the individual body/face as a racial type, but rather about representing 
the individual body/face as a cultural type. In this sense, we return to Rony's 
suggestion (1996, p. 65) that dance)s the archetypal spectacle wherein the 'native' 
becomes associated with his or her body and/or face. Indeed, in this context, the 
masked face is only a more literal version of the typifying 'masks' we saw in the 
previous chapter; in both cases, the individuality of the photographic subject is 
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superseded in favour of that which transcends it, and this is a point that we will 
return to in a moment (cf. McLaren, 2003, pp. 33-34). 
However, such a reading of these photographs becomes radically altered when 
they are examined in conjunction with one another. It is, of course, deeply 
meaningful that Haddon should choose to present these photographs as another 
triptych in the style of his earlier illustrated letters, but in this case as a more overt 
form of cinematic mimesis: the page masquerading as a vertical strip of celluloid. 
To that extent, a process of slippage begins to occur between photography and 
cinematography, and one can't help but think here of the sequential photography 
of figures like Eadweard Muybridge. Muybridge famously anticipated the 
kineticism of cinema to such an extent that his photographs of human and animal 
locomotion can now actually be projected in a way which closely resembles 
cinematic motion (cf. Doane, 2002, p, 
199; Kittler, 1999, p. 119). This works 
because his photographs are so 
rapidly sequential. For the effect to be 
perceived on the static surface of a 
Figure 19, 'The Horse in Motion', 1878. Eadweard numbers of small images in horizontal 
Muybridge's sequential photography (library of 
Congress, n.d.) succession (see fig. 19 opposite). 
Haddon does not have this luxury within or on the pages of a popular travelogue, 
nor are his intentions to scientifically inscribe the motions of the human body in 
the same way, but the positioning of these photographs - although not directly 
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sequential - is clearly intended to convey the sense of motion which is suggested in 
. the commentary. In that sense, the images and the words combine in an effort to 
conjure - rather than directly represent - motion, and then to bind that motion to 
an overarching narrative not directly contained within it. Neither words nor 
images can do so alone, and so spectacle and narrative come to supplement one 
other. 
However, this effort comes up against a serious impediment: his attempt to banish 
the hard fought motion from between the frames only succeeds in highlighting 
motion within the frames, albeit a motion ironically not readily perceptible when 
the frames themselves are in motion. In a sense, there is an excessive leakage 
between the dynamism of the dance and the speed of the film, and motion returns 
as blurring, particularly in the centrally important images of the Bomai mask, that 
most sacred and revelatory part of the film (see fig. 20 below). This makes visibly 
evident the two contradictory forces at work in Haddon's use of cinematic stills: a 
desire to represent - or conjure - the motion of the body and a desire to represent 
the stillness of the mask. 
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Figure 20, Film stills from shot one (Haddon, 1898c) (these are taken from the same frames that 
Haddon uses in Head-Hunters, albeit in diffe re nt form) 
The centrality of the figure of the mask that we mentioned earlier becomes deeply 
significant in this context, and it is here that Barthes' discussion of specificity and 
generality in photography takes on a strange literality: 
Since every photograph is contingent (and thereby outside of meaning), 
Photography cannot signify (aim at a generality) except by assuming a 
mask (ZOOOa, p. 34). 
In our analysis of the type photograph in the previous chapter, we looked at how 
Haddon used representations of individual human faces to typify a racial 
generality. The latter became a kind of generalizing mask drawn over the faces of 
those individuals photographed. As Barthes (2000a, p. 34) reminds us, 'it is this 
word [mask] which [ ... ] designate[s] what makes a face into the product of a 
society and of its history [ ... ] the mask is the meaning' . In the context of Haddon's 
first ethnographic film, not only are specific events 'masked' by being rendered 
typical - the latter is their meaning' in that context - but the faces of its individual 
protagonists are literally masked thereby sublimating their individuality and 
conjuring a cyclically repeated set of ritual - 'rite of passage' - narratives readily 
legible to its individual initiates. The faces of the film's protagonists are masked, 
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but these masks in turn evoke both the totemic allegiances of the culture-hero( es), 
Malu-Bomai, and an abstract depiction of their anthropomorphic faces. We move, 
therefore, from face to mask and back again, and the failure of both to signify with 
any cinematographic or photographic clarity is of paramount importance for 
Haddon, necessitating a retreat into other supplementary forms of - non-indexical 
- inscription. 
.-
This opens up something of an interesting disjuncture between indexicality and 
motion. In this case, the indexical power to capture that 'strange feeling of reality', 
to use Metz's phrase (2003, p. 144) - the power to display, to make appear - seems 
compromised by the perpetual motion of the 'still' images; cinematic time inheres 
in them still as they stand poised between action and inaction, appearance and dis-
appearance (see fig. 21 below). There is, to appropriate John Mowitt's phrase from 
another context (2005, p. 114), 'a volatile mix of stasis and motility in the image'. 
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Figure 21, Comparison between the film stills in Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, Plate V., A., B. and C., 
facing p. 48) and those taken from the film 
Such an inbetweenness renders the images only partly legible, but rather than 
suggesting a schism between cinematic inscription and visual perception, one 
might read the relationship between them as one of empirical analogy (cf. 
McLaren, 2003, p. 59). Indeed, part of the optical illusion which allows us to 
perceive motion in cinema (the so-called 'stroboscopic effect') creates blurring in 
our visual perception of non-cinematic motion (such as the blurred spokes of a 
moving wheel). 'The truth of motion' as Mary Ann Doane (2002, p. 84) has 
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remarked, 'is imprecision of form and indedpherability'. Blurring in cinematic 
inscription and visual perception might be as one. However, such an analogy 
threatens the very representability of motion. 'An artist sketching a dancing 
woman', Doane tells us (2002, p. 84), 'imagines the [ ... ] body coming and going, an 
unseizable ghost' but 'that truth is too stark for, and indeed in contradiction with, 
the goals of representation'. 
To that extent, Haddon's blurred images of the Bomai mask come to implicitly 
evoke the explicit attempt by photographers such as Etienne-Jules Marey and 
Arturo Bragaglia to harness such blurring in order to represent time and motion 
within pre-cinematic photography (cf. Doane, 2002, ch. 3; McLaren, 2003, pp. 22-
23). Unlike Muybridge, who attempted to conjure time and motion through a 
sequential succession of clear, still images, Marey (in his 'chronophotography') and 
Bragaglia (in his 'photodynamism') attempted to do so through blurred single 
images, where the traces of time and motion take visible form (Doane, 2002, p. 87; 
McLaren, 2003, p. 24). Such an attempt had been prefigured in earlier attempts to 
capture the dynamism of modernity in paintings of people, animals and machines 
in motion, but the indexicality of photographic variations on this theme lent the 
images a particularly striking spectral uncanniness (McLaren, 2003, p. 25). They 
capture what the eye actually sees, but the resultant images both' capture and 
collapse time and motion in such a way that their familiarity is rendered 
unfamiliar. In some ways, this is akin to Benjamin's (2002 [1936], p. 117) 
discussion of an 'optical unconsciousness' in film, whereby techniques such as the . 
close-up and slow-motion actually come to represent aspects of our visual 
cognition which we might register but not be consciously aware of (cf. McLaren, 
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2003, pp. 27-28). 'One goal', Felicia McLaren tells us (2003, p. 22), 'was to 
photograph, in movement, what the eye could not see', or at least not register. 
For Haddon, such residual motion is less an abstract representation of movement, 
time and cognition and more a further limit point of the 'technology of cinema, 
albeit a limit point that manifests itself as an excess. The cinematographic camera 
records more than the eye can see, and when reduced to 'still' images, such excess 
literally obscures what the eye can see. However, his response to such a limit point 
is perhaps telling in that he turns to other forms of inscription in a bid to 
supplement and thus 'clarify' the cinematic 'stills' that will not sit still. In a -
presumably utilitarian - attempt to eradicate motion from the picture, he deploys 
his visual skills to literally draw (in ink) and paint over the images of the Boma; 
mask, the point at which that most sacred of secrets is ~~vealed (see fig. 22 below). 
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Figure 22, Photographic film stills from the Cambridge Museum.of Archaeology and Anthropology 
archives (the sequence is as follows: P.934.ACH1-P.937.ACH1) and the same photographs in Head-
Hunters (inset) (Haddon, 1901, Plate V., A., B. and C., facing p. 48) 
It is these modified versions of th~ film stills which end up in Head-Hunters. This 
opens up a strangely complex play between the different modes of inscription, as . 
drawing and painting over cinematic stills conceals as much as it reveals in this 
c0ntext, as we can see from this later and more complete photo-cinematic touch up 
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- in this case using charcoal, pastel and paint (see fig. 23 below). 
Such a process of transformation reveals 
the mask more clearly, but it does so at the 
expense of the image's indexicality and, 
indeed, that indexicality's bond to the 
sacred secret. This places Haddon into 
something of a crucial double bind: caught 
between the desire to maintain a certain 
indexical integrity - which threatens the 
images' visibility or legibility - and the 
necessity to superimpose a supplement -
which threatens the images' indexical 
Figure 23, 'Three phases of the Ceremonial 
Dance of the Bomai-Malu zogo Ie', Reports, 
Vol. VI (Haddon et ai, 1908, Plate XXIX, no 
pagination) 
verisimilitude. The former poses the film as self-enclosed in and of itself - single 
shot focus, fixed camera, no narrative editing, no intertitles, no obvious 
impositions of any kind, a desire for pure transparency - whereas the latter 
exposes the film's deficiencies because of the necessity to superimpose a 
supplementary visual and/or narrative frame. Without the latter, the former is 
seemingly rendered inexplicable, but conjoining both seemingly impinges upon the 
indexical verisimilitude of the former. In other words, there is a need to 
supplement an indexically rendered visuality with something else, such as 
phonetic writing, drawing and painting, and a something else which, in this 
context, casts it roots deep into the past through memory. 
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II. Vision-Memory-Imagination: Resuscitating the Past 
In the end he plumps for the option of photographic modification, but this tension 
between clarity and verisimilitude, indexicality and its others, is particularly 
marked here for one key reason: what is displayed to us with such indexical charm 
is in fact a reconstruction of a pre-Christian initiation ritual no longer practiced, 
owing to powerful missionary influence since 1871. The masks are made from 
Haddon's cardboard packing cases, the protagonists are pillars of the Christian 
church and the initiates are replaced by the camera. Haddon had first become 
aware of these practices during his earlier visit to the islands in 1888. At that point, 
they were conveyed to him as memorial accounts of rituals already no longer 
practiced (memory and mourning going hand in hand, in a sense) and without 
concrete visual counterparts, save in the imagination ... This was so because, in a 
wide-ranging process of iconoclasm, the missionaries had made certain the 
destruction of the visual traces of ritual (cf. Herle, 1998b, pp. 87-90). 
Thus Haddon's task becomes more complex than the conventional trope of the 
'vanishing primitive' would suggest. Rather than simply deploying indexical 
technologies to record the last vestiges of a moribund culture, Haddon's task 
becomes shifted towards the· use of those technologies for the conversion of 
memory and imagination - Haddon's included - into vision (to conjure forth into 
vision) (cf. Kittler on Freud, men-wry and visuality, 1999, pp. " ..14J-142; Herle, 
1998b, p. 94). In fact, his task swings between both in a sense. Just as Barthes in 
Camera Lucida (2000a, p. 95) is pricked by the realization that the prisoner's death 
is both iinminent with an 'i' (Le. coming) and immanent with an 'a' (Le. already 
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there), so too Haddon is caught between a rhetoric of being 'on the brink' -
bestowing legitimacy upon his recording practices - and 'too late' - necessitating 
post-hoc reconstructions. 'It was', Haddon tells us (1901, p. 190), 'very saddening 
to be continually pulled up in our researches by the oft-repeated cry of "Too late!"'. 
In this context, Haddon's.appeal to record Indigenous customs 'before they have 
become lost to sight and memory' (1898a, p. xx, emphasis added) takes on a 
particular significance. The two are wound intimately together for Haddon; the 
former will come to rescue the latter by rendering it visible. 
The flip side of this argument, which Haddon appears only dimly aware of at this 
point, is the well-worn idea that the inscription of memory also partakes of its 
destruction (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 10). Of course, this is precisely why writing has so 
often been rendered subordinate to speech, as Derrida (e.g. 1981; 1997; 2001; etc.) 
has meticulously demonstrated. The tension lies in the fact that although 
inscription emerges as the necessary condition for the preservation of memory, 
such inscriptions are viewed as falling still-born onto the page. Live and personally 
accountable memory gives way to a supposedly dead and impersonal writing. 
However, this is so 0/ necessity, a point which renders memory simultaneously 
complete and lacking. To that extent, part of Haddon's fear of cultural loss is bound 
up in the fact that, no matter how detailed, his inscriptions will never be adequate 
to the memories which they conjure; on this understanding, all speech must give 
way to loss, whether recorded or not. As James Clifford (1986b, pp. 117-118) has 
argued, this is part of a broader anthropological allegory of redemption and· 
damnation by which the discipline - focused as it is or was on supposedly 'non-
literate' communities - brings speech into (phonetic) writing o/necessity, but then 
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regrets the lack of adequacy between the two. Therefore, the pathos of Haddon's 
work stems from the tension between such knowledge - however implicitly 
registered - and a desire to proceed nonetheless, to press on regardless in order to 
bring an invisible memory to a visible surface. 
Here we have a repetition of the surface-depth relations which we examined in the 
previous chapter. There we found Haddon using an indexical and visible surface 
(the 'type' photograph) to justify a non-indexical and invisible depth (the 'truth' of 
race). Here we see Haddon once again using an indexical and visible surface (filmic 
reconstructions) to justify a non-indexical and invisible depth (memory and 
imagination). This is a masquerade of positivism or scientism concealing a central, 
memorial fantasy, and such a tension works its way within and between Haddon's 
popular and scientific writings (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 141). 
This adds a new layer of interpretation to the visual supplementation of the 
cinematic stills, in that memory and imagination bear a peculiar relationship to 
indexical inscription. Put simply, one cannot - in any direct sense at least - film 
from memory or imagination. One can, however, draw or paint from memory or 
imagination, a point which allows Haddon's imagination freer rein and gives these· 
forms of inscription a heightened sense of importance, albeit at the expense of 
their empirical utility. Indeed, the difficulty for Haddon is that what, at one level, is 
a utilitarian clarification of an indexical image is, at another le,:el, an imaginary 
imposition of subjective memory. The slippage between indexical and non-. 
indexical inscription therefore opens tip a troubling seam of subjectivity, the 
variability of which is made clear when one attends to other attempts to visually 
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capture the masks and the Malu ceremonies through drawing alone (see fig. 24 
below). 
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Figure 24, Drawings by Islanders and expedition members of the Boma; mask (left) and the Motu mask 
(right), Reports, Vol. VI (Haddon et ai, 1908, pp. 290-291) 
These composite drawings, taken from Haddon's Reports, are more complex than 
they at first appear, both in terms of temporality and in terms of the relationship 
between memory and vision. The bottom two drawings on the right-hand page and 
the drawing on the right-hand side of the left page were drawn by Islanders before 
the masks were made, but after the rituals were no longer practiced. In other 
words, they were drawn from memory. The drawing on the left-hand side of the 
left page and the drawing at the top of the right-hand'page were drawn by Haddon 
or another expedition member after the masks were made. In other words, they 
were drawn in the visual presence of the objects, or at least a photograph of them. 
Of course, these objects were in turn based on the memories captured in the first 
set of drawings. We therefore enter into a circle of memory, inscription and 
materiality: from memory to drawings, from drawings to masks and from masks 
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back to drawings again, and the consequent variability between them is 
considerable. 
However, in order to fully untangle this assemblage of inscriptions and their 
complex relationship to. indexicality, inscription, memory and vision requires 
paying closer attention to the way in which these images and Haddon's cinematic 
stills of the masks become stitched within the fabric of Head-Hunters. Indeed, 
Haddon devotes a whole chapter of Head-Hunters to the Malu ceremonies, 
indicating both his considerable and abiding interest in the topic and his deep 
desire to recreate the event for the camera (Haddon, 1901, ch. IV). In this chapter, 
Haddon makes clear the ring of extreme secrecy which surrounds such events - a 
ring which he and the readers are now, of course, breaching - and the symbolic 
qualities of the masks with regard to such secrecy. 'Sacred emblems', Haddon tells 
us (1901, p. 42), 'are frequently shown to the lads [Le. the initiates]; these are often 
masked men who symbolise some legendary or mystical person or event'. There 
are two points worth stressing here, both of which echo Haddon's broader 
predicament: how to use the specific to conjure the general without each 
collapsing the integrity of the other. One point is that - as we have mentioned - the 
masks, like Haddon's 'types', enable the masked men to reach beyond themselves 
and their individuality. In a sense, wearing a mask renders the specific general, but 
not in a way that keeps such divisions clearly distinct; the masked men remain 
both specific and general at the same time. The other related point to stress is that 
the totemic animals which these masks often represent are themselves caught up . 
in the tension between the specific and the general. Abstracted - and often quasi-
anthropomorphic - images of specific totemic animals come to represent both such 
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totemic animals in general and the broader social groups with which they are 
affiliated, and, by extension, specific individuals come to represent both their own 
general groups and that group's totem: 
This animal, or whatever it may be, is spoken of as the totem of the clan 
or individual, and it should be borne in mind that the totem is a species 
of animal, or plant, not an individual one. Thus all cassowaries, and not 
anyone particular bird, are the totem of the whole cassowary clan, or of 
each member of that clan (Haddon, 1901, p. 43). 
As a result of these tensions, there is a constant and disorientating process of focal 
shifting between specific and general registers, and it is this which Haddon must 
grapple with, both in his writings and in his ethnographic films. This difficulty or 
tension is especially compounded when, as in this case, the rituals in question are 
no longer extant. On that basis, Haddon's reconstructions must, therefore, bear the 
weight of specificity and generality; firstly, they must be conjured forth in all their 
visual specificity in order to render the invisible memory of the past in a visual 
form, and, secondly, their consequent representations must also be made to 
transcend themselves, to typify the general. As a consequence, it is precisely at this 
point in the chapter that Haddon shifts focus from a general discussion about 
totemism to a specific discussion of his attempts to reconstruct the Malu 
ceremonies. However, this is ultimately with a view to being able .to shift back 
again - from the specific to the general - either directly or by implication. 
Before filming proceeds, Haddon (1901, p. 46) is able to work·up enough of a 
'temporary recrudescence of interest in. these and other ceremonies' to induce a 
number of Islanders to create cardboard models of the Malu masks for him. This is 
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significant in this context because Haddon's impulse to commission these masks 
can be traced back to a failed attempt to do so on his prior 1888-1889 trip to the 
Islands (Haddon et aI, 1908, p. 289). His imagination had been piqued when a 
number of Islanders told him of the already wavering or extinct Malu ceremonies 
and later made drawings of the masks from memory (see fig. 25 below), as 'the 
originals had been destroyed' (Haddon et al, 1908, p. 289). Therefore, in the 
absence of 'original' or reconstructed masks, Haddon must contend with an 
intertwining of memories - theirs and his - made material and visual through 
drawing. 
Haddon seemingly has these types 
of drawings and memories in mind 
when he once again attempts to 
render memory in a visual form by 
commissioning the Bomai masks in 
1898, and the discrepancy 
Figure 25, Drawings by Islanders of the Boma; and 
Malu masks (circa 1888-1889), Reports, Vol. VI (Haddon 
et ai, 1908, pp. 290-291) 
between the two elicits some disappointment. 'Both models [see fig. 24, the top 
drawing on the right-hand page and the left-hand drawing on the left page] were 
slightly different from what I expected, but there is no doubt they are as accurate 
representations as it is now possible to obtain' (Haddon, 1901, p. 46). What is at 
stake here is that the various non-indexical attempts to visually apprehend a 
memorial past are both subjective,and troublingly variable; they merely hint at the 
contours of an uncertain past. Haddon therefore attempts to even out or flatten . 
such variability by creating an intermedial synthesis, which is crucially both 
indexical and non-indexical, or which at least swings between the two. He begins 
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with a description of the cardboard model of the central Bomai mask: 
The face-mask is of open work, painted red, and stuck on it are 
scattered white feathers. The raised nose is made of beeswax; the eyes 
are two red seeds; a ring of wax represents the lips. Cardboard models 
represent the beard of human lower jawbones. Above are feathers of 
the Torres Straits pigeon and croton leaves. Behind is a model of a turtle 
(Haddon, 1901, p. 47). 
At this stage, we already have a complicated overlapping of memory, vision and 
commentary: the visually apprehended memories of the Islanders from Haddon's 
1888 expedition (along with Haddon's own memories); the material conversion of 
that memorial vision through the creation of the masks, and Haddon's conversion 
of both into a written description. Despite his concerns about accuracy, Haddon is 
nonetheless pleased with the affective power that this overlapping assemblage of 
reconstructions elicits, and it is here that the circle is ~ompleted: from memory to 
vision and back again. Reacting to the injunction not to show the masks to 
uninitiated women, Haddon suggests that this is: 
[A]n interesting proof of the sanctity in which the original was held. The 
ceremonies had not been held for a quarter of a century, the people are 
all Christian, and yet even now a woman may not see cardboard models 
of the tabooed masks! (1901, p. 47). 
However, the affective power of the masks is most marked when viewed by 
Islanders with personal memories of their own initiations (cf. Herle, 1998b, p. 94): 
We had many male visitors to see the masks, and it was quite pathetic 
to see the expressions of pleasure tempered with sadness manifested 
by the old men. They shook their heads and clicked, and even the tears 
started to their eyes. Ichabod! (Haddon, 1901, p. 47). 
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As if to conjure something of this affective power, 
the commentary is at this point wrapped around the 
same monochrome drawing of the cardboard mask 
that we saw in the Reports (see fig. 26 opposite; cf. 
fig. 24). However, this drawing has now become 
congealed with the memories and narratives which 
have preceded it. Indeed, what is particularly 
significant about this drawing is that it is an implicit 
attempt to weaken the link to an invisible past and 
to strengthen the link to a visible present; in other 
words, it is a sleight of hand, or eye. Rather than - or 
Figure 26, 'Model of the Bomai 
mask of the Malu Ceremonies', 
Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, p. 
47) 
as well as - transporting the viewer back into an invisible, historical and mythical 
past, the mask and its images draw that past into a visible present through an 
implied performance (Griffiths, 2002, p. 141). The first set of drawings of the mask 
were created from memory alone, and a fairly distant one at that, for which there 
were few visual correlates. This second drawing is drawn either in the presence of 
the cardboard reconstruction or its photograph, and can thus implicitly claim 
greater historical and visual accuracy - however speciously - as well as a type of 
visual potency situated in the present. This is attested to by its affective power, and 
this appears crucially important in that, as Alison Griffiths argues (2002, p. 141), it 
allows Haddon to align his visual reconstructions with the viscerality, tactility and 
emotion of the original ceremony ,(Le. the invisible ceremony which has not been 
filmed) (cf. Herle, 1998b, p. 92): 
It is tempting to see, then, in Haddon's cinematically inspired recreation 
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of the Malu ceremony for the Head-Hunters reader an alignment of 
visuality itself with the senses and the emotions rather than the 
rationalist rhetoric of the expedition's Reports. So where Haddon's 
Head-Hunters description of the Malu-Bomai ceremony attempts to 
evoke the phantasmatic excesses of the original ceremony, and capture 
something of the visceral and tactile quality of the dance, which could 
only be hinted at in the photographs, his dispassionate Reports entry 
more closely parallels the discursive tenor of his still photographs of 
the same event (Griffiths, 2002, p. 141). 
Indeed, it is this affective dimension of Haddon's approach to visuality which is 
exploited in appropriations of the drawing of the mask from Head-Hunters. For 
example, the Australian novelist, Ion Idriess, whom we encountered in the 
previous chapter, uses the image in his 1947 novel, Isles of Despair. Set in the 
1840s, Isles of Despair is an account of Barbara Thomson, a young Scottish 
shipwreck survivor on the Torres Strait who is alone spared by the Islanders 
because they take her to be the spirit of one of the chiefs dead daughters. 
Like many of his other novels, Idriess is keen to 
stress the factual basis of the narrative, both by 
drawing on actual events (there was a Barbara 
Thomson; she was a shipwreck survivor; she did 
live on the Islands for many years and returned to 
tell the tale), and by $ituating that narrative within 
the shell of a non-fiction account, and it is here 
that Haddon figures prominently. Indeed, the 
novel is littered with drawings from Haddon's 
Figure 27, Isles 0/ Despair (ldriess, 
1947, p. 96) writings, and in chapter XIV ('Lurking Dangers'), 
Idriess (1947, pp. 91-99 [96]; see fig. 27 above) literally shapes his writing around 
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the drawing of the cardboard Bomai mask as well as one of the earlier drawings 
made by one of the Islanders (albeit inexplicably upside down). Here the affective 
power of the masks, which created a sense of awe amongst the initiated Islanders, 
is here converted into an exoticized and simultaneously intoxicating and 
suffocating threat of danger: the time and place of initiation from which women 
are barred access and transgression is punishable by death. Choosing a female 
protagonist takes on a particular significance in this context in that - given the 
gendering of secrecy, space and the sacred that I mentioned earlier - it allows 
Idriess to heighten the effect of his exotica by focusing on the nature of 
transgression. In this case, the transgression is doubled: not only a breach of 
sacred, secret and gendered space, but such a breach perpetrated by a white 
female outsider unwittingly elevated in status by being misrecognized as an 
ancestor. This suggests a complex articulation of ge~der, race and class, all of 
which plays through Barbara's first encounter with the very apotheosis of the 
sacred and the secret, i.e. the masks: 
The ghost and spirit masks of the mari, markai, Lamar and dogai ghosts 
and spirits. Masks less hideous but grotesque in their barbaric design 
and colour were half men and half reptile, part men and part bird or 
fish [ ... ] Masks of cultural heroes, of Yadzebub the Warrior and other 
warriors who made history, of visitors from the skies, Bomai, Malu, 
Abob and Kos, Bia, Siwi, Gelam, and many others (Idriess, 1947, p. 92,-
emphasis added). . 
However, her first premonition of danger comes when, passing through the 
'grotesque poles and carvings and shrines', she is confronted with 'a' fantasy from 
prehistoric ages': a sorcerer preparing fo~ the 'Death Dance' (Idriess, 1947, p. 93): 
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Even light and shadow seemed weirdly affected by these grotesque 
poles and carvings and shrines [ ... ] She stared. Shambling out from the 
ravine mouth was a something, a monstrosity neither tree nor giant 
bird nor man but a living thing reminiscent of all three - a fantasy from 
prehistoric ages. Trembling plumes, shivering leaf and vine under the 
towering mask of the markai, Spirit of Death. It came gliding up through 
the amphitheatre to pause by the spirit shrine [ ... ] The illusion of gliding 
was perfect, helped by the grotesquely patterned leaf petticoat 
stretching almost to the feet, kept in tautened shape with ribs of cane 
[ ... ] 
It was Barbara's first real awakening to the unknown dangers which 
surrounded her. Not the ordinary dangers of shark or animal, reptile or 
man, but the elusive, much more terrible dangers of the age-old beliefs 
and violent revenges of primitive man (Idriess, 1947, pp. 93-95). 
Such purple prose might appear to be at a considerable remove from Haddon's -
and, on the whole, it is - but it is significant that it is at the precise point at which 
we encounter Haddon's affective drawing of the Bomai mask in Head-Hunters that 
Haddon's prose begins to rhetorically echo Idriess's 'weird [ ... ] grotesque [ ... ] 
fantasy'. Having succeeded in getting the Islanders to animate the masks for a 
reconstruction of the Malu-Bomai ceremony, Haddon finally gives way to his 
fantastical desire and kaleidoscopic imagination, and it is this which he is most 
keen to capture on film: 
Gadodo, Kilerup, and another man dressed up, and I had the satisfaction 
of being able to take a cinematograph picture of the processional dance. 
The grotesque masks worn by ruddled men, girt with leafy kilts, had a 
strange effect as they emerged from the jungle, and very weird ·was the 
dance in the ·mottled shade of the tropical foliage, a fantasy in red and 
green, lit up by spots of sunshine (1901, p. 47). 
This is a crucial point for Haddon - rendered in uncharacteristically "florid prose -
_ and it is one which enables a specific event with specific, named individuals to 
" . 
reach well beyond itself: out into a typifying generality and out into Haddon's 
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visually charged imagination. The specificity of the event, and the surface 
representations peeled away from it, become a conduit through which he hopes to 
conjure the invisible depths of imagination, memory and desire. Indeed, this is a 
timely reminder that such reconstructions are ultimately not - or not only - about 
the affective power of th~ masks and their associated rituals to the Islanders, but 
about the affective power of such masks and rituals to Haddon himself. Haddon's 
attempt to reconstruct both masks and rituals is caught between a rationalized 
desire to fill an epistemological gap and a affective desire to recreate a 
phenomenological experience. As Alison Griffiths suggests: 
One is [ ... ] struck by the way the film negotiates several different and 
potentially contradictory modalities: the theatricality of performance, 
intimations of the subjectivities of the Islanders, and the putative 
certitude of scientific knowledge (2002, p. 141). 
Such tensions persist in published accounts of the event as well, although the 
balance between these forces shifts uneasily depending on whether one is reading 
Haddon's popular or scientific writings (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 140). The difficulty 
for Haddon is that he must contend with anthropology's broader predicament, i.e. 
the paradoxical way in which personal experience authenticates generalized 
narratives. However, such a process is fluid rather binary, and so over-
emphasizing the former runs the risk of undermining the validity of the latter. This 
is particularly problematic when the question of 'experience' shifts from providing 
an authenticating base, which is rendered invisible after the. fact, to a more 
complete exploration of the affective qualities of ritual and recording. Indeed, this' 
'tension prefigures a debate about representation and experience which would 
only come to the fore much later in anthropology and ethnomusicology, 
171 
particularly in experientially rich domains like ritual and/or music (e.g. Clifford 
and Marcus, 1986; Barz and Cooley, 1997). Here the disparity between dry, 
abstract analysis and profound personal experience was particularly strongly felt. 
Of course, such a tension between these two levels is only dimly registered by 
Haddon, but it is presumably for this reason that Head-Hunters - the popular, 
narrative account of the expedition - gives much freer rein to the representation of 
experience than Haddon's Reports - the scholarly, scientific accounts of the 
expedition (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 140). Nonetheless, this should not blind us to the 
fact that such a tension is present in each. Indeed, to some extent, Head-Hunters 
might be regarded as a window onto the suppressed forces within the Reports 
themselves, and both must contend with the core tension between specific and 
general and between experience and representation. 
It is seemingly for this reason, therefore, that when we at last encounter his 
cinematic stills in Head-Hunters, Haddon carefully shifts the focus away from the 
specificity of the singular event and the filming of the ritual - associated with a 
visible present - towards a more generalized account of the narrative details of 
such rituals - associated with an invisible past. More precisely, the former is being 
used to conjure forth and authenticate the latter: 
In order to give the reader a substantially accurate idea of the Malu 
ceremonies, I do not propose to describe exactly what we saw, but I 
shall endeavour, as briefly as possible, to resuscitate the past (Haddon, 
1901, pp. 47-48, emphasis added). 
At the crucial moment the narrative folds in two, shifting from vision to memory, 
from present to past and from the 'red and green' of perception (Haddon's 'fantasy 
172 
in red and green') to the black and white of the page. However, this is not an 
historical past; it is an undated pre-Christian past, where the sacred men of Mer 
(no longer named individuals but allegories or representatives of the whole) 
perform the 'traditional' (i.e. habitual) Malu-Bomai ceremony (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 
141). Indeed, the irony or Haddon's incursion into this imaginary pastness is that 
the further he pushes into it, the further he moves away from historical time; for 
Haddon's past time is closer to what we might call 'structural' time, an expanded 
ethnographic present set in the past. In other words, the supplementary narrative 
is both an account of an event, a fleeting moment captured in time - one day, one 
set of people, one location - and an invocation of that which exceeds that event. 
This highlights the kind of shift routinely enacted in ethnographic accounts and 
one which James Clifford (1986b) has famously dubbed 'ethnographic allegory', 
where one register (e.g. historical individual action) allegorically recalls another 
(e.g. generic habitual behaviour). 
Therefore, the narrative detail required to make the film and the film stills legible 
is less a description of the film - and the fleeting moment it captures (what Alison 
Griffiths gave us earlier) - and more a reconstruction of a social memory - and the 
structural continuity it implies. More precisely, there is a two-way process at work· 
between the two forms of inscription and the two registers. The film and the film 
stills remain part of a tangible, visible present, but they require the conjuration of 
an invisible past to make them legible. Conversely, the invisibl~ past requires a 
visible present in order to become authenticated, visible and tangible. These two' 
'registers remain distinct, but Haddon 'attempts to allow each to interact and 
intertwine with the other. Nonetheless, this is not an entirely symmetrical 
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relationship. Haddon requires the vitality of a 'living', breathing present to impart 
life into a 'dying' past, to 'resuscitate' it, and, as we shall see/hear in a moment, 
such breath will take on an auditory quality. 
However, the slide between these two registers of present and past becomes more 
complete as Haddon moves to a discussion of the second part of the initiation: a 
less sacred phase where the initiated are given public recognition of their status. 
This event is not depicted in Haddon's film and so he must fall back on a drawing 
of the scene in order to render the memorial past visible and - later - audible. 
However, this is a drawing which takes its visual cues from a set of photographs 
which he later published in the Reports, and which he only latterly peoples more 
completely with initiates and spectators (see fig. 28 below). 
Figure 28, Drawing of the second initiation ritual from Head-Hunters (on the left) (Haddon, 1901, Plate 
VI., A., facing p. 49) and a photographic reconstruction from the Reports, Vol. VI (on the right) 
(Haddon et ai, 1908, Plate XXV, no pagination) 
It is as if his desire for reconstruction is so strong that any indexical inscription 
will serve as an authenticating base upon which he can reconstruct a tangible - . 
albeit imaginary - ritual experience. The stillness of this visual reconstruction is 
then mapped onto the implied motion of the commentary: 
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Two or three pairs of omai Ie [dog men: initiates] rushed forward, with 
bent body and trailing arms; with their hands they jerked up sand 
behind them as they ran, ever and again stopping and playing about and 
jumping over each other after the manner of the dogs they personated. 
These were followed by several pairs of daumer-/e [pigeon men: 
initiates] who, in the intervals of running forward, jumped about in a 
crouching attitude, and beat their chests with the palms of their hands, 
thereby imitating the perching and the flapping of the wings of the 
Torres Straits pigeon (daumer) (Haddon, 1901, p. 49). 
This is then followed by an overlapping play of gazes wherein the scene we see in 
the drawing and read about in the commentary is witnessed not only by the 
spectators but by the zogole (or sacred men of Mer) who participated in the first 
initiation (Le. the one captured on film). However, in this case, they see without 
being seen, or at least without being recognized. In order to preserve the sacred 
secret which they represent and which they conferred .~n the first initiation ritual, 
the individual identities of the zogole - and what they represent - are 'masked' 
from view on pain of death (and once again we are reminded here of the gendering 
of secrecy, space and the sacred): 
These operations were watched by the three zogole, who slowly and 
sedately marched along till they arrived opposite the spectators, and 
they then stood still. The reddened bodies of the zogole were entirely 
covered with white feathers, and their heads were similarly obscured; ~ 
each carried five wands in his right hand. Although they were VIsible to 
the women, the personality of the zogo/e was supposed to be unknown 
to them, and should any woman divulge the name of one of the zogo/e, 
"she die that night" (Haddon, 1901, p.49). 
Here the tension between experience and representation becomes particularly' 
knotted because unlike later forms of anthropology and ethnomusicology, where 
the problem is how to adequately represent - or at least convey - one's 
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experiences, Haddon's representations are attempts to conjure experiences which 
he did not actually have. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that the tension 
between experience and representation is actually doubled: Haddon must firstly 
work out how to represent his own personal experiences and secondly work out 
how to make such repre~entations conjure a second set of habitual experiences 
rooted in a past which he did not actually inhabit. This is an important variation on 
the theme of using the specific to represent the general, because this is not about 
using personal experiences rooted in the present in order to authenticate the dry, 
generalized abstractions of a positive science, but about using such experiences to 
authenticate a second-order experiential seam of habitual pastness. 
Indeed, such a tension comes particularly to the fore when he attempts to convey a 
crucial part of the ritual that has so far been missing, and that is sound. Just as 
Haddon attempted to use indexically registered visual representations of a 
reconstructed present - in this case, the film stills - to conjure an invisible past, so 
too he attempts to use indexically registered audio representations of a 
reconstructed present - in this case, phonograph recordings - in order to conjure 
an inaudible past. We have already discussed Haddon's attempts to 'synchronize' 
his cinematic and audio recordings, but the obvious limit point that he must 
contend with within the confines of the pages of Head-Hunters is the stubborn 
muteness of the technology of the book. This is a point that ethnomusicologists 
would later struggle with, often by literally supplementing th~ir writings with 
recorded material, but Haddon's choice is to juxtapose narrative descriptions of . 
the auditory dimensions of the second Malu ritual - rooted in an inaudible and 
imaginary pastness (singing, chanting, drumming) - with a photograph of actual 
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phonograph recordings in the present (see fig. 29 below). 
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Figure 29, 'Ulai singing Malu songs into a Phonograph: Gasu is beating the Malu drum', Head-Hunters 
(Haddon, 1901, Plate V!., B., facing p. 49) 
The drum-men appearing from behind a point at the southern end of 
the beach, ran forward and beat their drums with the characteristic 
staccato rhythm, and as the chant slowly augmented in sound, all the 
other voices were hushed, and the audience sat motionless in hushed 
expectancy (Haddon, 1901, p. 49). 
The photograph of the phonograph recordings comes to authenticate this narrative 
description, and in turn, the narrative description comes to flesh out the 
photograph. However, in some senses, the phonographic apparatus itself becomes 
the object of the photographic gaze here, because it, rather than an isolated 
photograph of a singing, chanting or drumming Islander, appears to conjure sound, 
or at least to authenticate the written description of sound. Indeed, Michael 
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Taussig (1993, p. 215) suggests that the phonograph in this image is positioned in 
a 'sacred pose'. The intermedial relationships obviously become very knotted at 
this point, but the point to stress is that Haddon is using every weapon in his 
technical arsenal in order to convey, rather than directly represent, experience. 
All of which begins to cast Haddon's cinematographic project in a very different 
light: less the cinematic verisimilitude that one might expect from an indexical 
form of inscription and more a fantasy of imagining and remembrance. As we have 
looked at in various ways so far, such a process of imaginary reconstruction swings 
between visual supplementation (adding to or amending the images with ink, paint 
or other images) and a process of narrative supplementation. Both modes· of 
supplementarity are closely intertwined. Indeed, as Gunning (1996, p. 73) is the 
first to point out, 'the desire to display may interact with the desire to tell a story, 
and part of the challenge of early film analysis', he suggests, 'lies in tracing the 
interaction of attractions and narrative organization'. Show and tell go hand in 
hand, a point that Haddon is all too conscious of. 
However, Haddon's desire to recreate and/or convey the experience of the Malu-
Bomai ceremonies is not restricted to the types of visual, narrative (and, by 
implication, audio) supplementation that we have considered so far, 'and it is here 
that we move beyond Head-Hunters. Indeed, some of the supplementary images 
produced in other writings bear a,strangely disjunctive relations~ip to the details 
of the film, or perhaps a strangely consonant relationship with the absent details of . 
the film (e.g. the initiates, those commissioned to beat the sacred wasikor drum, 
the avenues of stave-touting men, etc.). We have already examined this process at 
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work in the drawing of the second initiation ritual in Head-Hunters} but as if to 
hammer this point home in relation to the first and more sacred initiation ritual 
captured on the film} Haddon produces a watercolour drawing of the more 
complete picture for volume VI of the Reports} where those absent features are 
included (see fig. 30 below). 
Figure 30, 'Restoration of the Initiation Ceremony of the Bomai Malu Cult', 
Reports, Vol. VI (Haddon et ai, 1908, Plate XXX, no pagination) 
This becomes another imaginary visual supplement to the film which invokes a 
past remembrance. However} this does more than merely fill gaps in the empirical 
record; rather intrjguingly} it also offers us a view of the off-screen space of the film 
(marked by the foreground)} a space which, in the film, is occupied by the 
cinematographic camera and tripod and is here occupied by the initiates (see fig. 
31 below). 
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Figure 31, Comparison of a plate from the Reports, Vol. V (Haddon et ai, 1908, Plate XXX, no 
pagination) with a film still from shot one (Haddon, 1898c) 
This point is particularly significant in that we might read it as puncturing some of 
the voyeuristic anonymity that could be perceived in the film. Indeed, although not 
unambiguous, it is tempting to articulate Haddon's spectacular display to a colonial 
and perhaps even voyeuristic scopic regime: constructing a spectator who, as Metz 
(cited in Gunning, 1996, p. 75) puts it, is pOSitioned to '.watch[ ... ] in secret, without 
the scene he watches acknowledging his presence'. Looking again, however, the 
spectator is pressed into the disconcerting realization that in this case they are in 
fact also positioned as the chosen addressees; their gaze fuses with that of the 
absent initiates; they no longer see without being seen. In some ways this is less a 
dissolution of the voyeuristic regime per se, and more a shift from one type of 
voyeurism - where one sees without being seen - to another - where one watches 
the film 'as though it were aware of one's presence' (Mowitt, 2005, p. 20, emphasiS 
in original). However, without suggesting that this reciprocal gaze is symmetrical 
in terms of colonial power, it 'does pose a number of questions about the 
relationship between the film and one of Gunning's most central characteristics of ' 
the 'cinema of attractions', i.e. direct spectatorial address. As Gunning suggests: 
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The attraction invokes an exhibitionist 'rather than voyeuristic regime. 
The attraction directly addresses the spectator, acknowledging the 
viewer's presence and seeking to quickly satisfy a curiosity. This 
encounter can even take on an aggressive aspect, as the attraction 
confronts audiences and even tries to shock them (the onrushing 
locomotive that seems to threaten the audience is early cinema's most 
enduring example) (1996, p. 75). 
In this case, we are reminded of the fact that the performance of the zogole is 
designed both to instil a sense of grave secrecy and fear within the initiates and to 
lodge that experience within their memory. This is more than a neutral address 
and it perhaps allows us to double up the meaning of 'display', i.e. where it is both 
a spectacle to be voyeuristically consumed by the spectator and an aggressive 
social display directed towards that very spectator (now positioned as an absent 
initiate), thereby puncturing its voyeuristic anonymity: display as spectacle and 
display as performance. 
In other words, there is something of a reversal at work here between different 
scopic regimes and spectatorial positions. At first glance, the spectator is 
positioned ~o look at the sacred men (zogo/e) through a voyeuristic, colonial visual 
regime, which produces hierarchies of power and - in a related way - hierarchies 
of the senses. However, such zogo/e look back at that spectator through a sacred 
mask, repositioning them as visible - albeit in this case absent - initiates. This 
exchange of gazesjs significant in that it establishes a second type of spectatorial 
address - the visible and confronted initiate - existing in principled tension with 
the first - forms of anonymous colonial voyeurism that see and are not seen. This 
shift or tension goes some way towards reversing (and perhaps even displacing) 
the hierarchical relationship between the former - the spectatorial voyeur - and 
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the colonial objects of such a scopic regime. In this case, the ostensible 'objects' of 
the film (i.e. its referents, the zogo/e) are in a position of power over the absent 
initiates, and it is this latter demoted position which is now being mapped onto 
that of the spectator. Once again, this does not 'scale up' to the concrete hierarchies 
of colonial power, but it does puncture some of the microscopic asymmetries of the 
film. The other side of this argument - I won't call it a master/slave dialectic ....: is 
that this reversal might itself be said to be reversed by the simple fact that the 
spectator (when positioned as an absent initiate) is also positioned to receive 
secret and sacred knowledge. Therefore, what we have here is a circle of 
exchange(s) wherein scopic regimes and spectatorial positions keep shifting. 
We can expand on this shifting play of gazes, regimes and positions by turning 
briefly to the fourth of Haddon's ethnographic film~ - recording the technical 
processes involved in fire-making - for it is here that the direct address of the 
cinematic subjects is most explicitly registered.70 This is significant for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, because it is an opening to the types of complex Islander agency 
and subjectivity which surface from time to time in Haddon's writings. In this case, 
three of Haddon's closest informants are shown seated in a grassy plain using the 
friction technique to make fire. Making fire and making film: the alpha and ol!1ega 
of light-based technologies. The question of reciprocity becomes ~omplex here 
because, contrary to the 'cinema of attractions', the purpose of the film is not - or 
not merely - to produce a cinematic spectacle, but rather to produce a cinematic 
narrative. (Indeed, the hearth is a common spatial trope associated with' 
storytelling.) This fact is underscored by the direct spectatorial address between 
70 A clip of this film can be found on the following site: http://aso.gov.au/titles/historical/torres-
strait-islandersjclip2/ [accessed 15/12/11]. 
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cinematic subject and cinematic film-maker, for what is transpiring between them 
is actually a verbal dialogue, albeit one that is shrouded in silence. The cinematic 
subjects are literally addressing the cinematic film-maker both in an exchange of 
gazes and in an exchange of voices. Put more simply, whilst Haddon is filming 
them, they - presumably - are teaching him about making fire, a point which 
renders the obvious asymmetries of power between them more knotted and 
nuanced. 
However, it is here that we also come to the second point of significance about this 
film: the discrepancy between the film itself (qua spectacle) and this dialogue (qua 
narrative), and this returns us to our well-worn problematic of specificity and 
generality, which in this context is also mapped onto the relationship between 
artisanal production and technical reflection. Or, to put it another way, the space 
between the cinematic spectacle and its narrative dialogue is the space in which 
artisanal production is supplemented by technical reflection. What this section of 
the film actually depicts is a specific action of fire-making conducted in a now 
ossified present. In order for this present to evoke a generalized or habitual past, 
Haddon must extract general, technical principles. It is only by so doing that he can 
attempt to stave off the threat of contingency - which, we should remind ourselves, 
is inherent to the medium itself (cf. Doane, 2002, p. 65) - and convert the specific 
into the general. On this basis, the relationship between cinematic spectacle and 
narrative dialogue replicates or. echoes the relationship behyeen experiential 
authority and scientific generalization. The former of each pair represents-
'specificity and the latter generality. Mary Ann Doane makes a similar point in 
terms of the relationship between description (which she associates with 
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contingency, the present and vision) and narration (which she associates with 
necessity, the past, and - by implication - blindness): 
Description is a capitulation to the vast and uncontrollable, and 
ultimately meaningless, realm of the contingent. It is allied with the 
visual (a "picture") and with the contemporaneous ("one describes 
what one sees, and the spatial 'present' confers a temporal 'present' on 
men and objects"). Narration, on the other hand, has an intimate 
relation with the past (it "recounts") and is therefore able to testify to 
necessity and inevitability (2002, p. 12). 
However, it is precisely this kind of tension which sits at the heart of all technical 
processes: the supplementary relationship between technical action 
(performed/described in the present) and logical reflection (preceding such action 
and/or narrated/produced after the fact). This is the point at which technics 
becomes a techno-logy. Despite the tendency to emphasize the latter over the 
former, on the grounds that logical reflection might somehow confound the 
contingencies of technical action, each leaves a trace in the other. On this basis, the 
horizontal foresight of technics gets cross-cut by the vertical blindness of chance 
(Kilroy and Swiboda, 2007). No matter how detailed and thorough one's logical 
account of fire-making, for example, each instance is unique and - of necessity -
subject to the contingent vagaries of environment and materials. This is the 
tension that is contained in the space between the cinematic spectacle and the 
silent narrative, and the join between them is the look to the camera, a look which 
solicits the attention of the spectator and foregrounds the link to the 'cinema of 
attractions'. 
However, where the link to the 'cinema of attractions' breaks down is in the space 
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between spectatorial positioning and audience reception: given its extremely 
limited exhibition to small scientific gatherings, none of Haddon's films had a 
substantial audience to look back, in the same way that other films of the period 
had, and neither did that limited audience see itself mirrored in the film (cf. 
Griffiths, 2002, p. 148). ~evertheless, the film has actually been exhibited on the 
islands more recently by the Australian documentary film-maker, Frances Calvert 
(personal communication). Indeed, Calvert includes a section of the Malu film in 
her important documentary about Islander material culture, Cracks in the Mask 
(1997), which was also shown on the Islands recently, in part as a substitute or 
precursor for the repatriation or loan of the objects depicted. 'By taking the images 
back it revitalises our culture and has created a greater awareness amongst 
younger people' (Anon, 1997, p. 3). A series of more recent documentaries have 
done likewise (e.g. the BBC's recent 'Hidden Treasures "of ... Australian Art' [2011]), 
suggesting that Haddon's films have more of an audience now than they ever had 
at the time of filming. In this sense, the 'cinema of attractions' circle becomes 
complete, wherein the film not only acquires an audience, but an audience who 
recognize themselves in the film. Of course, such recognition is at one remove, 
historically and - to some extent - culturally; the familiar rendered at least 
partially unfamiliar, but it nonetheless provides a mechanism by whic~ an 
audience can supplement the kinds of cinematic spectacle we have b'een looking at 
with its own narrative account. 
However, both approaches - focusing on the spectacle of ethnographic cinema or' 
'the supplementary narratives of its audIence - bring us to a problematic impasse: 
how do we avoid being pushed to either side the screen? The former focuses on the 
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spectacular visibility of the cinematic referents and the latter on the narrativized 
visibility or audibility of the cinematic audience. The problem is that each 
produces its own form of blindness by looking through rather than at the screen -
and, by implication, the camera and its material supports. This move is significant 
here because it marks a ~hift from the type of broadly 'horizontal' analysis that we 
have been conducting thus far - focused on the intermedial relationships between 
cinema, photography, phonetic writing, etc. - to a type of 'vertical' analysis -
focused on the constituent elements within one medium (e.g. camera, tripod, 
celluloid, screen, etc.). As I set out in the introduction, both can be gathered under 
the rubric of the 'writing-machine' and are often intertwined, but the latter in 
particular serves to foreground the presence of the medium's material supports. 
How, then, do we begin to look? How do we shift attention away from either side of 
the screen - referents and audience - and towards the cinematic surfaces 
themselves and what implications does this have? 
III. TransparencY-Opacity-Contingency: Haddonls Cinematic Surfaces 
One place to begin is on the material surfaces of the celluloid itself (cf. Doane, 
2007a, p. 18). This is an area of analysis that is often literally overlooked in the 
study of early ethnographic film - and in film studies more generally, albeit with 
notable exceptions (e.g. Doane, 2002; 2007a; 2007b; Mowitt, 2005). This is 
arguably the case in no small part because of the seductiven~s~ of cinematic 
indexicality, where our gaze is sometimes directed through rather than at the' 
screen. To this extent, cinematic indexicality - as an extension of its photochemical 
base - offers the lure of what Didi-Huberman (cited in Doane, 2007, p. 129) refers 
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to as the 'fantasy of referentiality', a modality"of light-inflected 'touch' allowing one 
the illusion of brushing up against a cinematic referent whilst viewing an iconic 
likeness, if we are to use Peirce's terminology. As Alison Griffiths suggests: 
[O]ne is struck by the tactile quality of the cinematic image, the way in 
which the flat spatial composition and surface textures of the image 
seem to drift out toward the spectator not just visually but through a 
simulated sense of touch (2002, p. 142). 
This is the illusion of distance mastered, to borrow Benjamin's insight (2002 
[1936], p. 105). Such a fantasy could be said to be particularly pronounced in the 
earliest proliferation of 'actualities', film shorts and ethnographic cinema, where -
as we have already considered - the sheer visceral thrill of display preceded the 
emergence of narrativity and montage as the dominant cinematic paradigm(s). 
However, such a lure also threatens to render the material base of the cinematic 
inscription a deceptively transparent one, as one becomes seduced by the 'other 
side' of the screen - the 'that-has-been' of cinema (cinematic index as trace) - or as 
one follows the pointing finger of the indexical sign through the screen and 
beyond: 'look, here is a spectacle' (cinematic index as deixis). Both forms of index 
(deixis and trace) find their way into the cinematic 'fantasy of referentiality', the 
former pointing to a 'something', to a 'this', the latter revealing its specificity. 
Nevertheless, that 'something' in this context is at least doubled, for cinematic 
inscription bears within itself more than just an indexical trace .of its referent(s); 
its bears an indexical trace of its own material conditions of possibility: the action· 
'of light, dust, scratches and temporal decay upon its photochemical base, and the 
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material/ideological effects of the broader cinematic apparatus.71 Such an 
expanded reading of cinematic indexicality renders the material base of the 
cinematic inscription a resolutely opaque one, an inscribed surface composed of 
and by the action of light, dust, scratches and temporal decay, an action which both 
inscribes and continu~lly re-inscribes, creating a surface of imperceptible 
movement and change even in its unprojected stillness (cf. Doane, 2007, p. 129). 
One is pressed against the cinematic surface itself, which, in its own right and in 
light of subsequent debates about indexicality and digitality, poses a range of new 
questions surrounding spectatorship, authorship, contingency, historicity and 
temporality, and which calls for a newly revivified set of analytical codes and 
conventions as one flits between a cinematic surface at once indexical and iconic, 
transparent and opaque. 
It is at this point that we may benefit from a return to C.S. Peirce's work on 
indexicality. Indeed, although I have invoked Peirce's reading of the concept 
throughout this chapter, one of the things worth pointing out here is that Peirce 
reads photography - and we might extend this here to film - as sitting between 
iconicity and indexicality (cf. Metz, 2003, p. 139; Doane, 2002; McLaren, 2003, p. 
26). The photograph or celluloid print both look like and, in a sense, touch ~heir 
referents, but - unlike the footprint and the foot - the line of touch which persists 
between them is only so via the mediation of light (cf. Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, 
71 It should be stressed that, for the most part, I will be using the term 'apparatus' in an 
intentionally narrow sense here to refer to the medium's material supports, or the relationship 
between camera, celluloid, screen and so forth. This is in part to hold the analysis at arm's length 
from from the full force of 'apparatus theory'. However, this is less a principled disagreement or . 
a key theoretical decision - indeed, aspects of what I am calling the 'writing-machine' could 
arguably be accommodated to a broader idea of the cinematic apparatus (qua l'appareil and 
dispositij) - and more an attempt to narrow the focus to the types of material/technical effects of 
interest here. In this sense, the analysis is possibly closer to l'appareil than dispositif, although I 
am less interested in what might be glossed as 'ideological effects' and more in how Haddon's 
attempt to erase the medium's material supports undoes his positivist logic. 
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pp. 113-115; McLaren, 2003, p. 26). One might think here of the opening of Camera 
Lucida where Roland Barthes (2000a, p. 1) describes his youthful self becoming 
fascinated with an image of Napoleon's brother on the grounds that he (Le. the 
young Barthes) is gazing at the eyes that gazed upon Napoleon. This is a 
conjunction of gazes which Jacques Derrida and Bernard Stiegler (2002, pp. 113-
115) analyse in terms of the lines of light and touch. This inbetweenness or 
mediation is, I think, important to consider in that it encourages us to reflect upon 
the sometimes overlooked forms of what we might call 'hyper-indexicality', forms 
which often only appear when one attends to the materiality of the image surface 
itself, when one looks at it rather than (or perhaps as well as) through it, rather 
like a dirty pane of glass which momentarily catches our gaze in contrast to the 
view beyond; it is difficult to apprehend both at once. Just as a footprint is an 
indexical trace of the foot which made it, so too are the dust, scratches and flashes 
of light on the celluloid surface ('spots of sunshine', to reuse Haddon's phrase) (see 
fig. 32 below) indexical traces of the air particles through which the light travelled 
to produce these images, and the processes of time and age which subsequently act 
upon them, none of which are under the regulatory control of the 
cinematographer, and all of which subject the celluloid to the vagaries of chance, 
serendipity, and - perhaps - historicity; in other words, to a certain (technical) 
alterity beyond conscious control.72 This produces a form of, what we might call, 
--
'overwriting' (sometimes passing beyond human perception at display speed): the 
machine literally writing itself on itself, a form of automati~ or auto-graphic 
writing. 
72 Compare Bill Morrison's extraordinary film Decasia (2002) constructed entirely from decaying 
film stock. 
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Figure 32, Film stills from shot one showing marks on the celluloid (Haddon, 1898c) 
These features arguably bring both the cinematic apparatus into view - the 
appearance and disappearance of which is part of our broader dialectic here - and, 
indeed, the effects of history itself (literally time on the screen). However, there is 
another obvious layer of complexity that can be alluded to, and that is that what is 
represented here is, of course, a digitized print from the celluloid, which, contrary 
to certain views on the topic, does not so much as eradicate the issues surrounding 
indexicality and materiality as render them more complex and knotted.73 
Computers, screens and projectors are all material objects and they leave their 
own indexical/material traces, most notably here in the visibly decomposed 
pixelation of the image (see fig. 33 below). Here the 'overwriting' is overwritten 
again; a technological palimpsest. Thus Haddon's film contains both the marks of 
its original and secondary inscriptions (e.g. dust, light flashes, scratches, marks of 
age, etc.) as well as the marks of its tertiary inscription (digitized pixelation). 
73 As we will also examine in the phonograph chapter, such a shift from celluloid to digital 
supports enacts a concomitant shift in interpretation, which is part and parcel of what I mean by 
the 'writing-machine'. 
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Figure 33, Film stills from shot one showing pixelation (Haddon, 1898c) 
These issues of material traces come particularly to the fore in the second and 
third sections of Haddon's film - which are split into three discontinuous shots -
and where Haddon is forced to confront the materiality and opacity of the 
cinematic apparatus. In each of these shots, we see a series of highly 
choreographed, stylized and patterned crouching movements mimetically 
replicating activities associated with agriculture (such as planting yams), fishing 
(such as collecting pearl shells) and ecology (such as the movements of crabs, birds 
and iguanas, etc.). Thus Haddon's choice is as much strategic as it is aesthetic: 
dance as a metonym of the social. Dance in this context is made up of bodies in 
motion and their prosthetic extensions - feathered headdresses, etc. - which 
together create a gestural language that reflects on various economic, ecological 
and religious dimensions of the social; it is, in effect, one form of body movement 
'representing' another. 
So what Haddon is confronted with - or rather orchestrates - is a singular pro- . 
filmic event of bodies in motion, an event with its own internal duration and 
spatial arrangements or logic, but an event nonetheless composed of ephemeral 
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moments. The challenge for Haddon is to make such ephemera exceed themselves 
and their moment of inscription, to make them typify (a culture) rather than 
represent (a moment), to obviate, in other words, the threat of contingency 
implied by the logic of the event. In this case, his singular event is implicitly caught 
between at least three contradictory - or perhaps overlapping - temporal 
formulations wherein the so-called 'real time' of the event is made to exceed itself: 
firstly, the event as part of, what we might call, a structural-present, or, more 
commonly, an 'ethnographic present' (the ahistorical motif: where individual 
historical action - 'this is how X person performed a dance on that day' - invokes 
generic habitual behaviour - 'this is how the X people perform such dances in 
genera}'); secondly, the event as part of a present-becoming-past (the vanishing 
native motif: where one presents oneself as before the deluge, just in time to 
record the last moments of the damned) and thirdly, the event as part of a past-
becoming-present (the reconstruction motif: where depictions of partial or 
complete reconstructions are given the scientific seal of indexicality, in this case 
partial reconstructions of dances much reduced by missionary influence). So one 
either denies historical time - slicing through to the typical - invokes it as a form of 
imminent loss, or regards it as the backdrop to one's ruins. In other words, one is 
either outside time, just in time or too late. These temporal formulations produce· 
fracture lines which run throughout the project as a whole, but all three provide a 
means of shifting from the event, a fleeting moment captured in time - one day, 
one set of people, one location -, towards that which exceeds t~at event, and, as 
such, they provide a means of staving off the spectre and threat of contingency· 
"implied by the logic of the event itself. 
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However, the crux of such a threat is that it leaves its mark(s) on 'both sides' of the 
screen: both the pro-filmic event and the inscription process. Haddon has already 
responded to the former by trying to efface the presence of the event (or reduce it 
to structure); he now responds to the latter by trying to efface the presence of the 
apparatus (or reduce it to transparency). In this regard; Haddon finds himself 
caught in an unresolved tension between transparency - a desire to obliterate the 
presence of the apparatus, to 'touch' the spectral referent and evaporate its 
contingency - and opacity - a realization of the impossibility of any such 
obliteration. The film's surface stubbornly refuses to be occluded and Haddon is 
forced to weave between it and its 'beyond'. 
The attempted erasure of the cinematic apparatus operates in a number of 
overlapping ways (relating to temporality, spatiality and light): firstly, disavowing 
any intentional ruptures, cuts or edits (Le. attempting to make the time of the 
event - so-called 'real time' - consonant with that of its representation, and this is 
the 'real time' which I have suggested has been made to exceed itself); secondly, 
giving the camera a fixed position (no pans, close-ups or other movement, etc.74) 
and thirdly, replicating the height, positioning and light intensity of vision. Clearly 
these factors are (at least in part) determined by the mechanics and limitations of 
the apparatus (circa 1898), but such an eventuality is not in itself incidental or 
--
ideologically neutral as Jean-Louis Baudry (e.g. 1992) has made clear in his 
cinematic apparatus essays. In this context, what is being primarily established or 
demonstrated is a positivistic fantasy of cinematic transparency. 
74 See Mowitt (2005, p. 153) on the later attempt to incorporate the zoom shot in ethnographic 
film as a 'visual sign of nonintervention', on the grounds that one can appear closer without 
moving the camera. 
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However, the attempt to efface the apparatus meets with certain crucial limit 
points, most neatly summed up in this case by a series of ruptures or - what Mary 
Ann Doane (2002, pp. 159-160) refers to as - 'ellipses' created by a series of 
camera jams in this case - and here we return to Melies' 'stop tricks'. This happens 
three times in the second set of clips, represented below (fig. 34) in three 
horizontal rows (1-3, 4-6 and 7-9). 
Figure 34, Film stills from shots 2, 3 and 4 of the film (1898c) 
The numbers in the central vertical column (2, 5 and 8) represent the point just 
before or after the jam and the numbers at the left and right of each represent 
moments a few frames either side. Numbers 2 and 5 are just after the camera has 
been restarted (Le. it is the beginning of the new shot rather than the end of the 
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old) and number 8 is just at the point of the jam (after which he gave up and went 
on to a new subject: fire-lighting). 
Such ruptures (whether intentional or not) were disavowed by some as producing 
an unpalatable perceptual shock, and courted by others (e.g. Georges Melies) as 
producing magical effects of appearance and disappearance. As Stephen Bottomore 
remarks in his study of the origins of cinematic editing: 
[Shot transitions] without warning and without intermediate change 
[meant that the] eye suffered a shock [ ... ] for a new eye, one image 
replacing another in a flash does in fact give the impression of a magical 
substitution, a lightning-like metamorphosis (1990, pp. lOS, 112). 
Both responses (perceptual shock and magical fascination) are closely analogous 
to, and bound up with, the affective relations between modernity, technology and 
subjectivity, but they are particularly pronounced in this case given that the 'edit' 
was produced by a contingency of the camera. To Haddon - no great theorist of 
modernity - this is a mere nuisance, a risible opacity of the equipment, the glass 
turned to sand, the water to snow, but such ruptures are highly overdetermined 
and lodge an opaque screen between the event and its representation (both 
literally and metaphorically). Such a space of opaque mediation is of particular 
concern to Haddon because it means that the representation carries both less and 
more than the event. It records too little (there are gaps and discontinuities in the 
record, and no record, however c9mplete, will substitute for a cultural milieu) and 
too much: it creates points of deviation between the representation and the event-. 
- '. as-spectated in terms of temporality, spatiality and light, all of which cut into 
I 
Haddon's attempt to efface the presence of the apparatus. 
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Firstly, we see the rupturing of so-called 'real time', which not only produces a 
jarring shock to the smooth spatial and temporal flow of the film, but much more 
pointedly becomes an exemplar of the concealed rupture that is cinema itself. In 
other words, the rupturing of so called 'real time' merely foregrounds what is 
normally hidden (Le. that cinematic 'real-time' is an effect of projection: stillness 
made to masquerade as movement). Secondly, we see a magical disappearance of 
the performers as they are cast into an off-screen space - evoking Bottomore's 
'lightning-like metamorphosis' (see fig. 34, number 2) - and the subsequent 
movement of the camera into that space (see fig. 34, number 5), which destabilizes 
the film's momentum, drawn from a contrast between the rapid movement of the 
dancers and the relative stillness of both the camera and the photographic 
tableaux in the background. Thirdly, we see a brilliant excess of light intensity (see 
fig. 34, number 2) at the point of rupture, rendering the image opaque (or at least 
translucent), and this highlights the extent to which the very light which makes the 
image transparent or legible is what, in it excess, makes it slide towards the 
opaque and the illegible: a cataract forming over a camera eye. 
The significance of such a material focus is that it foregrounds the artifactuality of 
the image or image construction process and makes visible the technology of 
cinema itself (and/or its effects), all of which, so the argument goes, have been 
traditionally occulted or effaced ,.in classical narrative film. SUC? artifactuality is 
bound up with - and unveils - the history o/the inscription itself and the histories . 
. -. '- in which such an inscription is embedded. In Mary Ann Doane's apt phrase (2002, 
p. 143), it reveals a film 'stained with [its] own historicity'. Less obviously perhaps, 
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such a focus also challenges the residual hylomorphism (or form-matter relations) 
of cinema, which often reads the celluloid surface as inert matter to be formed -
and thereby submerged - by an overarching cinematic authority or authorship. 
Challenging such an approach gives the camera and the materiality of the 
cinematic surface a role in the authorial process: the machine literally writing itself 
on itself. Just as the carpenter or sculptor can never fully master their materials, so 
too the film maker can never fully master theirs. This exposes the film surface to 
more than the effects of light, but also to the godly whims of chance, as we have 
seen. Some film makers have deliberately courted such effects by literally showing 
the camera on screen or actually marking or scratching the surface of the film, but 
what I have tried to explore here is the extent to which such experiments 
foreground what is already there - but perhaps occluded - in other forms of 
cinematic inscription, either through extremely visible marks of historical decay or 
through fossilized instants or ruptures within and between frames which are 
barely perceptible to the eye at projection speed. The challenge of such an 
approach is to sidestep the poles of residual hylomorphism on one side - which 
reads the cinematic surface as inert matter - and a form of materialist determinism 
on the other, which reads the celluloid surface - as well as cinema's broader 
material conditions of possibility - as entirely constitutive of cinematic inscription 
(without residue). The former gives cinematic materfality too little significance, the 
latter too much. Thus the challenge is to lay recourse to a non-reductive reading of 
cinema's material base, as part of.the condition of possibility for, but not the limit 
point of, cinematic inscription. 
I would argue that it is precisely the accumulation of these kinds of effects which 
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ultimately presses Haddon into a decisive - and perhaps damning - double bind: 
i.e. that his images offer both too little - acting as poor substitutes for vanishing 
referents and requiring supplementation to counter illegibility - and too much -
becoming, on the contrary, too legible, too overdetermined and prone to manifold 
readings, too excessive and open to chance encounters and unencumbered 
historicity (cf. Griffiths, 2002, p. 143). Indeed, it is perhaps for this very reason that 
Haddon, in his later years and published works, began to turn away from indexical 
technologies, and their visually or acoustically rendered surfaces, towards a more 
strictly phonetic writing, a turn which post-Victorian anthropology at large began 
to effect. As mentioned before, this was part and parcel of a more general shift in 
anthropology from data to meaning, surface to depth and positivism to its others, 
etc. However, what at one level might be read as a turn away from the 
reductiveness of positivism can also be read as a turn away from the excessiveness 
of indexical technologies. On this reading - and we will develop this in the next 
chapter - anthropologists began to squeeze the human sensorium through the 
'bottleneck' of phonetic writing (Kittler, 1999, p. 4) in a bid to either bypass 
indexical technologies altogether or to hold their excesses in check. Either way, 
such a move could not succeed without residue, and this is most forcefully in 
evidence in the disjunctive logics and kaleidoscopic colours of Haddon's 
ethnographic imagination. Haddon's oeuvre swings'between the 'red and green' 
excesses of an experiential prose and the 'black and white' interests of a rigorous 
science, and that is a tension whi~h remains unresolved, but ultimately - I would 
suggest - creatively generative for the anthropological generation to come. 
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PART III: PHONOGRAPHY 
'The Exhalation of the Past': Moribund Objects, Mimetic 
Machines and A.C. Haddon's Phonographies 
Memory is unique to each one of us, and it is familial, tribal, communal, the seepage into 
our minds of other memories, an intravenous inheritance, the past in our bloodstream, 
elixir, stimulant, poison, antidote l ... ] the exhalation of the past that shapes the present, 
like the glassblower's breath in the bubble of hot, melted sand. 
Peter Quinn, 'In Search of the Banished Children' (1997, p. 143) 
Media Convergence: The Digital Uncanny 
Each of the preceding chapters has examined the set of tensions which arise in the 
shift from medium specificity (centred on the indexicality of photography and 
cinematography; cf. Doane, 2007, p. 129) to intermediality (the sets of 
relationships between or within these media and their others: published phonetic 
writing, drawing, handwriting, etc.). However, one of the core points of tension is 
that the one never gives way to the other in any complete or clean-cut way. There 
is no clear point at which photography slides into. - and thereby becomes' - its 
others, or cinema!ography ceases to maintain its medium specificity, etc. Despite 
appearances, each remains distinct and yet - perhaps paradoxically - at the same 
time is clearly marked by its situatedness, relatedness or juxtaposition with or 
within its others. Such a tension or problem is neither coincidental nor extraneous 
to the medium in question. It is an inherent or latent tension, but one which 
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becomes especially marked, highlighted or pronounced in situations of intermedial 
proximity. 
Such a tension has also been registered within this thesis, which is nominally - and 
self-consciously - structured around medium specificity, but which gives way at 
each instant to a set of intermedial complications to such specificity. In this 
chapter, phonography will participate in the same set of tensions as photography 
and cinematography, but, as deployed by Haddon at least, it will do so in very 
particular ways with very particular consequences both for our discussion of 
intermediality and for our discussion of indexicality and motion. This chapter will 
therefore add to the continuing discussion of medium specificity and 
intermediality both by considering the role of phonography within this set of 
questions but by also considering a question that has remained peripheral or 
latent up to this point: the question of media convergence. Indeed, it is precisely 
because medium specificity does not give way to intermediality in a clear-cut way 
that Haddon is forced to look for solutions which will merge - what Friedrich 
Kittler in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999, passim) likes to call- 'data streams'. 
Interestingly, however, Haddon's work appears to reverse the direction of travel 
that Kittler schematizes in Discourse Networks. Summarizing in Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter, Kittler (1999, p. 3-4) suggests that, circa 1800, phonetic writing offered 
a clean and unitary funnel through which the human sensorium could be 
channelled, and thereby transfonped into, the written signifier. The compatibility 
between each signifier - even, or perhaps especially, if that compatibility is one of. 
-- ., binary opposition - meant that the game of signification could be played on a level 
playing field. Without necessarily surrendering to the idealist implications of this 
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sentiment, signifiers could be referred back to other signifiers and, at least in 
principle, all sensation could be rendered comparable in ways that were 
impossible with variant sensations like touch and sound, for example. As Kittler's 
translators, Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz put it: 
The discourse network of 1800 depended upon writing as the sole, 
linear channel for processing and storing information. For sights, 
sounds, and other data outside the traditional purview of language to 
be recorded, they had to be squeezed through the symbolic bottleneck 
of letters, and to be processed in meaningful ways they had to rely on 
the eyes and ears of hermeneutically conditioned readers. Reading, in 
that sense, was an exercise in scriptographically or typographically 
induced verbal hallucination, whereby linguistic signs were commuted 
into sounds and images (in Kittler, 1999, pp. xxiv-xxv). 
Circa 1900, enter into this walled garden the indexical triumvirate of the 
nineteenth century: photography, phonography and cinematography. For Kittler, 
this suggests that acoustical and visual 'data streams' became detached for the first 
time both from the human sensorium itself and from the relative comfort of the 
written signifier: 
With the advent of phonography and film, however, sounds and 
pictures were given their own, far more appropriate channels, resulting 
in a differentiation of data streams and the virtual abolition of the 
Gutenberg Galaxy (Winthrop-Young and Wutz in Kittler, 1999, pp. xxiv-
xxv; cf. pp. 4-6, 14). 
Whatever the merits and demerits of such an argument, Haddon is, in a sense, 
faced with this predicament in reverse: he starts with a disembodied human 
sensorium and the kinds of mutually incompatible 'data streams' that are essential. 
- "for a nascent positive science, particularly when such a science fears a loss of 
object. However, as we have considered already, such disembodiment and mutual 
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incompatibility pose serious threats, not only to the goals of a positive science, but 
to the goals of a positive science that wishes to communicate its intentions, 
methods and conclusions to an interested scientific audience and, even more, to a 
general and popular readership. In short, some form of media convergence - for 
which read media translation - is in order. As we have considered in the preceding 
chapters, Haddon's response is to channel such variant 'data streams' through 
phonetic writing, albeit in ways which are simultaneously incomplete, fragmentary 
and excessive, and, as we shall consider in this chapter, such an approach to 
merging different media reaches a certain limit point or complication with the 
phonograph. 
One might begin to establish this by first pointing to Kittler's own addendum to his 
'discourse networks', suggested in Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999) and 
developed in Literature, Media, Information Systems (1997): circa 2000, the spectre 
of media convergence returns via the question of digitization. The divergent, 
analogue 'data streams' of 1900 converge once again, but this time as binary code. 
This is ultimately a form of writing itself, of course, but one which must be 
'machine-read'. Writing in 1985, Kittler (1999, p. 2) prophesied that digitization 
would precipitate a convergence of media, or - more hyperbolically - the 
obliteration of media altogether (cf. Doane, 2007, pp. 130, 143). In the context of 
Haddon's media archive, this produces unanticipated intermedial relationships 
and juxtapositions which reveal" the uncanny qualities latent within the media 
themselves and within their inter-relationships. Indeed, there is something of a. 
-- "paradox here in that digitization draws' all media through one convergent, digital 
filter - l~ke phonetic writing circa 1800 - whilst at the same time revealing each 
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medium in all its specificity. The closer the media are brought together, the more 
we are able to understand their differences. 
Auld lang Syne: IThe Wonders of the Gramophonel 
We therefore encounter two types of media convergence, analogue and digital. 
Haddon's obvious adherence to the former means that, by drawing his multiple 
data streams through the filter of alphabetical writing, he must simultaneously use 
and occult such streams. The multiplication of data streams is therefore both a 
blessing and a curse for Haddon: the former because it enables greater empirical 
depth and scope, and the latter because it is contingent and unwieldy. As we have 
said, he attempts to sidestep this by re-converging such data streams back into 
letters. As a result, their combined affective force is not always felt. No matter how 
intermedial it might be, a piece of travel writing, for example, is not the same as a 
multimedia presentation. However, it is somewhat ironic that one of the ways in 
which these streams can be made to most fully enact their affective potential (in all 
their analogue medium specificity) is by attending to their digital convergence. In 
other words, one can shift from an intermedial publication to a multimedia 
presentation by way of digital reproduction. Despite the now shifted bond between 
inscription and referenes, one can activate the uncanny and discrepant registers of 
Haddon's media by so doing, and two of the key elements for this effect are chance 
and simultaneity. To choose one prominent example, such an ef~ec~ is produced 
when - as happened to me by accident - one inadvertently ends up listening to a 
75 There is obviously a large body of writing on the relationship between indexicality and 
digitality, but particularly notable or relevant examples include: Doane, 2002, 2007; Kittler, 
1999 and Stiegler, 2002. 
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digitized phonograph recording of the expedition's linguist, Sidney Ray, on the eve 
of the expedition 76, whilst simultaneously reading a scanned copy of his obituary in 
an anthropological journal (see fig. 35 below).77 
This is an aural version of Barthes' 
(2000a, p. 95) analysis of the 
simultaneously dead and dying 
prisoner in Camera Lucida (Ray is 
dead and he is going to die) and it 
serves to highlight the paradoxical 
closeness and distance of indexical 
r~cording technologies, even if this 
is at one digital remove. The 
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Figure 35, Obituary of Sidney Ray (1858-1939) Manl 
April 1939, p. 58 
distinction here and seemingly the source of such uncanniness - is not that 
between the seeming vivacity of Ray's voice in the phonograph recording and the 
presence of death in the obituary. It is the realization that the obituary is merely 
drawing out more explicitly the presence of death/absence which is (of necessity) 
enshrined within the phonograph recording itself (cf. Derrida and Stiegler, 2002, p. 
39). That is what affords Ray's voice such a haunting, ghostly quality; it is so close 
and yet so far away; the aural 'focal' point keeps shifting. 
One could have such an uncanny encounter with a phonograph and a hard-copy of 
the journal, of course, but doing so digitally on one computer heightens the effects. 
76 British Library Sound Archive: 'Auld Lang Syne' Australia, 1898, A.C. Haddon & C.S. Myers, 2.38, 
C80-1485, C1. 
77 Whilst reading the obituary, I accidentally moved the cursor over the sound file, which started 
playing Ray's voice without me initially realizing. The sudden realization that the same person 
was being referred to in both forms of inscription produced a particularly uncanny effect. 
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of chance and simultaneity. This chance simultaneity exposes the spatial and 
temporal discrepancies between the two representations and between both and 
then/there and now/here. More than twenty years had passed between the 
invention of the phonograph in 1877 and Ray's recording in 1898 - a period of 
time which seemingly did little to lessen the machine's affective qualities, 
particularly where recording was concerned - and more than forty years passed 
between the recording and Ray's death in 1939. Historical time becomes uncannily 
flattened in the act of listening. What was recorded was for the purposes of a 
hypothetical future which has already come. 
This effect is heightened by the fact that the recording depicts Ray giving a 
demonstration of the 'wonders of the phono ... gramophone' (a telling slip of the 
tongue caught in wax), after which his friends and colleagues gather to say farewell 
by singing 'Auld Lang Syne'. Based on a Robert Burns poem about the passing of 
time, 'Auld Lang Syne' (literally 'old long since') is most commonly sung at New 
Year's Eve, but is also sung at any social event which marks both an end and a 
beginning, e.g. graduations, journeys, funerals, etc.78 This further levers open the 
relationship between the phonograph and death (cf. Brady, 1999, p. 15). The 
endings/new beginnings are multiplied: the expedition itself, the fear of cultural 
death of the Torres Strait Islanders (imminent and immanent) and the death of the 
expedition memb-ers themselves (imminent and immanent). All participants are 
dead and going to die, and this re,~lization - or experience - in a moment of digital 
78 One might think here of Gavin Bryars' attempt to musically grapple with The Sinking of the 
Titanic (1969-). In some versions of this composition, the ambient strains of a seemingly calm 
sea are combined with the gentle ringing of a buoy's bell and the implied sounds of revellers at a 
party on-board the ship. The temporal implication is clearly of a before and an after, and the 
sounds have been processed to sound as if they are emanating from the bottom of the sea; close 
and yet distant. 
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media convergence is both effectively uncanny and uncannily affective. Edison's 
'Home' phonograph (Haddon and Ray's machine of choice), used at home, opens 
itself up to the unheimlich. 
Aside from its general focus on voice and speech, sound and music, and loss and 
the machine - all of which will be examined in this chapter - this interlude 
suggests two important specific points. The first is a reiteration of a point from the 
introduction: namely, the extent to which a shift in archival supports (e.g. from 
wax and paper to binary code and hard-drives) effects a shift in interpretation, 
experience, archivization and institutionalization. This is part and parcel of what is 
meant by the 'writing-machine' and once again it enacts a shift from an intermedial 
or 'horizontal' analysis (between phonography and phonetic writing in this case) 
to a medium specific or 'vertical' analysis (from wax to computer memory). 
Sometimes this shift is geographical, topographical or topological (for example, the 
recording in the above vignette is lodged digitally within the British Library Sound 
Archive and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Studies rather than at Cambridge University). To this extent, digitization 
precipitates a type of institutional or archival spread which - although contained 
within - is not bounded by these traditional institutions. This is a shift of, 
space/place as well as a concoI?itant shift of authority; it is a dispersal as well as a 
gathering (cf. Derfida, 1995, esp. 1-23). At other times, the shift from analogue to 
digital actually precipitates a repetition of an earlier discursive construct. For 
example, the question of digitization figures in a peculiarly recurrent· version of the 
,trope of loss that we have been tracing throughout this thesis: namely, that the 
analogu~ recordings created to indemnify against loss are themselves subject to 
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the threats of decay or loss. The response this time is to digitize, a process which is 
rhetorically encrusted with ideas of permanence and solidity. As Mary Ann Doane 
suggests (2007, p. 143), the 'cultural dream of the digital is a dream of 
immateriality, without degradation or loss'. In that sense, this is not only a return 
of the threat of loss (albeit reformed), but a return of the related threat of 
contingency. Digitization promises (and obviously fails) to finally render the 
process of mediation invisible, or at least translucent rather than opaque, and to 
escape the ravages of material decay. Therefore, what at one level might be a loss -
a broken bond between referent and representation - might at another level be a 
gain: a promise of immaterial permanence (cf. Doane, 2007, p. 143). However, as 
we considered in our discussion of film in the previous chapter, such a promise is 
as likely to be compromised by digitization as enabled by it. 
The second point that this interlude suggests is the extent to which phonography is 
such an inherently temporal medium, both in the general sense of past/present 
relations (phonographic recordings are always a/the past [cf. Ames, 2003, p. 314]), 
and in the more specific sense of the role that temporality plays in the perception 
of recorded sound itself. Indeed, this latter quality takes on an a particularly 
important significance here and begins to shift phonography away from other. 
media, like photography for e~ample. The 'meaning' of any phonograph recording 
(that is to say, our ability to perceive it as such, rather than it semiotic qualities) is 
entirely dependent upon temporal duration in a manner analogous to one's 
immediate perception of music, to choose one prominent example~ 
Such a point suggests Husserl's influential discussion of the distinction between 
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primary, secondary and tertiary retention (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 124-163). 
Following Husserl's favourite example of musical perception, primary retention is, 
according to Husserl, what makes that perception possible as such. As each musical 
instant slips away into the past, we must rely on an immediate act of memorial 
retention in order to join these instants into a meaningful whole that we 
experience as music. Whilst so doing, we simultaneously project our perception 
into the future (what Husserl calls 'protention'), in anticipation of future musical 
instants (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 128, 138). Together, these instants are gathered 
together and meaningfully perceived as music. In other words, we literally could 
not hear music as music without memory. This is analogous to the process by 
which we perceive the projection of discontinuous still images in cinema as 
movement. In the musical example, such temporal discontinuities in sound are 
perceived as the smooth flow of musical perception. This effect is even more 
effective in auditory experience, because, unlike film, we cannot slow it down to 
reveal its discrete components (or at least not in the same way). Therefore, the 
illusion of a smooth flow of sound is even more convincing. This lack of 
discreteness poses something of a problem for Haddon, as we shall consider later. 
In sum, what will constitute a musical unit of analysis? 
Secondary retention refers to the process of memory at one remove from the event 
(e.g. remembering a piece of music that one had heard earlier in the day). Tertiary 
retention - an area that Husser~ was famously uninterested in and which was 
subsequently taken up in phenomenal detail by Bernard Stiegler (e.g. 1998) -. 
refers to the process of externalization by which such memory is stored up or 
written down, etc. Phonograph recordings clearly fall into this latter category, but 
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these three memorial modes form more of a loop than a line in the sense that one's 
perception of something like a phonograph recording depends upon primary 
retention, and one's later remembrance of such perception could be regarded as 
secondary retention; the circle is complete. 
Interesting, although such an insight about phonography's inherently temporal 
nature might move phonography away from photography, it actually brings it 
closer to cinematography, for 'temporal duration' is really 'movement' by another 
name (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 196). Just as with our discussion of cinematic movement 
or kineticism in the previous chapter, part of the core fascination with the 
phonographic apparatus itself and its recordings is not only that they bestow a 
certain movement, dynamism or vitality, but that they do so of necessity. Cinema 
stopped is photography; phonography stopped is silence. 
From Social-Semiotics to Mediation-Translation 
Each of these themes - archival supports, loss, temporality and movement - will be 
developed later in the chapter, but let us first move to a brief methodological 
consideration of the kinds of analysis which I would like to conduct here. For' 
Haddon at least, phonography is embedded in an intermedial context in at least 
three main ways: explicitly as a sociological phenomenon; peripherally as a 
photographic object and implicitly as an intermediary between speech and writing, 
music and graphical notation. The second strand here has already been explored· 
briefly within the photography chapter, but also touches at times on the other two 
strands .. I therefore propose to perform two overlapping tranches of analysis: 
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firstly, examining the phonograph (qua material object) and phonography (qua 
practice) from a broadly socio-semiotic perspective. Here we overlap with 
Elizabeth Edward's analysis of anthropological photography (e.g. 2001): 
photography qua social mediator rather than, or as well as, photographs as 
evidential or semiotic surfaces. Indeed, phonography figures prominently and 
similarly in Haddon's writings, and Head-Hunters in particular, sometimes in terms 
familiar to Michael Taussig's (1993, pp. 200-207) reading of what might be called 
the 'technology of enchantment'79, but more often - alongside photography - as a 
means of general social interaction. Either way, the significance lies in the fact that 
the phonograph is there at the scene of inscription, foregrounding the apparatus 
itself. Like the 'cinema of attractions', it is not only the 'natives' who are fascinated, 
as we considered in our 'Auld Lang Syne' interlude, and also like the 'cinema of 
attractions', one of the principle sources of fascination is with the process of 
recognizing oneself in the apparatus. 
Secondly, I propose to examine the phonograph as a means of transformation from 
speech to phonetic writing and from music to graphical notation. To that extent, 
this second tranche sees the phonograph adopting one of the original purposes 
intended by Edison: the phonograph qua mechanical amanuensis or copyist, albeit. 
with something of an ironic ~hift from office and home (Haddon used Edison's 
'Home' phonograph after all) to the field (cf. Brady, 1999, pp. 1, 22-23). Indeed, this 
function is doubled here such that the phonograph qua mechanical amanuensis is 
implicitly transcribing - and rendering tangible and immortal - the' final words of, 
79 This phrase is most commonly associated with Alfred Gell's essay (1999, pp. 159-186), 'The 
, Technology of Enchantment and the Encharitment of Technology'. Here I mean it in the more 
general sense implied by Michael Taussig (1993, pp. 198), i.e. what he calls 'the white man's 
fascination with their [colonial subjects'] fascination with these mimetically capacious machines 
[photography, film, phonography, etc.]'. 
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the dying (cf. Kittler, 1999, pp. 11-13). As' Kittler suggests (1999, p. 13), '[t]he 
realm of the dead is as extensive as the storage and transmission capabilities of a 
given culture [ ... ] In our mediascape, immortals have come to exist again'. 
In this context, phonography performs these functions - transcribing and 
preserving - by becoming an intermediary between speech and phonetic writing, 
music and graphical notation (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. xii). Following Kittler's discussion 
of media convergence, such a process of mediation enables an otherwise 
bewildering variety of data streams to be returned to the comforting familiarity of 
a convergent 'Gutenberg Galaxy' (Kittler, 1999, p. 4). Whilst Kittler's translators 
suggest that phonography can 'faithfully manipulate the spoken word in ways that 
no longer require that speech be translated into writing' (Kittler, 1999, p. xii), 
Haddon's predicament is that such a process of translation is a necessity. So far as 
he is concerned then, the process of mediation between speech and phonetic 
writing and music and graphical notation marks a shift from the material 
unwieldiness of Edison's 'fugitive sound waves' (cited in Brady, 1999, p. 1) to - a 
perception of - the control offered by phonetic writing. In this sense, phonography 
adopts the role ofa true medium (cf. Brady, 1999, pp. 8-9). 
However, the vital mediating role it plays in this regard is but one link in a long 
chain of musicological conversions or translations that need to be telescoped out. 
There is a second - and prior -, order of transformation at work here: from the 
. . 
materiality of the voice to speech and from the complexities of audible sound -
., including the sound of the machine and.the audible traces of its recording surfaces 
- to mu~ic. One must therefore make a distinction between speech and music (qua 
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meaningful signification) and voice and sound (qua material excess, 'fugitive sound 
waves', etc.). The transformation of the latter into the former involves a distinct 
process of occultation, not only of the machine and its recording surfaces, but of 
the sonic complexities and contingencies of sound and voice. 
Thus, we have a chain of transformation expanding from sound to music to 
graphical notation. However, between sound/music and graphical notation, 
phonographic inscription adds a third mediating layer by transforming 
sound/music into material culture qua tangible recorded object (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 
313). This is an extension of the idea that material objects (like the masks of the 
previous chapter) might encode historical narratives. In this context, sound and 
music are being encoded as material objects. Only then can such sound (qua music) 
be transformed into graphical notation, and only then can the latter be further 
transformed into information to build an evolutionary narrative (information qua 
positive data [cf. Ames, 2003]). 
The process of transformation therefore telescopes out like this: from 'noise' to 
meaningful sound, from sound to music and material culture, and from material 
culture to phonetic writing, graphical notation and information. This is similar to 
the process of transformation we saw in the previous chapter where an invisible 
memory was converted into a visual, material form. In this case, we shift from an 
invisible and intangible sound to "an inaudible but visible surface. However, this is 
not just a shift from the invisible to the visible. As with the previous chapter, the. 
- ,more specific link between memory and vision comes into play - adding a fourth 
mediati~g layer - as much of the music waiting to be transcribed stems from 
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memorially mediated, post-hoc reconstructions. To that extent - under certain 
circumstances - the process of transformation might actually telescope out like 
this: from memory to 'noise', meaningful sound, music, material culture, phonetic 
writing, graphical notation and information. 
Whatever way we choose to order this complex and expanding set of 
transformations or translations, it is this second tranche of transformation or 
translation that will prove the most problematic for Haddon, not least because it is 
the place and source of the most bafflement, excess and contingency (cf. Ames, 
2003, p. 304). That is not simply because of the complex chain of transformations 
involved and the possibility of going astray at each stage, but also because the 
phonograph itself records too much as well as too little. In other words, it is not a 
silent or transparent partner in the process of mediation. Part of its strength is that 
it records more than passes through readily perceptible semiotic filters (the 
materiality of the voice, the shuffling of the material surfaces of the machine, etc.) 
(cf. Ames, 2003, p. 314). This authenticates 'raw data' as data, but it also produces 
streams of excess which have to be whittled away in the process of analysis, 
successfully or otherwise. Haddon has therefore to follow a circuitous route 
whereby once recording technologies function to gather and authenticate their 
data, they can be cast aside, as transparent and/or incidental to the analysis, 
successfully or otherwise. 
I. Phonographic Exhibition: 'Voices Echoed from The Mysterious Instrument' . 
Thus adumbrated stand our two main tranches of analysis. Let us then begin with a 
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discussion of the phonograph qua sociological phenomenon. To open with by far 
the most resonant source for such an analysis (Haddon's [1901] popular 
travelogue, Head-Hunters), explicit references to the phonograph (qua material 
object) and phonography (qua practice) appear no less than twenty-seven times in 
the book. These are instances of what I might call 'phonographic events', and will 
act as the units of analysis for this more sociologically and semiotically oriented 
section. This book therefore offers the deepest and richest seam for a sociologically 
oriented reading of how phonography mediates colonial social relations between 
Haddon's team, the Torres Strait Islanders and inhabitants of Papua New Guinea. 
As with the analyses that we have conducted thus far on photography and 
cinematography, Head-Hunters again becomes a most valuable source, not least 
because Haddon's methodologies and informal interactions - seemingly of 
peripheral interest to the more 'scientific' and less 'narratively' focused Reports80 -
are left clearly on display and operative within the book. Indeed, the relative 
volume of references to the phonograph, whilst not overwhelming, is itself 
interesting in that it represents roughly a third of all Haddon's references to media 
in the book, despite the fact that of his three core modes of inscription, it is 
photography which leaves a disproportionately high trace within the published 
materials associated with the expedition (e.g. the six volumes of scientific Reports, 
the various articles and Head~Hunters). This is deeply symptomatic of (amongst 
other things) the-' beguiling performative appeal of the phonograph, an appeal 
which is matched only by the ~agic lantern slide as a form of entertainment, 
.-
edification and, perhaps most crucially, a form of social interaction eliciting. 
. ethnographic material. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that both performative 
80 Bearing in mind that such a dichotomy between science and narrative is neither posed explicitly 
by Haddon nor endorsed uncritically here. 
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modes (each approaching the temporality and dynamism of cinema) tend to either 
sit side by side or overlap in Haddon's writings (and in Head-Hunters in particular). 
It is also worth stressing that, although little remains to record audience responses 
in any detailed way, Haddon later exhibited such multimedia displays to a 'home' 
audience back in England (Griffiths, 2002, pp. 134, 148). In other words, the 
performative appeal of the phonograph is a general one, even if the filtering of 
colonial power therein is far more context-specific. 
As a result, such beguiling qualities need to be first set within the context of the 
various ways in which phonography often figures within colonial writings, 
sociologically and semiotically. For example, one of the first ways in which it 
appears is via the 'colonial farce' trope that we encountered in the first chapter on 
photography. This trope functions by rendering comedic or farcical the 
unwillingness of the informant to comply with and/or understand a request to be 
filmed, photographed, recorded or measured, etc. (cf. Gitelman, 1999, pp. 122-
123). As the writer most often assumes their presence and right to record to be 
both takenfor granted and unquestionably rational, such unwillingness is almost 
always coded as some combination of ignorance, irrationality, truculence, greed, 
laziness or stupidity rather than resistance, however muted or inchoate. Therefore, 
what might be excised from a 'scientific' account as an epistemological failure is 
converted in a popular account into the kind of anecdotal whimsy that raises a wry 
smile from the anthropologist, tra:veller or knowing reader. 
- ,Such a trope also has a distinct class dimension and maps very neatly onto the 
early re~eption of the phonograph in Europe and America (cf. Gitelman, 1999, pp. 
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121-122). As Erica Brady suggests (1999,· ch. 2), one popular feature of such 
discourse is the presence of an urban, wealthy elite mocking the lack of 
understanding of the unsophisticated masses - either metropolitan or rural - who 
simply cannot comprehend the relationship between machine and sound or 
referent and acoustic signifier without recourse to violence (witness the famous 
early advertising campaigns for the phonograph [cf. Gitelman, 1999, pp. 122-125]). 
As with so many other comparable examples, a rhetorical chain is created between 
colonial subjects, metropolitan or rural masses, children and animals (cf. Brady, 
1999, p. 29), a point which phonograph advertisers made considerable rhetorical 
use of (e.g. the 'listen to the band' or 'his master's voice' series [Gitelman, 1999, pp. 
124-125]). 
One of the other related ways in which the phonograph appears in colonial 
writings is via the more familiar 'technology of enchantment' trope: 'the white 
man's fascination with their [colonial subjects'] fascination with these mimetically 
capacious machines', as Michael Taussig (1993, p. 198) would have it. Following 
Taussig (1993, pp. 200-203), one might think here of the famous scene in Robert 
Flaherty's 1922 film, Nanook of the North where one of the bewildered Inuit 
protagonists attempts to consume a phonograph record being played. Or one 
might think of Werner Herzog's 1986 film, Fitzcarraldo, where the trope is 
extended such that 'native' fascination with the phonograph (whilst travelling up 
river - the colonial trope par eXfellence) might be exploited for the purposes of 
placation (cf. Taussig, 1993, p. 203). The assumption is that the 'natives' will not be . 
. able to understand the technology - and the colossal body of scientific knowledge 
behind it - and will therefore mysticize such technology by incorporating it within 
216 
their own worldview (e.g. attributing 'magical' properties and powers to a machine 
that can copy the voice and bring back the dead). This effect is all the more 
powerful if the recordings themselves are of a sacred or magical nature. At that 
point, message and medium merge in the realm of the mystical. 
Finally, and this is most often the case within anthropological and 
ethnomusicological writings, the phonograph sometimes appears via the trope of 
an authenticating albeit anecdotal reportage ('today we recorded native song using 
the new machine .. .' 'I was there ... I recorded this data'). Predictably for Haddon, it 
is this final and somewhat more prosaic figure which makes its presence felt most 
forcefully in his writings. Nonetheless, it is the play between these tropes which 
offers the most insight into the sociological and semiotic mechanics of the 
phonograph. 
However, it would be useful to sound a note of caution at this point, albeit one 
which contains an important methodological and theoretical clarification. I would 
not like to overplay the presence and force of these tropes here, partly because, as I 
hope to demonstrate in a moment, they present themselves with more subtlety, 
nuance and specificity in Haddon's work, but more importantly because - to 
reiterate one of the underlying arguments of this thesis - one cannot simply pre-
format an overarching set of colonial tropes and then foist them upon singular 
pieces of literature, without e~pecting unexpected deficiencies, excesses and 
" 
contingencies. This is part of the broader framework within which this chapter: 
-- , and, indeed, to a larger extent this thesis, is located: a call for specificity and 
nuance ,~n readings of complexly singular colonial relations. The first tranche of 
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this argument is therefore fairly conventional: close attention to the ways in which 
phonographic events figure within such writings cautions against any generalized 
or stereotyped conclusions about how the phonograph mediated colonial social 
relations in toto. 
This point will be expanded upon in more detail in the conclusion, but suffice to 
say at this stage that the first tranche of the argument follows similar calls by 
analysts of colonial and anthropological specificity, such as Elizabeth Edwards 
(2001), Nicholas Thomas (1994) and Ann Laura Stoler (2010). For each of these 
analysts, the devil is very much in the ethnographic detail. In some senses, such 
scholars could be said to be merely applying an anthropological and ethnographic 
penchant for microscopic (,bottom-up') specificity to the broader field of 
anthropology itself. Viewed from such a perspective, there is' often a lack of fit 
between specific writings and generalized tropes. However, I want to go further 
than this by arguing that this lack of fit is precisely wherein the analysis lies, and 
this is where we move from the first to the second tranche of the argument. Such a 
call also resonates with the (perceived) tensions between an Anglo-American 
strand of 'poststructuralism' (itself an Anglo-American term of convenience) 
drawn from Foucault and a similar strand drawn from Derrida. Such tensions are 
played out with more nuanc~ and subtlety in the actual engagement between 
Foucault and Derrida (e.g. Derrida, 2001, pp. 36-75), but it serves to make the 
point here that such a tension, ~owever carefully construed or formulated, also 
plays out in a shift from what is sometimes claimed to be a 'top-down' reading of a. 
-- " generalized 'colonial discourse' (as a unitary entity) to a 'bottom-up' reading of a 
complex and fractured multiplicity of social relations, ideas and writings. Of 
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course, one could easily argue that any talk of a tension between 'top' and 'bottom' 
misunderstands Foucault's more fluid or permeable reading of power (1998, pp. 
92-102). Indeed, such positions do not need to be posed in such stark binary terms 
in the first place. 
However, whatever the merits of this claim, different points of emphasis, drawn 
from different theoretical and methodological sources, can nonetheless be 
prioritized. In this sense, I consider the analysis here to be calling for one such 
point of emphasis (Le. making a claim for the analytical importance of the detail) 
rather than taking sides in a falsely binarized polemic. In my view, details often 
reveal complex conceptual knots (not necessarily - but often - aporias) which, 
when partially unravelled (there is no endpoint or hermeneutic finality), not only 
reveal complex connections between convergent or divergent ideas and practices, 
but, perhaps most importantly, often take one unawares in terms of their 
specificity and in terms of the forms which those details take, despite the 
conceptual framework one brings to it in the first place (e.g. our set of colonial 
tropes). Details beget details in this sense, some of which push one further into the 
immediate work, some of which open up other intertextual associations. 
To t?at extent, and bearing in ,mind the obvious risk of reductionism, the analysis, 
here is indebted 'to a broadly 'deconstructive' - at times explicitly Derridean -
approach to a type of alterity (not reducible to 'cultural difference') that is 
simultaneously anticipated and surprising (cf. Derrida, 1997, pp: 157-164; Royle,. 
-- ,,2003, p. 57). The irony of such a position is that those who make the call for 
'bottom-.up' subtlety and nuance in readings of 'colonial discourse' very often elide 
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the differences between Foucault and Derrida in the name of a generalized 
'poststructuralism', which commits the same generalizing error they are critical of, 
or even a generalized 'postmodernism', which is even worse. Put simply, the point 
to make is that Derrida (cf. 1997, pp. 157-164) has more to say about subtlety, 
nuance and specificity than such critics might care to admit. I would, therefore, like 
to conduct the following analysis in the critical spirit of those who want to move 
away from an undifferentiated notion of 'colonial discourse', but without 
jettisoning the theoretical sensibilities drawn from certain strands of 
'poststructuralism' . 
Phonographic Encounters 
Our first encounter with the phonograph in Head-Hunters (Haddon, 1901, p. 36) 
follows an account which significantly uses sound to register the cultural hybridity 
that Haddon most often renders as loss. The scene emerges on Mer ('Murray 
Island') within the context of a war of wills between the expedition members and 
an influential Samoan preacher and teacher, Finau, who fears that Haddon's work 
will risk a 'recrudescence of paganism' (Haddon, 1901, p. 35). In this context, and 
partly for Haddon's benefit, a neighbouring village decides to lay on a mllsical 
performance of songs from 'Thursday Island [the administrative' centre of the 
Islands] or from the crews of fishing-boats' (Haddon, 1901, p. 35). Indeed, it is 
worth pointing out that such a source for the songs is significant: the colonial 
administrative centre and the sea are literally fluid sites of hybrid interaction' 
. between cultural influences. Conse'quently, and to Haddon's enduring 
disappointment, any desire for pristine cultural 'authenticity' is once again 
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thwarted by a complex hybrid mixture, and like so many similar scenes, Haddon's 
tone suggests a mixture of farce and pathos. The performers arrive in their 'Sunday 
best', the songs are Japanese, the girl's faces are daubed with white powder and a 
'dab of red pigment on each cheek' - in imitation of Japanese settlers - and the 
dancing swings between a barely recognizable European polka and a pale 
imitation of a carnivalesque mass ornament: 
[A] man blowing a whistle walked round and round and called out, 
"Twenty-five cents a ride," or something to that effect. Next a number of 
men ranged themselves in pairs, like the spokes of a wheel radiating 
from a hub of girls. The latter sang, and the men walked round and 
round the girls, gradually going faster and faster. This was in imitation 
of a merry-go-round which had paid a couple of visits to Thursday 
Island (Haddon, 1901, p. 36).81 
Condensed in this small vignette is the whole, complex history of colonial relations 
on the Islands: the interstitial location between Europe and Asia; the impact of 
European missionization; the reach of industrial capitalism and its carnivalesque 
entertainments via Thursday Island, the administrative centre ('So popular was 
this merry-go-round that I was informed the owners made a profit of £1,600 for 
three months' work' [Haddon, 1901, pp. 36-37]); the ambivalence of colonial 
mimicry; the flexibility of Islander cultural forms to absorb and reflect the 
changing histories in which they are embedded (as we saw with the model-plane 
'dance machines' in the previous chapter), etc. However, what is particularly 
significant in this example is that the familiar complexities of cultural hybridity are 
being channelled through bodily movement and sound. This i~ the shape and 
sound of industrial capitalism, colonialism and Christianity, or rather it is the shape' 
and sound of their absorption and recapitulation. From the 'la la la - la la la' of a 
81 This story is recounted in Haddon's journal of the expedition (1898b, p. 65). 
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transformed European polka ('copying a white man's dance', Haddon, 1901, p. 36), 
to the whistle of the merry-go-round, the Islanders are translating the complexity 
of their historical circumstances into the terms of familiar cultural forms like song 
and dance. This is an exercise in meaning-making, assimilation and perhaps even 
mockery in Bhabha's terms (Bhabha, 1994, ch. 4), rather than an exercise in bald 
mimicry. It returns a warped and unflattering vision/echo of Europe back to itself 
(cf. Bracken, 1997, p. 5). However, for those such as Haddon, this scene merely 
highlights the extent to which music and language are particularly ephemeral and, 
when combined with the supposed mimicry of the Indigenous population, are 
extremely susceptible to being 'lost' through hybridity (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 310). 
It is perhaps for this reason, therefore, that this is the scene which precedes the 
introduction of the phonograph, with its brimming potential for musical and 
linguistic redemption. However, there is something of an irony here in that its first 
appearance is as part of 'an evening entertainment in the schoolhouse' (the 
expedition team's centre of operations), being used primarily to play 'band-music 
and songs' from England (Haddon, 1901, pp. 37, 338). Following a pattern that 
would become familiar, the phonograph becomes situated somewhere between 
entertainment, pacification, inducement and ethnographic solicitation. It is 
consequently not a surprise tc? see it paired up with the magic lantern, both of 
which have the dual function of inscription and performance. Indeed, as Eric Ames 
(2003, p. 310) makes clear in" his examination of the field of comparative 
musicology (one of the forerunners to ethnomusicology), the dual function of. 
--- -"Edison's phonograph gave it something, of a dual reputation as both poison and 
cure in relation to Indigenous music: the spread of popular song by the 
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phonograph was often partly blamed for the destruction of 'traditional' music, 
even if the ephemeral nature of this music could be best captured by such a 
technology. Sociologically and semiotically then, the phonograph figures as both a 
metonymic echo of Western civilization, and as an inscribing cure to Western 
civilization's poisonous decay (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 310). As Erica Brady suggests: 
The phonograph as a force in popular culture accelerated the process of 
corruption and decay of traditional ways of life - or so claimed many 
ethnographers. Ironically, many chose the phonograph - the very agent 
of corruption - as their tool of choice in preserving the disappearing 
remnants of those ways (1992, p. 2). 
In this light, it is significant that both of the phonographs which Haddon brought 
with him (Edison 'Home' phonographs) had a dual record and playback function, 
as this dual function is a crucial part of its social situatedness. However, at this 
stage it is the latter which takes precedence. As Haddon (1901, p. 338) tells us, he 
had brought recordings of 'band-music and songs' from England, presumably with 
the express intention of using them to entertain and to solicit ethnographic 
information, but, in the first instance, they soften the force of his request for 
compliance. Such recordings bookend his opening speech, producing an effect that 
is subtle but noticeable: on its first appearance, the phonograph is imbued with 
power, an inducement to make representations rather than - or as well as - a 
means of making representations themselves. 
Haddon's opening speech is a req'uest or injunction to conduct research, or rather 
an explanation of what is to be done: 
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I opened the proceedings with an address in jargon English, and 
referred to my last visit and told them what we wanted to do this time 
(1901, p. 37). 
In the context of colonial administration, Haddon's rights of access had obviously 
not been established through consultation with the Islanders, but through 
representatives of the colonial order. Referring his listeners to his past visit in this 
context has the dual effect of refreshing their memories and anchoring his 
authority to return. At this point, the line between demand, call and request starts 
to thin, but there is little doubt that Haddon merely assumes the right to present 
himself on the Islands and to record. The details of what is to be recorded and 
when might be subject to negotiation, but not whether such recordings proceed in 
the first place. In an attempt to supplement and/or soften his speech, such a 
demand or call is followed immediately by 'a couple of tunes on the phonograph', 
which, in this regard, begins to perform something that 'unmediated' speech 
cannot, something beyond conventional signification: a demonstration of a 
'superior' technical prowess, an unspoken but sounded injunction to comply (cf. 
Gitelman, 1999, p. 122) .. 
In this light, it is somewhat ironic that the phonograph is introduced as a 
replacement for what would otherwise have been live musical accompaniment. 
Charles Myers, the expedition's musician, 'was to have performed on his violin, but 
unfortunately the violin had suffered from damp, had become unglued and had 
fallen to pieces' (Haddon, 1901, p: 37). The phonograph's first fun,~ti9n is therefore 
to replace a broken violin, and Ray, the expedition's linguist, is left in charge of the' 
phonograph, rather than Myers, the expedition's musician. The process of 
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disarticulating music and musician has therefore been made a necessity by the 
material contingencies of the tropical climate (the same climate which had caused 
Haddon's cinematographic camera to regularly jam), but the symbolic power 
wielded by the machine is made all the more forceful as a result. 
This effect is heightened by having the phonographic recordings followed by a 
magic lantern slide of an earlier expedition to the Islands in 1845 (under Captain 
Blackwood), complete with images of all-powerful ships and compliant Islanders. 
By implication, this is a claim to prowess coupled with a call for compliance, and it 
is at this point that Haddon attempts to conjure the dynamism and sound of his 
other media: the illustrated slide, Haddon tells us, depicts a 'noisy, gesticulating 
crowd of naked savages' (1901, p. 37, emphasis added). Embedded in this context, 
the phonograph becomes a metonym of colonial power. Its sheer presence and 
functioning, irrespective of content, signifies (cf. Pietz, 1987, pp. 268-269). It is 
inextricably, albeit ambiguously, bound to the same cultural, economic and 
political forces that Haddon is trying - or claiming - to hold at bay (cf. Ames, 2003, 
p.310). 
However, as if to supplement the stick of compliance with the carrot of reciprocity, 
Haddon follows the magic lantern slide with a recent photograph of a gift of fruit 
given to the team by the Islanders (literalizing the ethnographic gift economy that 
Haddon wishes to participate in: photographing the gift as a gift returned); a 
photograph of a recent wedding (seemingly at the request of the participants); and 
- "a photographic selection from his previous visit in 1888. After another 
phonographic interlude, Haddon (1901, p. 37) exhibits some slides 'of native 
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decorative art and native drawings of animals', alongside some comic slides and 
finishes with 'a couple of phonograph records'. By implication, this is an 
ethnographic quid pro quo, a reciprocal - if entirely asymmetrical - social contract 
of sorts. 
On this reading, phonography is enmeshed in a complex intermedial power-play. 
However, what is interesting is the extent to which the Islanders appear neither 
particularly intimidated nor especially fascinated by the machine. Where one 
might expect to see an appearance of the 'technology of enchantment' trope, it is 
often the opposite that occurs. Indeed, the relative indifference to the phonograph 
. is perplexing and interesting. Reiterating our earlier train of thought about the 
symptomatic lack of fit between general tropes and specific writings, what Head-
Hunters often reveals is precisely the extent to which the Islanders understood and 
exploited both the power and pathos of the phonograph and its recordings. As 
Erica Brady makes clear, responses to the phonograph were often more 
nonchalant than it would otherwise appear: 
Native and other informants brought their own cultural equipment to 
the experience of being recorded, enabling them to face the mechanical 
wonder with more nonchalance than the patronizing anecdotes give 
them credit for - sometimes with more sangfroid and dignity than ~ 
members of the culture intent on recording them (1999, p. 30-31). 
This can be considered, for example, in the way in which Islanders and Papuans 
often appear to bend it to suit their own purposes, which, more· often than not, is 
.' . 
about the pleasure of hearing-oneself-speak or sing after the fact. Indeed, once' 
Haddon shifts emphasis from using the phonograph to 'exhibit' (and the visual 
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metaphor is somewhat interesting in this regard) recordings brought from home 
(popular songs and band-music) to those recorded in the field, one theme repeats 
itself over and over: the exquisite delight in hearing-oneself-speak or sing, the 
visceral thrill of hearing one's voice echo back as if from beyond the grave. As 
Haddon tells us about his trip to British (Papua) New Guinea and after: 
During our stay at Bulaa [British New Guinea], Ray gave several 
phonograph demonstrations and recorded some of the local songs. The 
natives were never tired of listening to the machine, and fully 
appreciated singing into it, and were very delighted at hearing their 
songs repeated by it. [ ... ] 
In the evening we had a performance on the phonograph, which gave 
great enjoyment to the natives of both sexes and all ages. As in New 
Guinea, the reproduction of their own songs pleased the people much 
more than hearing the band-music and songs on the cylinders we had 
brought with us from England (1901, pp. 234, 238). 
Figure 36, Phonographic recording by Ray in British (Papua) New Guinea (from the collections of the 
Cambridge Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology [see P.2057.ACH1-P.2058.ACH1])82 
82 The use of an Edison 'Home' phonograph in this context (that great icon of bourgeois 
This theme of aural pleasure seems 
to far outweigh any fascination, fear 
or ignorance associated with the 
phonographic apparatus itself. What, 
then, might be at stake in this 
pleasure? To some extent, one might 
suggest that the thrill lies precisely 
in the deJay between' speaking (or 
singing) and hearing. This is perhaps 
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Figure 37, 'Ulai singing Malu songs into a 
Phonograph: Gasu is beating the Malu drum', Head-
Hunters (Haddon, 1901, Plate VI., B., facing p. 49) 
an ironic echo of Derrida's (1973, pp. 78-79) discussion of the phonocentric (auto-
affective) feedback loop of 'hearing (understanding) oneself speak', but in this case 
without the comforting illusions of interiority or self-presence. Indeed, it is 
important to remember that one's voice sounds fascinatingly or disconcertingly 
different once disembodied and delayed (as anyone playing with their first 
recording device will attest: 'Is that really me?' [Royle, 2003, p. 54]). Without the 
resonating chamber that is one's head and body - and which only the bearer can 
hear - one hears oneself as if from afar, likes others do, as an other. One becomes 
an other to oneself, which is ironically how anthropologists and 
ethnomusicologists often construct their subjects/objects: self-alienated others. 
However, it is also important to stress that the phonograph does not merely divest 
the voice of a body; in a sense, it dis- and then re-embodies the voice. Within the 
machine itself, the resonating wood and metal take the place of one's body. This 
domesticity) is something of a delicious irony here. Domestic space is replaced by public space 
and 'home' is replaced by the colonies. This photograph also suggests the one above from the 
Malu recordings (fig. 37), which we examined in the cinematography chapter. In both cases, the 
phonograph itself also becomes the object of the photographic gaze. In this context, it is also 
interesting to note that Frances Calvert's 1997 documentary about Torres Strait cultural 
material, Cracks in the Mask, opens with a phonograph as a metonym of Haddon's project. 
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might pose something of a threat (to personal authority, self-presence, etc.), but it 
can equally be experienced as an exquisite, uncanny delight, part of the frisson of 
which is a foretaste of one's own death and resurrection in wood and metal; death 
and immortality are both to-come.83 
Most of the subsequent phonographic encounters are also split between the dual 
functions of inscription and performance (with or without references to magic 
lantern slideshows), but between which one can usually detect the distinct 
patterning of colonial power. More often than not, the phonograph becomes an 
active player in the solicitation of ethnographic and biological information, 
material culture, photographic opportunities and, of course, field recordings. The 
phonograph sits at the very centre of Haddon's multimedia apparatus, both as a 
social lubricant and as a scientific instrument in its own right, and as with other 
instruments of colonial knowledge, it is suffused with colonial power. To that 
extent, the 'technology of enchantment' argument is implied rather than plainly 
stated, albeit contained within a seemingly benign anecdotal tone which anchors 
and authenticates the narrative ('I was there. This is how 1 made my recordings'). 
Haddon hopes that the apparatus will hold sufficient interest to enable other 
transactions to take place, and in a recapitulation of the tensions between scientific 
generalization and poetic narrative that we saw in the first. chapter, the 
phonograph often follows the latter whilst adopting the tone of the former. Here 
are a selection of examples from across British New Guinea and the Torres Strait: 
83 Alongside pleasure, the other important implication of auditory delay is that it forces the 
listener into a realization of the difference between acoustic signifier and referent, contrary to 
the stereotyped trope by which colonial subjects (and children, animals or the working classes) 
would not be able to understand the difference. 
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Into, and out from, the sombre shadows there passed lank women and 
jolly children, whose bronze skins were picturesquely lit up by the 
flickering yellow flames. We traded a little with the natives, and Ray gave 
some tunes on the phonograph. [ ... ] Next morning we returned to Iasa 
[ ... ]. I measured ten men and did some trading. 
[T]owards evening [we lit] a fire, sitting by which we had our dinner, a 
crowd of natives watching our every action with great interest. We 
afterwards bought some specimens, whilst Ray gave a phonographic 
exhibition, and secured two good records (Haddon, 1901, p. 100, 
emphasis added). 
[ ... ] On Monday morning we measured ten natives pretty thoroughly 
and took a number of photographs. Ray exhibited the phonograph, and 
obtained some new records, whilst Seligmann worked hard at native 
medicine (Haddon, 1901, p. 174). 
[ ... ] We went ashore about eight o'clock the following morning and 
stayed till about four in the afternoon. We measured half a dozen men, 
and made records of their hair, eyes, skin, ears, etc. Seligmann tested 
the tactile sensibility of one or two natives, and got some interesting 
results. Ray gave a tune on the phonograph, and got some young people 
to sing a hymn on a blank cylinder. Wilkin took some photographs 
(Haddon, 1901, p. 200). 
The colonial knowledge-power relations that were latent within Haddon's opening 
speech start to take on a more concrete quality here. More often than not, the 
phonograph sits right at the centre of a coercive and racialist practice of 
knowledge production, albeit most often as the lure rather than the direct 
instrument. Crucially, what these examples suggest - and this point can be 
extended to the opening speech - is that, sociologically speaking, Haddon is using 
the phonograph to methodologically supplement the other media. In other words, 
there is a type of methodological and sociological intermediality at work here. For 
example, when photographic portraiture fails or becomes difficult to conduct 
because of a lack of stillness or concentration, phonogra'phy becomes a 
.. photographic enabler by stoking a sense of faScination, placation or focus. The 
resultant photography might be published as self-sufficient and separate, but 
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Head-Hunters is particularly interesting in pointing to the medial lack which 
phonography attempts to make good. This effect can also be considered in reverse, 
where phonography fails to achieve its goals and photography is used to fill the 
gaps. Indeed, this appears to be one of the main reasons why Haddon so often 
deploys a combination of phonograph recordings and magic lantern slides to get 
what he wants. 
This can be examined in an addendum to the scene of colonial mimicry that we 
encountered in the photography chapter, where Gewe - the Papuan chief - refused 
to remove his European top hat and guard-bandsman's uniform to submit to be 
photographed (Haddon, 1901, pp. 244-246). Here Haddon explicitly deploys a type 
of audio-visual colonial sovereignty to achieve his epistemological - and, by 
extension, political - demands (cf. Pietz, 1987). In an attempt to force capitulation, 
Haddon initially deploys his tried and tested method of phonographic exhibition. 
However, this effect fails and for rather telling reasons, i.e. because Gewe and his 
coterie do not appear to 'understand' the machine (Haddon, 1901, p. 246). Rather 
than such ignorance giving way to magical enchantment, placation or even self-
interested manipulation of the machine, it gives way to indifference. Consequently, 
Haddon attempts to display photographs of Indigenous dances to get Gewe to 
submit to be photographed, ~nd when this doesn't work, he attempts to deploy 
both photography and phonography. Indeed, the only thing that convinces Gewe to 
doff his top hat in respect is when Haddon (1901, p. 246) exhibits a magic lantern 
slide of Queen Victoria whilst playing a recording of 'Soldiers of the Queen' on the. 
, phonograph.84 Such an articulation of music, militarism and monarchy rhetorically 
84 In her book length study of the phonograph, Scripts, Grooves and Writing Machines (1999), Lisa 
Gitelrrian publishes a cartoon sent by an admirer to Edison in which a colonial 'type' destroys a 
231 
picks up on Gewe's quasi-militaristic bandsman's uniform as w~ll as Haddon's 
ironic references to Gewe's 'regalia'. The portrait of the Queen seems to mockingly 
echo Haddon's portrait of Gewe, not least because Gewe - although not quite a 
sovereign - is a self-styled leader of his people. He appears to understand how to 
align his own power (or perception of power) with that which appears to emanate 
from his 'European' clothing, with its rhetorically encrusted military and royal 
associations. In other words, this is not about 'magic' or 'mysticism' misplaced; it is 
about power. However, it is interestingly at this point that Haddon's tone shifts 
from one of mockery of Gewe's attempts to 'copy' European clothing and 
mannerisms to one of patronizing respect, a tone which spreads from clothing and 
mannerisms to implicitly racialized readings of his face; compliance appears to 
improve physiognomy. 
He had a fine distinguished face. He held himself well, and behaved like 
a gentleman. When the portrait of Queen Victoria was on the screen, the 
phonograph played "Soldiers of the Queen," and I made Gewe take off 
his hat. He did so cheerfully, as if he understood the Queen should be 
respected, and directly after the picture was changed I let him put it on 
again (Haddon, 1901, p. 246). 
Here we have a direct meeting between the colonial sovereignty of the monarch (at 
this time, the Torres Strait Islands were still legally 'Crown land') and the power of 
photography and phonography to encapsulate,' amplify and· enforce such 
sovereignty. Such-a knowledge-power relationship is, of course, very much implied 
within all of the preceding phonographic encounters, where colonial power is 
never far from colonial knowledge production, but it takes on a strange literality in, 
phonograph because he cannot distinguish between mimetic representation and reality. To 
double the theme of mimicry for comic effect, the cartoonist has the colonial type pick up a top 
hat left on the beach (Gitelman, 1999, p. 122). 
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this context. The irony of this particular encounter is that Haddon has unwittingly 
- and contrary to his own intentions - partially succeeded in doing what European 
missionaries and colonial officials had been claiming to do all along: to make 
colonial subjects in the image of their imperial overseers. 
'The Mysterious Instrument' 
Amongst these generalized examples of phonographic encounters in Head-Hunters 
lies one encounter in particular that is worth considering in more detail, not only 
because it is one of the more complex examples of tangled cultural hybridity that 
Haddon recounts in detail, but because at its heart lies the phonograph itself as a 
central and emblematic figure, albeit in ways which loosen the categories with 
which colonial phonography is sometimes understoo~. The scene emerges in the 
Mekeo district of British (Papua) New Guinea at a Catholic mission station. Haddon 
hopes to use this as a base for a later ethnographic excursion into the interior, and 
in order to find favour with their hosts, Haddon and Ray decide to deploy the 
phonograph: 
Ray, by request, had brought the phonograph ashore, and he gave a 
selection on it in the course of the evening, greatly to the delight of the-
Fathers and Brothers, none of whom had ever heard one before. 
Brother Philip, a kind-hearted, merry Dutchman, who is always smiling 
and laughing, and who is one of the musicians of the fraternity, was 
child-like in his enthusiastic appreciation of the machine. We persuaded 
some natives to sing into the phonograph, and, as usual, they were 
delighted at hearing their own voices echoed from the mysterious 
instrument (Haddon, 1901, p. 252). 
The casual reference to a childlike state is extremely interesting in this context, not 
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least because it is not directed at the Indigenous population - as is the stereotype -
but rather at a Dutch missionary who, rather pointedly, also happens to be a 
musician. The fact that he is a musician is interesting in that - unlike the 
Indigenous listeners - his fascination is both with the apparatus itself and with the 
pre-recorded music brought from Europe. As someone who plays music, his 
fascination is seemingly drawn from the fact that this is the first time that he has 
heard music disarticulated from its makers. As Erica Brady remarks: 
For a first-time listener, the phonograph demanded a new and 
unfamiliar way of hearing in which the source of the sound was 
completely divorced from the usual accompanying sensory information 
derived from visual interpretation of movement (1999, p. 33). 
By contrast, the response of the Papuan listeners is arguably subtly different. If the 
response of the Dutch missionary suggests the pattern of the 'technology of 
enchantment' (Le. a fascination with the apparatus in itself), then the Indigenous 
response appears to suggest the affective power of the delayed voice that we 
discussed earlier. Haddon's reference to 'the mysterious instrument' is clearly 
intended to elide the gap between the response of the missionaries and that of the 
Indigenous listeners (implying the 'technology of enchantment'), but there is 
nothing to suggest that the latter group views the instrument itself - as opposed to 
the voices emanating from it - as particularly mysterious. That would be to mystify 
what might otherwise be read as a generalized curiosity, knowledge or ignorance. 
Indeed, one need not attribute magical properties to a technolo"gy one does not 
fully understand. Part of Haddon's own fascination with the machine appears to be 
with its seemingly inexplicable ability to capture Edison's 'fugitive sound waves' 
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(cited in Brady, 1999, p. 1). For him, perhaps as much as it is for the Islanders, it is 
the 'mysterious instrument' (Haddon, 1901, p. 252). However, to know that it 
works - and without supernatural prompting - is not the same thing as to know 
how it works, any more than for contemporary users of cars or computers. On the 
basis of Haddon's writings at least, the suggestion is that the latter is the case with 
most of the Islanders who come into contact with the machine. Nonetheless, many 
of the Islanders and Papuans - and the community leaders or 'chiefs' in particular 
- appear to demonstrate a distinct understanding of the ways in which the 
machine mediates colonial power relations by amplifying, immortalizing and 
expanding the power of the human voice. Seemingly without specific prompting 
about content, some of the community leaders deliver speeches into the 
phonograph suggesting not only an understanding of the power of the machine, 
but an understanding of the ways in which it might be incorporated within - or 
made to serve - existing cultural practices like oratory. One can, therefore, make a 
distinction between a conventional reading of such scenes via the 'technology of 
enchantment' trope (e.g. the Islanders attributing bewildering and 'magical' 
powers to' the machine) and a reading of these scenes which suggests keen 
Islander knowledge of colonial power relations. 
For example, after an ethnographic trip into the interior of the district, Haddon and 
colleagues later return to the mission station with a phonograph recording made 
during the excursion: 
In the evening Ray gave a phonograph entertainment. On his visit a few 
days earlier he recorded a speech by Matsu, the chief, in which he 
exhorted the people to make the Government road, and finished off 
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with a hunting song. This speech sounded very fine; it begins with the 
customary loud clearing of the throat, and the sentences come in bursts, 
the intervals of silence being evidently part of the orator's art (Haddon, 
1901, p. 268). 
This encounter is more complex than it might first appear. Unlike the earlier 
encounters, where pleasure is implicitly taken from a temporal delay but a spatial 
continuity (recordings of speeches or songs played back in the presence of the 
performers but after the fact), this encounter is shifted from the context of 
recording both temporally and spatially. This has a number of important 
consequences. For instance, the listeners are no longer assumed to be members of 
the the chiefs own group, which means that any specific contextual meanings shift 
into the realm of generalization and typification. This is not a specific speech for a 
specific group of people; it is a general speech representing a type, a form posing 
as an entertainment. In short, the contexts of listening are different and this shifts 
the focus of the meanings. 
We have already considered this type of shift many times in this thesis (e.g. in the 
relationship between generalized viewings of photographic types and specific 
viewings of individual friends and relatives, etc.). This is part and parcel of 
anthropology's broader predicament between the general and the particular, but it 
maps onto phonographic con~exts in very similar ways. For example, in Frances 
Calvert's 1997 documentary, Cracks in the Mask, the Torres Strait elder and 
cultural historian, Ephraim Ba~i, is played one of Haddon's phonographic 
recordings of an unnamed informant recounting a mythical tale. Up to that point,. 
all focus had been placed on the recording as a general representation of a 
particular tale, but Bani is amazed to discover that the storyteller is his wife's 
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ancestor. Such a shift of focus obviously has significant implications for how one 
understands a recording, and it is all too easy to forget such significance within an 
anthropological setting. As Alan Jabbour remarks about contemporary interest in 
early Native American recordings: 
To the scholars they provided fascinating documents for the study of 
cultural history; but for the spiritual heirs of the traditions the cylinders 
documented, the recordings had the greater intimacy of being 
"somebody's grandfather" (cited in Brady, 1999, p. 5). 
In this context, it is clear that the listeners in the missionary station are hearing a 
very different recording than that intended by Matsu, the chief. For the general 
audience, it is posed as an 'entertainment', a general demonstration of the 
apparatus with the added frisson of a colonial setting and subject. For Haddon, it is 
a demonstration of the machine's incredible ability to not only represent content, 
but to capture and generalize form. Haddon is not interested in representing 
Matsu's speech in all its specific detail; he is interested is using it to typify the 
general art of oratory, and his enthusiasm appears to come from the power of the 
phonograph to locate such an art in the space between voice (qua material trace) 
and speech (qua signification). As Kittler's translators remind us: 
[Phonography] records all the voices and utterances produced by 
bodies, thus separating the signifying function of words [ ... ] as well as 
their materiality [ ... ] from unseeable and unwritable noises (Kittler, 
1999, p. xxviii). 
In this sense, it is telling that Haddon (1901, p. 268) should be most interested in, 
. the fact that the phonograph has m.anaged to capture that which exceeds 
conventional signification, e.g. 'the customary [for which read typical] clearing of 
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the throat' and 'intervals of silence'. The aesthetic qualities of these vocal nuances 
are of more interest to Haddon than spoken content, even if he must draw such 
data back through the filter of the written signifier in order to bring them to 
significance. 
By contrast, Matsu clearly intends a much more specific group of listeners with a 
much more specific content-focused context in mind. In the split between form and 
content, the former is the condition of possibility of the latter in this context, rather 
than a separable and hierarchically ordered entity. By posing the speech in this 
way, Matsu appears to demonstrate a core understanding of at least three key 
elements: a knowledge of the vagaries of colonial power relations (whatever the 
specific details, advocating participation in the building of a government road in 
late 1800s British New Guinea is hardly a politically neutral act); a knowledge of 
the phonograph as a technical means of amplifying such power; and a knowledge 
of how both can be channelled through - and assimilated within - existing cultural 
forms, such as oratory. 
Such phonographic insights are not restricted to the Indigenous population. 
Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable section of the chapter is towards the end 
where, in a peculiar conflati~n of missionaries and Papuans, Haddon uses the 
occasion of a phonographic exhibition to make racial observations of the French 
missionaries: 
Sunday, July 17th - We all went to early morning Mass, and Ray 
afterwards exhibited the phonograph to a very large audience of 
demonstrative, excitable natives and delighted missionaries. I was 
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particularly struck with the calm, strong, sweet face of the Sister 
Superior. She is a Parisienne, with a narrow face and a finely-shaped 
nose. The two Savoyarde Sisters contrasted with her in having round 
faces and snubby noses; their more homely countenances were brimful 
of simple-hearted kindliness. An instructive demonstration of two 
European races when I was on the look-out for a lesson in Papuan 
ethnology! The phonograph selection was decidedly mixed, but that did 
not matter in the least. The Sisters appeared most pleased with the 
European orchestral marches (1901, p. 273). 
The first point worth stressing here is the context: just as Islanders and Papuans 
appear acutely aware that the power-voice nexus can be amplified by the 
phonograph, so too the missionaries - arguably more than almost any other group 
- remain acutely aware that the power invested in the the voice exceeds mere 
speech or signification. One need only think of the the performative power of 
missionary oratory, for example. Indeed, Matsu is not the only one to excel in the 
rhetorical power of oratory. Therefore, giving a phonograph demonstration 
straight after a morning Mass takes on an extra significance here: one set of 
mediated voices is being replaced by another. 
The second point worth stressing is the set of contrasts: despite the seeming 
conflation of missionaries and 'natives', the latter are 'excitable' and 
'demonstrative', whereas the former are 'delighted'; the 'round faces and snubby 
noses' of the Savoyarde Sisters are 'homely' and 'brimful of simple-hearted 
kindness' in contrast to the narrow-faced Parisienne with the 'finely shaped nose' 
whose face is 'calm, strong and sweet' (Haddon, 1901, p. 273). Such contrasts are 
relatively rhetorically nuanced, but the implication of racial dif~~r~ncing is clear, 
even - or perhaps especially - if that is within a European context. One need only' 
think back to Haddon's writings on Ireland (see the photography chapter) to be 
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reminded of the fact that references to 'round faces', 'snubby noses' and 'simple-
hearted kindness' take on a racially charged, atavistic quality here, in contrast to 
the aquiline features of 'modern' northern Europeans. Once again, the phonograph 
participates in this racializing process as an important social protagonist at the 
scene of inscription, albeit in a more conceptually knotted way than before. 
Each of these sociological examples demonstrates the extent to which the 
phonograph (qua material object) and phonography (qua social practice) not only 
mediate colonial social relations in a general way, but become an active 
protagonist in the construction, distribution and perpetuation of a racialized and 
power-laden colonial knowledge. However, without laying recourse to a non-
discursive reading of humanistic resistance, such knowledge-power relations are, 
at the very least, more porous than they would otherwise seem. Indeed, this is part 
and parcel of our more general debate about nuancing colonial discourse analysis. 
This is most emphatically not to deny a colonial power-knowledge nexus, but 
simply to point to examples were such a nexus is subtly inflected by the 
complexities of social relationships on the ground. As mentioned before, such a 
'view from below' is in no way incompatible with a Foucauldian reading of power 
(Foucault, 1998, pp. 92-102), which is flexible and fluid enough to accommodate 
such nuances, but it is noneth~less at odds with the blanket way in VJhich Foucault 
is often deployed 'in colonial discourse analysis. Focusing on the nuances reveals a 
more complex process of negotiation and assimilation by means of which one set 
of knowledge-power relationships are read through the veil of an~ther, and bot~ 
are changed in the process. This process is neither symmetrical nor, in the final 
analysis, macroscopically disruptive to the larger forces in play, but is nonetheless 
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of particular interest to any analysis of the interpenetration or dissolve of 
analytical strata (e.g. from 'top-down' to 'bottom-up', or from colonial discourse 
analysis to sociology, etc.). 
II. Translations: Memory-Sound-Music-Writing-Culture 
However, there is more than one way to dissolve such strata and reveal the 
pressure points within the power-knowledge nexus. If we have thus far broadly 
paid heed to the social matrices in which the phonograph and phonography are 
embedded, we must also then pay heed to complexities of the phonographic 
inscriptions themselves and the matrices of musicological translation in which 
they are discursively embedded (memory-sound-music-writing-culture, etc.). 
Translation is one of anthropology's most basic narratives (translating one set of 
cultural norms into another, etc. [cf. Asad, 1986]), but here it takes on a much more 
fundamental quality where inexplicable acoustic phenomena are made to mean 
and brought to inscription. The processes of translation are multiple, complex and 
overlapping. This requires a shift of focus from a broadly socio-semiotic reading to 
a more musicologically or even 'ontologically' oriented reading, for want of a 
better phrase. It also involves a shift from Head-Hunters to the Reports (Vol. 4, 'Arts 
and Crafts' [Haddon et aI, 191.2]), where language,' and particularly music, take 
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centre stage as (positive) objects of (scientific) analysis. 
To that extent, this section is like Part I but in reverse: all of the affective qualities. 
, of recorded sound, music and voice mOst be stripped away for the purposes of 
musicological scrutiny, and when we do finally arrive at a 'scientific' discussion of 
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music, the phonograph becomes a silent and unacknowledged partner, an invisible 
and inaudible tool to be cursorily registered (qua sociological oddity or data 
source) but notably suppressed. In the shift from narrative to science and from 
Head-Hunters to the Reports, the phonograph's significance to Haddon's project 
will be heightened and its audibility reduced. Experience, - and the phonograph 
along with it - are jettisoned as music and language (qua positive objects) take 
their place. 
Such a focus suggests a simple opening question, albeit one which, when pressed, 
soon opens itself up to others: are music and language the starting point for our 
analysis or the expedition's analysis? Or, on the contrary, do such objects have to 
be discursively constructed as such from out of other sonic materials? If so, what 
are these materials? If they are sound and/or 'noise', then where do they come 
from? Are they the ambient noises and voices of Islander life or inaudible 
memories brought to sound by machine? If the latter, what happens then? How do 
we shift from machined sound to music and language? How then do we make such 
objects submit to inscription and analysis, and what kinds of analysis do we finally 
conduct? This set of questions not only suggests the complex matrices of 
translation in which music and language are embedded here, but also the pressure 
points which - at each stage of translation - threaten to conceptually unravel the 
expedition's underlying logics. Such matrices are, by their very nature, non-linear 
and overlapping, and therefore difficult to comprehend or represent. However, one 
way to do so is to set them out as an interlocking chain o'f translations o~ 
, transformations. To that extent, the 'moving over' or across of trans-Iation at least 
takes on a certain spatial coherence as a metaphor. Three possible sequences 
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suggest themselves: a logically extrapolated sequence (what is implied), a 
chronological sequence (what happened) or a linear sequence (what is written). 
The second sequence is of limited analytical value, and cannot accurately be 
reconstructed in any case, but the third sequence - which I intend to follow in the 
analysis to come - would seem to be analytically aided by the first - which I will 
therefore schematize here: 
(1) From memory to recorded sound: the first strand involves a process by which 
the inaudible and immaterial are translated into the audible and tangible, a 
phonographic surface capturing and replaying the voice and other sounds; (2) 
from sound to speech and music: the second strand involves a process by which 
the voice and other sounds are brought to meaning and translated - or discursively 
constructed - as speech and music; (3) from music and speech to graphical 
notation and phonetic writing (lyrics and commentary): the third strand involves a 
process by which music and speech are translated into vision as graphical musical 
notation or phonetic writing; (4) from graphical notation and phonetic writing to 
analysis: the fourth strand involves a process by which speech and music are 
translated into positive, evolutionary data. The relationship between each of these 
strands is complex and overlapping and - when examined within a specific context 
- is constantly re-ordered, re-organized and re-doubled. 
,fV/aking Music 
. Published fourteen years after Haddon's second Torres Strait expedition of 1898, 
the 'Arts and Crafts' volume of the Reports (Haddon et al, 1912) is one of the main 
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sources of information for the team's analysis of Torres Strait Islander music. 
Written by the team's chief musician, Charles Myers, the 'Music' chapter of volume 
four of the Reports conducts a strictly musicological - rather than 
ethnomusicological or sociological - reading of musical forms from the Torres 
Strait Islands. The focus of the chapter is therefore abstract and analytical and its 
ostensible themes are technical in nature, but if one attends to the interstitial 
spaces of such a reading, one of its underlying (or, perhaps, overriding) themes is 
that of translation. This is not least because, firstly, music itself must be made -
fashioned, discursively produced, and not only by the Islanders - and, secondly, 
because it must be made to submit to inscription. The complexities of how these 
dual forces pan out within the commentary can easily be overlooked if one does 
not pay heed to the written and graphical cues littered throughout the chapter. 
However, Myers does not start at this point. He starts with prefabricated, 
'primitive' music and asks 'why should we study it?' Nevertheless, even the very 
first line of the chapter suggests far more than it is actually saying and introduces 
the theme of translation by subtle implication: 
The songs of the Miriam or Murray Islanders, which form the subject of 
this section, are of considerable interest from the standpoint of musical 
history and development. For they differ among one another not only in 
complexity of structure ·but also in date of composition and place of 
origin (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 238). 
Contained within this simple formulation is a complex process of ~ra.nslation which 
not only implies a translation of sound into music - of which more below - but; 
more importantly, of music into evolutionary data. This is the first strand of 
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translation that we can highlight here (comparable to the fourth strand of our 
logical sequence above). We will return to this in more detail a little later, as it 
becomes entangled in some of our other stands, but it bears remembering at this 
point that, following our continuing theme of the relationship between the 
particular and the general in anthropology, phonographic recordings were often 
made less with a view to the specificity of musical performance, and more with a 
view to how that specificity might be obliterated in the furtherance of comparative, 
evolutionary aims (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 311). However, unlike Victorian 
anthropologists such as Edward Tylor, who took their cue from the Enlightenment 
ph ilosophes, Myers' focus is not on origin and cultural development along a 
universal scale (of savagery, barbarism and civilization), but rather on origin and 
geographic spread within a particular region. As Myers tells us (Haddon et aI, 
1912, p. 238), such forms of music 'thus afford an opportunity of tracing the 
changes in musical expression which may occur in course of time within a 
primitive community'. 
To that extent, Haddon and Myers' comparative musical method is drawn more 
from the zoological and biological sciences (compare Darwin's finches, for 
example) than from the burgeoning field of comparative musicology. Indeed, the 
two major jin-de-siecle phonograph archives crucial to the development of that 
field - Vienna and Berlin - were not brought into being until 1899 and 1900 
respectively (cf. Ames, 2003). Haddon and Myers' work on music therefore sits 
somewhat anomalously between evolutionary studies in the spread and. 
-- "psychology of music and the foundation of the fields of comparative musicology 
and, later, ethnomusicology. This inbetweenness is significant because Haddon and 
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his colleagues were not only breaking new ground in ethnographic fieldwork in 
general, but presaging the kinds of ethnomusicological fieldwork that were yet to 
exist. 
Nevertheless, the point to stress here is that there is a process of translation at 
work: musical experience is being translated into comparable data. Unlike Head-
Hunters, where musical experience plays an important role, the Reports are in large 
part an attempt to extract data from experience, casting the latter aside after the 
fact. The former may be the latter's condition of possibility, but once it has served 
its purpose - both to enable data extraction and, crucially, to authenticate it - then 
it can and must be cast aside. There is therefore a noticeable shift at this point from 
from narrative and sociology to the science of music. Such a shift is never complete, 
of course, and although the consequent tension is present in the expedition's 
popular and scientific writings, the balance between them is different. 
The difficulty of adopting such a fluid, comparative approach focused on the origin, 
development, distribution and spread of music is that musical form and content 
are in a state of perpetual flux. As mentioned in the first chapter, Haddon's team 
remain interested in 'vertical' cultural flows, where the Islands are positioned 
between British New Guinea and Australia, but not in 'horizontal' cultural flows, 
where they are pOSitioned between Europe and Asia. For example, the possible 
introduction of '[f]lutes, pan pipes and Jews' harps' from South Sea Islanders and 
Papuans is of legitimate interest, whereas religious music is prized most of all. 
because it is not 'affected by contamination with European music' (Haddon et al, 
1912, pp. 238-239, emphasis added). 
246 
The most significant music of all - and here we return to the themes of the 
cinematography chapter - is that associated with the Malu cult, the secret and 
sacred initiation ritual for Mer's adolescents. Such secrecy, Myers claims, saved the 
sacred music from 'contamination', but left it shrouded in silence: 
[T]he songs of the Malu cult were so sacred that no native woman or 
child might hear them; indeed no white man had ever heard them 
before the arrival of the members of our Expedition. It was only with 
the greatest difficulty that the natives were induced to sing them 
(Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 239). 
This is the archetypal and enabling fantasy of fin-de-siecle anthropology: to rout 
out the pristine from under the layers of contaminating cultural detritus. Here we 
have a return of the 'before the deluge' motif that we examined in the photography 
chapter. However, that which supposedly saves such musical data from the flood is 
also that which conceals it. Therefore, the pre-eminent problem for Myers and 
Haddon - preceding that of the conversion of music to data - becomes how to 
bring the consequent silence to sound. As is so often the case, it is at this point that 
the 'before the deluge' (redemption) motif gives way imperceptibly to an 'after the 
flood' (salvage) motif, for such music was actually no longer performed and had to 
be reconstructed from memory. Therefore, this brings us to our second, main 
strand of conversion: from memory to sound (comparable to the first strand of our 
logical sequence above). The silence that Haddon and Myers wish to breach is 
historical and memory is its' only bridge. In a direct '~n~logue to the 
reconstructions of the Malu ceremonies for the cinematographic camera ...: 
converting memory to vision - we here have a shift to sound - converting memory 
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to audition. Of course, it is the phonograph which will be used this time to give an 
'after the flood' reconstruction the indexical, scientific seal of a 'before the flood' 
redemption. The temporal flow is reversed: a present-becoming-past becomes a 
past-becoming present: 
In securing the records for the phonograph, great care, moreover, was 
taken to ensure that they were obtained from the older men who were 
alive in the times when the ceremonies were still being performed, of 
which these songs formed part (Haddon et a!, 1912, p. 239). 
Reconstructions from memory are accepted as positive data, albeit one step from 
observations and auditions. The other point worth stressing is the part-whole 
relations implied in this passage: specific instances of reconstructed songs 
metonymically evoke general song cycles, general song cycles metonymically 
evoke the ceremonies of which they are part, and both metonymically evoke a 
more general cultural world which is lost or being lost. As Eric Ames says of a 
similar predicament in comparative musicology: 
Rather than concentrate on the individual voices of distinguished men 
or loved ones, comparative musicologists gathered the "collective" 
sounds of non-European music. In so doing, they employed the 
metonymic logic of ethnographic exhibition, where the individual body 
of the performer represented the larger, absent whole (or "people"). By 
virtue of metonymy, "voices of the dead" came to describe the songs of 
entire, allegedly vanish-ing, populations (2003~ p. 311). 
In Haddon and Myers' case (Haddon et al, 1912, pp. 239-242), such a shift is more 
subtle, in that specific singers ate actually named in the Rep 0 r,t, ~ut the overall 
rationale for such recordings - as with the expedition and, indeed, anthropology as 
a whole - nonetheless pushes at the metonymic seam between the specific and 
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general. 
Section three of the chapter, 'Methods of Analysis', brings us to the real nub of the 
problem: how do we shift from - or distinguish between - sound and music, and 
what constitutes a musical unit of analysis? This represents our third and fourth 
strands of conversion: from sound to music and from music to phonetic writing 
and graphical notation (comparable to the second and third strands of our logical 
sequence above). Such a process might seem self-evident, but - repeating our call 
for analytical detail - it is only by attending to the details that one gets a sense of 
what is at stake in the process. 
The crux of this section is that in order for music to be studied as a positive 
scientific object, it must first be converted into - or constructed as - one (cf. Kittler, 
1999, pp. 25). This involves the processes of conversion or translation that we 
have been talking about thus far (Le. from silence to music via memory, and from 
music to data via evolution), but much more fundamentally it involves attempting 
to break music down into isolatable and analysable units. As Eric Ames (2003, p. 
305) makes clear in his study of the field of comparative musicology, ethnographic 
encounters with music were often perceived as a 'disorienting barrage of sensory 
stimuli that initially resisted transcription'. The problem therefore becomes one of 
both 'aural perception' and 'acoustic legibility' (Ames, 2003, p. 306). Here the 
phonograph played a key role and becomes an auditory version of Benjamin's 
'optical unconscious' where it can 'hear' more and better than we can ourselve~ 
(for example, by slowing down, speeding up or extending sections of music [cf. 
Ames, 2003, pp. 298, 313, 315; Kittler, 1999, p. 24]). Rather than a poor substitute 
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for a mouth and an ear, in this context it becomes a hyper-realized extension of 
speaking and listening, and just like Benjamin's analysis, the image that springs to 
mind for comparative musicologists is that of the scientist/surgeon dissecting 
reality (cf. Ames, 2003, pp. 314-315). Comparative musicology not only made this 
point particularly forcefully in relation to the phonograph, but in relation to 
cultural alterity - coded as the 'primitive' - most especially (cf. Ames, 2003, p. 
298). 
However, the difficulty resides in working out what constitutes a 
musical/phonographic unit. Is it a song, a set of lyrics, a melody or rhythm, a chord 
or note? Even more so than cinema, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, can 
be broken down into meaningful and readily apprehensible photographic units, 
phonograph recordings cannot be broken down in such discrete ways. There is no 
unitary measure of sound equivalent to the film still. To that extent, phonography 
is the 'temporal medium par excellence' (Ames, 2003, p. 314). Here we see one of 
the interesting implications of Kittler's (1999, pp. 15-16) attempt to align film with 
the Lacanian 'imaginary' and phonography with the Lacanian 'real'. Because 
cinema for Kittler (as opposed to the mere technology of cinema) is predicated on 
splices and cuts, it can be broken down into discrete units. By contrast, the smooth 
flow of phonographic sound. cannot be so dissected. Its meaning - that is, its 
condition of meaningfulness - resides in its forward or backward momentum (the 
relational differences between ~ow, then and to-come) even if that momentum 
gives the impression of musical stasis (e.g. a single note, repeated). Indeed, as w~ 
. have already mentioned, it is for this reason that Husserl chose musical melody to 
exemplify the role that retention and protention play in perception (cf. Moran, 
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2000, p. 128). 
However, it is worth stressing parenthetically that such a lack of discreteness 
becomes fundamentally altered in the shift from analogue to digital recordings -
the source of the analysis here. Whether or not musicologically useful or relevant, 
digitization not only channels Kittler's 'data streams' through a digital filter, but it 
allows such filtered streams to be broken down into basic digital units of ones and 
zeroes. This is the ultimate discrete unit and, as Bernard Stiegler (2002, pp. 150-
152) says of photography, it fundamentally breaks the direct indexical link 
between referent and inscription. In this case, the bond between original sound 
source, recording and ear is broken. To that extent, we might add another layer to 
Myers' own set of musical translations: from analogue to digital and from indexical 
to non-indexical. 
Myers has no such concerns about the indexical chain linking sound source, 
recording and ear. However, he does have his own reasons for not trusting the 
naked ear as a means of constructing a discrete musical object. Indeed, Myers' 
solution to such lack of discreteness - or lack of musical objecthood - is to not turn 
to the human ear in the first instance. As we mentioned with Eric Ames' (2003, p. 
306) analysis of comparative musicology, the first problem is. one of 'aural 
perception'. How-do we make sense of what we are listening to? How do we know 
that what we are hearing is the same as what the recording's protagonists or 
original audience were hearing? In short, to what extent is the act of hearing no~ 
only mediated by the machine, but by culture more generally? Unsurprisingly, 
Myers' response is not to attempt a type of cultural analysis of sound perception 
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that will cut into the latter's universality and objectivity. On the contrary, if he 
cannot hear phonographic sound as perceptible and analysable music with his own 
ears, he must lay recourse to machines that will serve as a supplementary 
sensorium for the purposes of further universalizing and objectifying sound. The 
human ear is not accurate enough. This solves Ames' first problem, 'acoustic 
perception', and lays the groundwork for the second, 'acoustic legibility'. Myers 
uses two devices to convert unfamiliar rhythms into 'standardised' (Le. European) 
units and unfamiliar tones into recognizable quantities on a scale: a metronome 
and a mysterious device for measuring tone called an 'Appun's Tonmesser'. The 
latter consists of: 
[A] box of metal tongues anyone of which can be made to vibrate at will 
by means of air driven from bellows. The tongues are carefully tuned so 
as to give tones which are successively different by two vibrations. The 
box contains 65 tongues giving as many tones ranging from 128 to 256 
vibrations per second. The pitch of tones emitted by such tongues is 
remarkably constant, despite the inevitable variations in temperature 
and wind pressure (Haddon et at 1912, p. 242). 
Myers is effectively using a breathing, mechanical mouth to hear (cf. Kittler, 1999, 
p. 26). The materiality of air pressure - and thus touch - is closely bound to the 
audition of sound; without tangible vibrations in air, there can be no sound ('in 
space no one can hear you scream'BS). In this case, inexplicable and variable sounds 
captured as vibrations (both those of the phonographB6 and those of the 
Tonmesser) are being made to conform to a standardized and superimposed 
numerical grid, irrespective of environmental shifts which might ptherwise change 
the sound. Crucially, what this device makes possible is a provisional answer to the 
85 This was the famous tag-line for the film Alien. 
86 '[T]hegrooves of Edison's phonograph recorded nothing but vibrations' (Kittler, 1999, p. 24). 
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question 'what is a unit of musical analysis?' Thanks to the Tonmesser, Myers -
who obviously has no access to digital sound - can now answer that it is a tone. 
With some amount of levity, this might even be regarded as a kind of digitization 
avant la lettre. Using this device, Myers can literally stop the flow of the music - the 
way one might take a still from a film - and isolate individual tones on a scale that 
is divisible into hundreds or 'cents': 
Anyone tone can be prolonged on the phonograph by holding up the 
lever which usually rests on the spiral steel thread and is driven along 
it. When this lever is held up, the glass style remains stationary instead 
of travelling along the spiral groove cut in the wax cylinder. The mean 
of several determinations, made both by upward and downward 
changes in the tones of the Tonmesser, is taken as the required pitch 
(Haddon et al, 1912, p. 242). 
What is interesting here is that, given the inherently temporal and relational 
nature of music (musical sense is, at least to some extent, predicated on the 
relationships between notes over time), Myers' attempt to isolate musical units 
converts them into something other than music in any conventional sense. Of 
course, this is the ultimate pseudo-scientific fantasy of mathematical precision: the 
belief that one's approximate measurements of the world - if sufficiently detailed 
and quantitative - can be taken to be that world. Indeed, this is what Husserl took 
to be part of the 'crisis of the European sciences' (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 164-191). 
Such a process converts sound into musical units of analysis and therefore readies 
them to be transcribed or translated into some form of musical inscription 
approximating 'European notation'. This is where we reach our . .fourth strand of 
conversion (comparable to the third strand of our logical sequence above): from 
music - or, at least, musical units - to phonetic writing and graphical notation, or, 
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by implication, from music or musical units to vision. 
However, this is where such notation reaches an important limit point. Despite his 
attempt to render such music in graphical form, the conventional means of doing 
so is only ever a very rough approximation, as Myers readily acknowledges 
(Haddon et at, 1912, p. 242). The music resists notation and must therefore be 
situated somewhat anomalously between two seemingly incompatible fields: 
European graphical notation (based on ratios) and numerical charts (based on 
frequencies) (cf. Kittler, 1999, p. 24). The supposedly universal division of an 
octave into twelve semitones is, by means of the Tonmesser, divided into units of 
one hundred for each semitone. Twelve semitones therefore becomes twelve 
hundred cents. Such precision - or perception of precision at any rate - therefore 
exceeds not only what the inexperienced ear can hear, particularly if one is 
culturally trained to hear only twelve notes in an octave, but also what the page 
can communicate or convey in graphical form. The provisional compromise is to 
provide a literal conversion chart between semitones and cents (see fig. 38 below). 
Such a conversion table is then further 
converted to the 'usual' or 'customary' (Le. 
European) alphabetical nomenclature for 
each note (a, b#, ·etc.) and, by extension, to 
graphical notation. Therefore, via a 
convoluted process of intermedial 
translation, sound is converted into 
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Figure 38, Conversion chart from Reports, 
recorded music, recorded music is Vol. IV (Haddon et ai, 1912, p. 243) 
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converted into numbers, and numbers are' converted into visually apprehended 
signifiers: letters and images. In other words, far from being a simple process of 
converting music into musical notation, sound must first be made into music and 
that music made ready for inscription (cf. Kittler, 1999, pp. 24-25). To that extent, 
the phonograph sits between sound, music and inscription .. 
However, perhaps unsurprisingly given the methodological and graphical 
complexity of the model Myers is trying to follow, the problem of the 
representability of music persists. This is not least because, as Kittler (1999, p. 25) 
points out, there is a 'gulf separating Old European alphabetism from 
mathematical-physical notation'. Kittler (1999, p. 24) reads this as a gulf between 
the 'symbolic' and the 'real', but it can also be read as a more general symptom 
diagnosing music's resistance to inscription. For example, such resistance to 
inscription is keenly demonstrated in the case of one of the particular songs that he 
attempts to analyse: Malu song IV A. In a return to the cinematography chapter, 
this is the song sung during the climax of Haddon's first ethnographic film: the 
precise point at which the initiates learn that the secret and sacred name of Malu, 
the culture hero, is Bomai. Given Haddon's abiding interest in the Malu cult, and 
given its ability to supplement the film and breach it silence87, this is a song which 
attains a particular significan~e for the expedition. As a consequence, an attempt 
had been made four years earlier to transcribe the song into· European notation 
and to translate the lyrics (see fig. 39 below). 
87 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the recording was at times 'synchronized' with the film 
on the rare occasions that it was shown. 
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Figure 39, Musical transcriptions from the Reports, Vol. VI (Haddon et ai, 1908, pp. 151, 297) 
Myers tells us that this earlier attempt 'does not always tally exactly' with the new 
attempt because the former 'was intended only to convey to the European a rough 
idea of the character of the songs' (Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 243, emphasis added). 
Therefore, in an attempt to rein the music in and make it submit to inscription, 
Myers (Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 243) develops an incredibly complex alpha-
numeric/graphical form of hybrid notation which combines European notation, '+' 
and '-' signs to indicate deviations between earlier and later attempts at 
transcription, numerical indicators of precise values of the tones derived from the 
Tonmesser, 'V' signs to indicate silences, asterisks to indicate drum beats and two 
ties to indicate 'glissand[i}, or continuous change[s] of pitch in passing from one 
note to the other' (see figs. 40 and 41 below). 
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Figure 40, Musical transcription from the Reports, Vol. IV (Haddon et ai, 1912, p. 244) 
Figure 41, Musical transcription from the Reports, Vol. IV (Haddon et ai, 1912, p. 262) 
The point to stress about this attempt to force music through the strictures of 
inscription is the lack of backward compatibility or backwards translatability. 
Although we might shift from sound to music to inscription, we would be hard 
pressed to shift in the opposite direction. In other words, any attempt at musical 
reconstruction would be unlikely to succeed in any recognizable manner. However, 
this appears to be the thin end of a much larger wedge. No only does this open an 
obvious space between positive data and the experience from which it is 
supposedly derived, it seems to suggest a paradoxically inverse relationship: the 
greater the desire for accuracy and precision, the larger the gap between the 
original performance and the above alpha-numeric/graphical inscriptions.ss This 
marks a peculiar point of in-f?lding or collapse within Haddon and Myers' 
positivistic desire. Their need to construct music as a positive, quantifiable object. 
88 The performance/notation dichotomy is a long running one in musicology (cf. Mowitt, 1992, p. 
180). In stressing this 'gap' here, I am not trying to uncritically oppose a supposedly unmediated 
'live' experience to its 'dead' transcription. I am merely stressing the desire wrapped up in 
Myer's failed attempts to make performance and notation commensurate. 
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(qua evolutionary data) is so strong that they are prepared to ride roughshod over 
musical experience to do so. In other words, if musical experience does not fit the 
representational model, they decide to forcibly reconstruct the former rather than 
the latter, which is all the more suspect from analysts placed squarely within the 
positivist tradition. Of course, this is something of a conjurer's trick and we have 
encountered it more than once before in this thesis: using empirical data to 
authenticate supra-empirical models whilst concealing the join and occulting the 
logical non sequiturs. 
In this sense, the positivistic desire for accuracy and precision of inscription serves 
only to prise open an increasingly large gap between experience and 
representation. Such a gap is most obviously because the process of 
transformation/translation is also a process of extraction from cultural context 
which converts specific musical performances into approximate and general types. 
This is familiar terrain here and it brings into sharp relief Eric Ames' suggestion 
(2003, p. 313) that phonography allowed analysts to 'speak of a body of music, and 
to shape it discursively into various 
forms', but, in this context, Myers 
pushes this to an extreme by literally 
taking four recordings of the same song 
and attempting to approximate a 
numerical, tonal average (see fig. 42 
opposite). 
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Figure 42, Conversion table from the Reports, 
Vol. IV (Haddon et ai, 1912, p. 250) 
However, there is a more fundamental reason for such a gap between experience 
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and representation: such musical performances simply exceed inscription. Indeed, 
this excessive gap between experience and representation is arguably one of the 
expedition's most significant legacies to the post-positivist disciplines of 
anthropology and ethnomusicology, both of which would later be forced to deal 
with the implications for their respective practices (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; 
Barz and Cooley, 1997). Moreover, these are the traditions which attempted to 
forcibly reconstruct the representational model rather than the experiences upon 
which it is based. 
In Haddon and Myers' case, such excess is merely the flip side of the coin of loss. 
Indeed, an important tension begins to emerge at this point between a perception 
of musical loss and a perception of musical excess: the expedition's phonograph 
recordings are hopelessly inadequate in the face of a feared cultural annihilation, 
and yet at the same time such recordings disconcertingly exceed both 'aural 
perception' and 'acoustic legibility' (Ames, 2003, p. 306). This is exacerbated by 
the fact that such a play between loss and excess in enshrined within the mediating 
technologies themselves, and this further complicates the attempt to distinguish 
between 'noise' and sound, music and notation, nonsense and sense, imprecision 
and precision. Not only do the new technologies of inscription record more than 
(symbolically mediated) mea~ing (in the sense of the materiality of the voice, for 
example), they also record more than the positivist's 'real', more than an index of 
the referent. For example, one no~ only receives an inscription of the materiality of 
sound and voice, but also an inscription of the materiality of the machine, an added . 
. second layer inscribed over the first. In this sense, indexical modes of inscription 
record more than that which emanates directly from the spectated or audited 
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event (e.g. the hiss or rhythmic shuffling of a wax cylinder, the marks on the 
celluloid, etc.). Phonography and cinematography - and, by extension, 
photography - therefore share a common bond: 
Both recorded indiscriminately what was within the range of 
microphones or camera lenses, and both thereby shifted the boundaries 
that distinguished noise from meaningful sounds, random visual data 
from meaningful picture sequences, unconscious and unintentional 
inscriptions from their conscious and intentional counterparts 
(Winthrop-Young and Wutz in Kittler, 1999, p. xxvi). 
However, if we are to follow Kittler's (1999, pp. 15-16) association between 
phonography and the Lacanian 'real', such a link between the machine and 
'indiscriminate noise' becomes even more pronounced in phonography than it 
does in film. This is both the best and worst of outcomes for Haddon and Myers. On 
Kittler's reading, phonography produces that most raw of raw data, but, as a direct 
consequence, it also demands careful subsequent processing to ensure that it does 
eventually pass through the grids of the symbolic lest its excessiveness 
overwhelms. In Haddon and Myers' case, music undermines and overflows the 
ability to both be heard as such and to be notated, and seemingly the only 
sanctuary is the written signifier. Here, for example, is Myers' attempt to interpret 
his ill-fitting musicological grid of the four versions of song Malu VI A: 
The average' for the above intervals of (iii) and (iv) amounts to 1.399 or 
581 cents, a slightly flattened tritone (32 : 45) [ ... J If we omit the 
intervals (bracketed in the above columns) due to these causes the 
average amounts to 1.361. Precisely the same average is reached if we 
limit ourselves to the fourth sung (without glissando) in (iii). The ratio 
1.361 amounts to 534 cents (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 250). 
Despite the incongruity of attempting to superimpose such an incoherent, . 
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positivistic and Eurocentric reading of Miriam sacred songs, Myers appears 
oblivious to the irony of castigating European incursions into such music (Song 
XVI) on the grounds that it demonstrates a 'more complex form': 
To many this song, like the last, will appear to bear suspicious traces of 
European influence. Despite its more complex form, however, it retains 
many of the leading characteristics observable in the majority of purely 
Miriam songs. The descent to a minor seventh from E to F is the most 
striking feature of the tune. It is followed by a twice repeated descent 
through two (?) minor thirds (Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 254, emphasis 
added). 
In one fell swoop, European influence is simultaneously disavowed as an incursion 
and heightened by association with formal complexity. This ironically doubled 
association (importing European models whilst critiquing the importation of 
European models [cf. Derrida, 2001, p. 356]) is further developed by deploying a 
Eurocentric historical (and, by implication, developmental) schema which divides 
between songs which are 'ancient', those which are 'medieval' and those which are 
'modern' (Haddon et aI, 1912, pp. 255, 241-242). This schema requires some 
unpacking here, both because of the slippage between developmental and 
historical scales and because there are several rhetorical, theoretical and 
disciplinary registers working with or against one another at the same time. 
Myers first alludes to Islander music as being 'ancient', 'medieval' or 'modern' 
towards the beginning of the chapter (Haddon et a!, 1912, pp. 241-242). Here he 
attempts to place such music into 'a developmental sequence whiCh can be mapped 
directly onto a loose historical sequence, the assumption being that music - like 
history - progresses towards greater complexity. However, repeating our earlier 
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point about the expedition's evolutionism, it bears remembering at this point that 
the avowed aim of the expedition was not - or not mainly - to place the Islanders 
on a universal and progressive scale of 'savagery', 'barbarism' and 'civilization', 
Expedition members often use such terminology, of course, and they also 
occasionally slip into such universal models (e.g. Haddon's 'Stone Age' Islanders 
from the photography chapter). However, the main thrust of their evolutionary 
model is a more directly Darwinian one drawn from zoology and biology. This is 
significant because Darwin's model of biological evolution is arguably more 
complex than anthropology's model of cultural evolution. Whilst the latter might 
posit a singular, universal and non-historical scale of development ('savagery-
barbarism-civilization') - where, for example, Stone Age Britons could be 
developmentally aligned with nineteenth century Indigenous groups - the former 
posits a telos that is locally rather than globally defined. In other words, rather 
than suggesting a grand chain of biological and cultural Being with white, male 
European humans at the apex, Darwin's model is driven by blind, chance-driven 
mutations selected for relative to environmental changes. Local environments 
determine "telos such that a shift in the former impacts directly on the latter; 
implicitly at least, there is no absolute hierarchy. 
Myers and Haddon do not follow these implications "to their fullest extent, but they 
are influenced oy Darwin to the extent that they are more likely to trace 
evolutionary or development ass9ciations in one locale (in this c~se, musical forms 
within and between the Islands) than claim 'primitive' Islanders are comparable to-
" Stone Age Britons. On this basis, Myers attempts to construct a tripartite schema of 
develoPment by which the relative complexity of Island songs can be charted and 
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then mapped directly onto a loosely construed historical sequence. Thus, Malu 
songs, as the most 'primitive', represent an archaic and mysterious past. Keber 
songs - or those of middling complexity - represent a more recent period and 
'secular' songs - as the most complex - the most recent: 
We may reasonably look on the Malu songs as representing ancient 
Miriam music. The question arises, of course, as to how far the keber 
and the secular songs may be respectively regarded as specimens of 
"medieval" and "modern" Miriam music (Haddon, et aI, 1912, p. 241). 
Admittedly, such a schema is self-consciously provisional and speculative, but 
deploying the terms 'ancient', 'medieval' and 'modern' (even in their lower case 
generality) to characterize the three stages and three musical forms is riddled with 
complexities and paradoxes. Firstly, it suggests a shift from the Darwinian model of 
evolution - where developmental scales are locally defined or relative to 
environment - to a model which slips confusingly between developmental and 
historical scales, and, what's more, scales drawn from Europe and speciously 
universalized. However, although such a move is common currency in colonial 
discourse, the way in which it is done here has particular significance. For instance, 
rather than use developmental terms such as 'savagery' and 'barbarism', or evoke 
varying degrees of 'primitiveness', and then map them onto historical terms like 
'Stone Age', 'Prehistoric', etc., which is the most cominon pattern (cf.-Fabian, 2002), 
the terms 'ancient', 'medieval' and 'modern' have different European historical 
correlates which extend beyond "a generalized sense of 'old', '~iddle' and 'new'. 
Such terms sit somewhere between historical and developmental frames and· 
, evoke both general and particular registers: the general relates to the way in which 
such terms are used in European history in general, but the particular register -
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most pertinent for our purposes here - 'relates to a specifically musicological 
discourse of historical development. This appears to be the main reason for such 
an invocation. 
Even within contemporary musicological writings, it is not difficult (albeit with 
some elements of caricature) to ascertaIn a meta-narrative of musical progress 
which begins in early medieval church music (e.g. plainsong) - the 'dark' ages 
being also the silent ages - progresses in complexity towards polyphony, harmony 
and increasing secularization; reaches its apogee in the classical and romantic 
high-points of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Central Europe; and then 
fractures into a myriad of more or less successful modernisms, many of which are 
read as reactionary or regressive (cf. Sadie and Latham, 1985). This is obviously an 
overly simplified narrative, but its roots run deep and its presence makes itself felt 
in Myers' use of the terms 'ancient', 'medieval' and 'modern'. In this context, he is 
extracting them from their historical context and giving them developmental 
overtones, such that, for example, harmonic complexity and a high volume of 
intervals can be given developmental priority over the doubled repetition of single 
notes, consonance can be given priority over dissonance, complex rhythms over 
simple rhythms, fixed tempo over fluid tempo, etc. Of course, given that Myers is 
writing this in 1912, such a. set of developmental associations is not without 
significance within the various musical strands of European modernism at the 
time. However, Myers' use of th~ term 'modern' is anomalous in this regard. By 
'modern' he explicitly means music that is not influenced (or 'contaminated') by-
~ ,Europe. Rather, he means contemporary Island music which has been composed 
by Islanders in recent years, is secular in character and displays higher levels of 
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'complexity' (Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 242). To that extent, and entirely beyond his 
intention, Myers has given the Islanders a type of ironic, non-European 
'modernity'. 
Nonetheless, in a metonym of the project as a whole - and, perhaps, anthropology 
as a whole - Myers more generally seeks out the non-European in the ill-fitting 
(musical) idiom of the European. Indeed, his whole musicological framework is 
drawn from European sources which rarely fit the source material (e.g. his attempt 
to reconstruct Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian scales or to specify relative major or 
minor dominance within songs even where 'no definite tonic is generally 
recognizable' [Haddon et aI, 1912, pp. 257-259]). Through such a framework, 
Myers (Haddon et aI, 1912, pp. 260-261) is able to suggest an implied 
developmental ranking vis-a-vis European music (e.g. fixed tempo and harmony as 
models of sophistication and 'lax tempo' and unison singing as markers of the 
primitive). Myers even speculates that the most 'primitive' (i.e. most 'ancient') 
songs, those associated with the Malu cult, are drawn more from 'natural' than 
cultural sources, wherein content dominates over form: 
It is not difficult to see how this feature has been derived from a 
prolonged cry or wail, the natural formless expression of sorrow. For this 
reason, doubtless, the mournful nature of' the Malu songs is so 
prominent (Haddon et aI, 1912, pp. 261, emphasis added). 
Such an implied developmental a~d historical schema of musical ~omplexity places 
the 'primitive' (or 'ancient') Torres Strait Islander music alongside the music of-
,Aboriginal Australia but below that of the Veddas of Sri Lanka. By contrast, the 
'secular' (for which read 'modern') Torres Strait Islander music demonstrates 'a 
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wider range of notes, greater tunefulness, and a more obvious attempt at contrast 
and alternation of figures' (Haddon et al, 1912, p. 261). Through a process of 
mathematically analysing the positive data, Myers (Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 256) is 
even able to 'deduce' that such 'modern' music displays a developmentally 
significant increase in intervals per song. However, even the 'modern' songs are 
subdivided into two and hierarchically ordered on the basis of how they sound to 
European ears: 
Both are characterised by a greater liveliness, by a greater range of 
tones, by increasing complexity of structure and increasing feeling for 
tonality. In the one, however, there is considerably greater conciseness 
of form and (to our ears) greater tunefulness and tonality than in the 
other, in which, on the contrary, diffuseness, an unwillingness to rest on . 
the natural tonic, and the avoidance of large intervals, are the 
distinguishing features (Haddon et aI, 1912, p. 266, emphasis in 
original). 
It is here that we reach the real nub of Myers' chapter - and, indeed, this chapter -
the point of translation par excellence: from quality to quantity and back again. 
This is yet another intellectual sleight of hand comparable to what we saw in the 
photography chapter - where Haddon attempted to use a set of visible surfaces 
(photography, skin) to authenticate an invisible depth of racial 'truth' - and the 
cinematography chapter - where Haddon attempted to use another set of visible 
surfaces (film, photography, drawings) to authenticate an invisible and intangible 
sets of memories~ In the case of phonography, the process has been taken a step 
further by passing through a qu~ntitative and positivistic medi~tor: not only are 
Haddon and Myers attempting to authenticate ethnocentric cultural hierarchies· 
". using supposedly empirical data captured by the phonograph, but they are 
attempting to do so with the extra force offered by quantification. This would 
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appear to render such hierarchies self-evident (and it is, of course, relevant that 
sound is being converted to the visual at the same time) and therefore beyond the 
realm of argument. This is also comparable to Haddon's attempts elsewhere (e.g. 
his reading of 'race' on the Aran Islands which we looked at in the photography 
chapter) to pass 'racial truth' through a doubly authenticating filter: not only is 
such 'truth' based on concrete experience, but it is based on concrete experience 
which can be quantitatively, and therefore hierarchically, ordered. 
The phonograph, therefore, begins to re-emerge at the highpoint of its significance 
and the low point of its audibility: it mediates and bolsters such 'truth' claims and 
allows them to consolidated by - and translated into - a process of quantification. 
To that extent, the phonographic apparatus and its inscriptions each participate in 
a much larger programme of knowledge and power which cuts across both 
tranches of this chapter. The sociological world of Head-Hunters offers a veiled 
glimpse of the cultural hybridity of power-laden colonial relations, and the 
methodologies and procedures by which colonial knowledge was produced in such 
a context. The positivistic musicology of the Reports demonstrates how such 
colonial knowledge can be subject to acute logical pressure points which weaken 
its power to cohere. Spanning quality and quantity, excess and loss, sociology and 
musicology, the phonographic apparatus and its unwieldy inscriptions are lodged 
in the interstitial s-paces between each. 
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CONCLUSION 
Reading the Writing-Machine: 
Historiographical Foreclosure and Theoretical Legacies 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer; Things fall 
apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world [ ... J 
W.B. Yeats, 'The Second Coming' (Finneran, 1997, p. 189) 
IThe Centre Cannot Hold l 
In his short 2003 study, Jacques Derrida, Nicholas Royle (p. 57) considers the 
extent to which the margin-centre relationship is bou"nd up with what he calls the 
'logic of the supplement', which he provisionally - and in a self-consciously 
instrumental way - glosses as an unresolved play between plenitude and lack (pp. 
48-49). Whilst appearing self-sufficient and complete, and capable of 
unproblematic addition from the 'outside', the centre simultaneously finds itself 
subject to unremitting internal pressure and dislocation from it margins. To that 
extent, Yeats' well-turned phrase provides something of a mantra for this thesis, 
not least because~ in broad terms, each of the preceding three chapters might be 
read as an attempt to fold the margins of Haddon's project inwards with a view to 
pressuring its logical/conceptual centre(s). This has taken many ·forms - from 
Haddon's photographic typologies and cinematic fragments through to Myers' 
musicological positivism - each of which, I have argued, dislodge their respective 
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centres. To that extent, I have made no claim to offering a systematic or 
comprehensive study of Haddon's work, the expedition team's work, or the work 
of the expedition as a whole; in real terms, I have barely scratched the surfaces of 
what is a forbiddingly large body of already scratched surfaces (photographic 
plates, celluloid, phonograph recordings, etc.). However, what - one might ask -
are the broader implications of such a move? What are the stakes? Can Haddon's 
project - or, more particularly a material, social and ontological reading of its use 
of inscription technologies - also be folded outwards towards a broader set of 
questions, debates and disciplines? In other words, beyond nuancing Haddon's 
role within the disciplinary histories of anthropology, what are the stakes of the 
project for its various and broader constituencies (e.g. the disciplines of British and 
American social and cultural anthropology, cultural studies, postcolonial studies 
and the theoretical humanities more generally)? 
To some extent at least, such stakes also participate in the supplementary logic 
between a series of ever-expanding margins and centres. For example, just as I 
have focused on the margins of Haddon's project with a view to pressuring its 
centre(s), so too the marginal position of Haddon's project as a whole within the 
discipline of anthropology comes to exert pressure on (a) the reception of his work 
within the discipline and (b) on the centre of that discipline itself (and its use of 
technologies of inscription therein). In that sense, my focus on Haddon's project 
can be very much read as an exte,nsion of the disciplinary critiq~es of the early to 
mid 1980s (e.g. Clifford and Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 1988; Fabian, 2002 [1983];' 
, Geertz, 1988a; Marcus and Fischer, 1999 [1986]). It builds upon such critiques by 
implicitly asking a set of crucial questions of far greater import than the relative 
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fate of Haddon's work within the discIpline: for example, what role have 
technologies of inscription (indexical and non-indexical) played in anthropology's 
construction of its object? What does Haddon's project have to say about the 
relationship between experience and representation in the discipline more 
generally? Why did mainstream anthropology turn· away from indexical 
technologies and - for the most part - retreat back into a narrow, phonetic 
writing? What would the implications be of calling for a return to an intertwining 
of such technologies today? Most importantly, how might we ask these questions 
whilst moving from a potentially paralysing critique to an enabling affirmation? By 
ex·tension, anthropology's relatively marginal position within the theoretical 
humanities (and cultural studies and postcolonial studies in particular) can be 
folded back into the centre via a rethinking of a kind of theoretically informed 
case-based work which presses at the seam between theory and object, active and 
passive and which calls for a rapprochement between the broadly - and obviously 
problematically - defined arenas of media theory and postcolonial studies. Another 
way to say the same thing is to consider the question of legacies, legacies which are 
not histories - legacies which haunt - and this focus on legacies is important 
because legacies cannot be historicized away. What legacies or traces, then, has 
Haddon's project left for or in anthropology, cultural studies and postcolonial 
studies and how might those legacies redefine the centre(s) of those fields? 
I. Historiographical Foreclosure 
'If we begin with the disciplinary reception of Haddon's work, it is fair to say that 
this thesis has, of necessity, read Haddon against the grain of such a reception, and 
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this is for a number of important reasons: the first is that his work is most often 
treated as a footnote to a disciplinary history with little of any import to say about 
the contemporary discipline or beyond89; the second is that it is not generally read 
in light of well-established disciplinary critiques 90; the third is that, with certain 
notable exceptions91, it is not generally read in light of his engagement with and 
between media; and the fourth is that it is often read through the veil of a certain 
imperial apologism. What at one level appears as an entirely laudable attempt to 
lever open a space for his work92 and to reveal a set of complex nuances within the 
disciplinary histories of anthropology, is at another level a foreclosure of that 
debate. Indeed, I would contend that there is a kind of double foreclosure at work 
within the historiographical reception of Haddon: the first stops the margins of 
Haddon's work from folding in on themselves (particularly in relation to race, 
imperialism and media) and the second stops Had~on's work as a whole - as 
marginal to the discipline of anthropology - from folding in on the centre of the 
discipline (and the two are obviously related). The preceding three chapters have 
focused in detail on - or intervened in - the former, but what of the latter? 
This double foreclosure works by creating a type of historical firewall around 
Haddon's work which converts an unwieldy legacy - that might otherwise catch 
the discipline unawares - into a fixed historicity - which stays within and knows 
89 Of course, the footnote also participates in the logic of the supplement, which is why I have 
attempted to fold such margins back onto their respective centres. 
90 This is so despite the disciplinary self-definition which opens Cambridge and the Torres Strait: 
Centenary Essays on the 1898 Anthropological Expedition (HerIe and Rouse, -1998), one of the few 
sustained studies of Haddon's work and that ofthe expedition team more generally. 
91 For example, Elizabeth Edwards (1998; 2001) and Alison Griffiths (2001) are extremely astute' 
analysts of Haddon's photography and film respectively. However, such a move tends to relegate 
these media to the sub-genres of ethnographic photography and film, and that does not get at 
the complexity and radicality of the relationships between them, which is important because it is 
here where both critique and affirmation are at their most forceful. 
92 Between the armchair evolutionism of Edward Tylor and James Frazer and the ethnographic 
paradigm of Bronislaw Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. 
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its place. This is a commonly repeated logic and it often adopts the appearance of 
its opposite. To take two notable and not incidental examples, recent public and 
academic debates around the histories of slavery and of colonialism have often 
given the initial impression of raising the profile of such issues - tracing legacies, 
considering questions of contemporary responsibility, etc. - whilst in real terms 
burying and/or protecting such arguments within the historiography. To 
paraphrase: 'that was then and this is now, and as we have raised the issue, we do 
not need to speak of it again or - more importantly - we do not need to trace the, 
often surprising and unexpected, relationships between then and now'. To do 
anything else is branded as irresponsible anachronism. Indeed, Catherine Hall's 
recent 'Legacies of British Slave-Ownership' project (2011-) is intended to counter 
such tendencies within the discipline of history on precisely those grounds (but 
even it only takes such legacies so far). However, the most crucial aspect of this 
logic - and, in some ways, the most insipid - is that it is not the same thing as 
concealment. Therefore any criticism levelled at the lack of debate can point to the 
fact that there has indeed been such a debate. However, what it occults or occludes 
in the process is the logic by which such debates fence off past and present in such 
a way as to forestall the argument or cut the relationship. 
In a less dramatic vein, such a logic is playing out in the receptio"n of Haddon's 
project, where ce"rtain aspects of his work - including its relationship to race, 
imperialism and media - are historicized in order to be historicized away and, 
therefore, its ability to leave unexpected and troubling - but possibly affirmative -' 
legacies to the disciplinary critiques of anthropology is foreclosed. To paraphrase: 
'we can't judge the past by contemporary standards'; 'he wasn't as bad as his 
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contemporaries', etc. This is a prime example of framing an historical debate with a 
view - deliberately or otherwise - to insulating the present: history as exorcism. 
By rendering his work anomalous or atypical, rather than peripherally critical, it is 
kept in its place, and a body of resources with which to critique and/or affirm the 
discipline of anthropology is denied. 
For example, Haddon's project has many troubling things to say about the 
relationship between imperialism and anthropology, troubling not least because 
his liberal humanist endorsement of imperialist reform refuses to stay put in the 
anthropological or imperial past. As I argued in chapter one, Haddon's liberal 
humanism is pro-imperial whilst at the same time sidestepping the traps of the 
'civilizing mission' and 'scientific racialism', and this has concrete effects on the 
types of humanitarianism from which contemporary' forms of imperialism often 
take succour. To that extent, whilst this thesis is centrally positioned within calls 
for subtlety, nuance, complexity and detail in readings of colonial discourse, this 
should in no way be read as a weakening of critical energy against imperialism. 
Indeed, Haddon's project is all the more problematically embedded for 
participating in a type of imperial logic which exceeds its historical situatedness, 
and that is undoubtedly one of his project's most disconcerting legacies: a liberal 
humanist, but pro-imperial, disavowal of the 'civilizing mission' and - eventually -
'scientific racialism'. The crucial slippage between past and present - or historical 
and structural - registers means that traces are left within anthropology's 
epistemologies, theories and methods, and they cannot be excised or exorcized' 
,through historical scrutiny, any more than colonialism might be relegated to a 
fixed past by treating it historically. Indeed, that is one of the core problems with 
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the historical debates surrounding anthropology's relationship to imperialism 
more generally: the often abstract links between past and present, historical 
events and disciplinary methodologies, are not made as forcefully as they could or 
should be. This is likely to lead to a cry of anachronism - and, indeed, what I am 
calling for here might be considered a type of 'critical anachronism' - but this 
project has been explicitly posed as something other or more than a micro-history 
of the discipline of anthropology. Just as Haddon's project is allegorical, so too is 
mine. 
That is precisely why the kinds of nl:lance that I have been calling for are necessary, 
i.e. to make the case that it is needed all the more to heighten critical readings of 
figures like Haddon and their disciplinary legacies. It is easy to. take an overtly 
racist slave-owner to task. It is all the more difficult to do so with figures like 
Haddon - and liberal humanist strands within the human sciences more generally 
- who/which tend to slip out from under any attempt to fit them within neat or 
fixed categories. However, that is precisely why such work needs to be done: both 
because - alongside overtly racist slave-owners - figures like Haddon are 
extremely common in colonial discourse, and - most disconcertingly - because 
much of Haddon's logic is recognizably post-Victorian, even contemporaFY at 
times. This fact enables his readers to - not to put too fine a point on' it - let him off 
the imperial hook: That debate (Le. that he is a pro-imperialist with pro-imperialist 
views) has been acknowledged b~t foreclosed and separated off from the present 
(as we examined in chapter one with the museological attempt to redefine' 
Haddon's overtly racialist 'type' photographs as examples of an emergent 
'anthropological portraiture'). However, I would argue that nuance is required not 
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to lessen the critique of Haddon's work, 'but to sharpen it and to rout out any 
resurgence of his logics in a contemporary context. 
What I am calling for, therefore, is a shift from a linear and causal history or 
historiography to a thinking of legacy and inheritance qua critical anachronism: a 
type of 'backwards time' where past, present and future are related in ways which 
are neither linear or causal nor foreseen (cf. Bennington, 2000, passim). The 
reception of Haddon's work93 does explicitly deal with the question of legacy in 
two fairly conventional but not insignificant ways: i.e. the narrow histories and 
methodologies of the British discipline of social anthropology94 and - more broadly 
- the history, culture and politics of the Torres Strait Islands. 95 Both are valid and 
interesting lines of development. However, both also implicitly· work with and 
within the juridical concept of legacy as a foreseeable gift to the future (and the 
ethical and legal dimensions of such a logic are not uninteresting or unimportant): 
legacy en. (pI. -ies) 1 an amount of money or property left to someone 
in a will. 2 something handed down by a predecessor (Pearsal, 1999, p. 
810). 
Such readings are not insignificant, but my reading cross-cuts them with another: 
the variation of the concept predominant in computer science, Le::. legacy as an 
ostensibly super~eded and unwanted left-over that - for logistical or financial 
reasons - remains and insinuates itself within the new (Pearsal, 1999, p. 810). 
93 This is most obviously represented by the 1998 commemorative volume, Cambridge and the' 
Torres Strait: Centenary Essays on the 1898 Anthropological Expedition CHerIe and Rouse, 1998). 
94 Most importantly, the legacy that W.H.R. Rivers' genealogical method left for the later field of 
kinship studies, and the lesser legacies that the expedition as a whole left for the later fields of 
psychological, physical and linguistic anthropology. 
95 Most importantly, the cultural, aesthetic, material and legal impact of Haddon's writings, 
recordings and collections on contemporary identity politics and land rights. 
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Such a legacy comes from behind in a sense. It is dorsal, in David Will's terms 
(2008). It comes as an unannounced disruption, and that is important in this 
context because once we move from history to legacy and inheritance, we are able 
to stress a type of structural - or perhaps even deconstructive - doubleness within 
Haddon's work, a doubleness centred on the three orienting frames of this thesis 
as I have laid them out: (1) anthropology's relationship to inscription in general, 
and the shifts in mechanical inscription towards the end of the nineteenth century 
more particularly (cf. Doane, 2002; Kittler, 1999); (2) anthropology's discursive 
construction of - and relationship to - its subjects/objects as vanishing or lost and 
(3) the epistemological or archival impulse which joins both together. As I have 
read them in the preceding three chapters, these frames authenticate the 
production of positive data and attempt to justify Haddon's project's 
uncomfortable positioning within imperial institution.~ and practices. 
However, read as a site of doubleness or expansion, each frame points in two 
directions at once; each can be opened out: (1) inscription becomes not only about 
the specifics of the emergence of mechanical inscription towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, but also about the complex forms of what Bolter and Grusin 
(1999, p. 273) call 'remediation'96 (that is 'the formal logic by which new media 
refashion prior media forms') at the end of the twentieth century and beyond (and 
that includes the question of digitization). Such a move positions Haddon's work as 
not only relevant to the so-called 'writing culture' debate in ant~ropology, but 
suggests a move beyond such a debate: moving backwards in order to move 
,forwards, i.e. by folding media into anthropology's disciplinary critiques. (2) Loss 
96 My thanks to John Mowitt for directing me towards this concept. 
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becomes not only about the historical specificity by which colonial modernity 
discursively produced Indigeneity as a site of perpetual moribundity, from which a 
stream of positive data could be peeled, but also an examination of the extent to 
which the figure of loss - or the relationship between inscription and loss - haunts 
the discipline of anthropology much more generally. This happens in the 
conceptual and historical shift from posing the discipline as a redeemer of 
vanishing worlds (the salvage motif) to a redeemer of unwritten worlds (the 
speech/writing allegory). Both figures of loss appear together in the fin-de-siecle 
discipline, but the latter figure transcends the historical specificity of the former 
and leaves its traces within the contemporary discipline in various complex ways 
which continue to endorse types of anthropological authority in some - but by no 
means all- contexts. (3) Finally, as I mentioned in the example above, the resultant 
or concomitant colonial epistemologies of desire and power are not restricted to 
that particular historical moment. They also leave traces in the methodologies, 
theories and orientations of the discipline more generally. Therefore, by stressing 
the logic of legacy over history - and by opening out our three frames - we are able 
to shift from Haddon and his historiographical reception to (an expansion of) the 
disciplinary critiques of anthropology. 
II. Disciplinary Critiques 
Indeed, Haddon bequeaths a series of important questions to the discipline which 
cross over our three frames and can be gathered under the ·rubric of what I have 
been calling the 'writing machine' (or a material, social and ontological reading of 
technologies of inscription): for example, what role have technologies of 
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inscription (indexical and non-indexical) played in anthropology's construction of 
its object? What does Haddon's project have to say about the relationship between 
experience and representation in the discipline more generally? Why did 
mainstream anthropology turn away from indexical technologies and - for the 
most part - retreat back into a narrow, phonetic writing? What would the 
implications be of calling for a return to an intertwining of such technologies 
today? 
Of course, it is not incidental that such doubleness or expansiveness has been a 
core theme throughout this thesis and throughout the discipline of anthropology 
more generally. As I suggested earlier, according to James Clifford's (1986b) study 
of ethnographic allegory, one of anthropology's great predicaments or tensions is 
that every empirical encounter and representation allegorically evokes and 
requires a larger (transcendental) narrative. For example, a specific description of 
childbirth simultaneously evokes - and is logically predicated upon - a 'universal' 
story of women's experience. For Clifford, that is the condition of meaningfulness 
of the representation. It is meaningful to us both because it is different - 'look at 
how "they" understand and experience childbirth differently' - and because it is 
the same - 'and yet we share the human universal of childbirth'. Such an 
empiricalJtranscendentallogic is inextricably bound to the history of anthropology 
and suggests a crucial anti-foundational impasse for the discipline: the conditions 
of possibility of an ostenSibly empirical diScipline are not empirical. This is neither 
a flaw nor a failing, but rather a result of the inevitable con.ceptual unwieldiness of 
all empirical disciplines, and it can either be courted or occulted but not removed 
through greater care or heightened empiricism. It is, therefore, perhaps more of a 
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flaw in the geological sense, a crack in a seam of rock which can be pressured and 
opened, or concealed and masqueraded, but not filled. This is anthropology's 
predicament and it has been woven throughout Haddon's work in many and 
various ways (most often via a tension between the particular and the general). 
However, it also weaves it way through this thesis itself. My project is woven and 
implicated within Haddon's. Indeed, just as anthropology's micro-narratives evoke 
larger ones, so too this thesis - focused as it has been on the margins of the 
margins (the marginal minutiae of a marginal figure) - evokes larger narratives as 
well. There is no outside from which we can resolve the tensions and square the 
circle, so to speak. 
However, it is my hope that stressing such doubleness - or expansiveness - will do 
more than merely entrench the disciplinary critiques of anthropology - which 
would be in danger of slipping into a type. of paralysing, self-defeating or 
iconoclastic stasis - but more pointedly that it will push towards a type of 
affirmation of contemporary anthropological media. And the concept which joins 
both together - critique and affirmation - is the concept of contingency, or more 
particularly the intimate bond between between indexicality and contingency, 
which has been one of the core arguments that this thesis has sought to sustain. 
This concept sits right at the centre of our disciplinary questions above: how does 
anthropology use technology to construct its object? Why did the diScipline turn 
away from such technologies, and how might a return to them push us beyond the 
'writing culture' debate? Simply put, indexical technologies. pt:0vided the emergent, 
positive human sciences with a vast body of 'raw data', and what's more a body of 
'raw data' peeled off a seemingly dying set of referents (the bond between 
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inscription and loss is here at its most intimate; this is where they cross and 
touch). To that extent, they were the positivist tools par excellence and promised to 
banish the subjective variability of the human agent, even more so than prior 
techniques born of the same desire (e.g. the anthropological questionnaire which 
was an attempt to standardize and perfect the collection process). However, such a 
logic was cross-cut by a crucial tension: such 'raw data' were also harbingers of a 
type of radical contingency at odds with any attempts at controlled rationalization. 
In other words, (nodding to Levi-Strauss) they were too raw to be cooked 97, and to 
that extent indexical technologies simultaneously enabled and disabled positivist 
ambitions. That is the rub. They exceeded their rational containment. 
This is a logic which has resurfaced again and again within the preceding 
chapters98, but the reason why it is so important here is not simply that it 
demonstrates the extent to which the margins of Haddon's work dislodge and 
displace the centres, (which is the first layer of unfolding), but that it contributes to 
an overturning of a vital argument within the broader disciplinary histories of 
anthropology (which is the second), i.e. that anthropology turned away from 
indexical technologies because of their proximity to a simplistic and problematic 
positivism and their predilection for the conversion of cultural surfaces into 
sources of data. Such a 'turning away' from indexical technologies (and 
photograp~y and cinematography in particular) was all the more ironic from a 
discipline which remained resolutely ocularcentric. Vision - primarily the 
supposedly unmediated vision of the lone ethnographer -.: remained at the centre 
97 My thanks to John Mowitt for directin'g me to this link or connection. 
98 As I suggested in chapters one and three, this is also part of a broader discussion about the 
relationship between technology and modernity, and between technics and chance. 
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of the knowledge production process (cf. Fabian, 2002, ch. 4); it simply retreated 
into the supposed depth and complexity of phonetic writing after the fact. 
However, if we make the argument that indexical technologies are not only 
handmaidens to an outmoded positivism, but also harbingers of a radical 
contingency, then the symptomatic disavowal or displacement of such 
technologies in the mainstream, ethnographic anthropology of 'founding fathers' 
like Malinowksi and Levi-Strauss might also be read as an attempted disavowal of 
contingency. In that light, the retreat into a narrowly phonetic writing in post-
Victorian anthropology at large can be read less as an exploration of positivism's 
others - depth, complexity and meaning, etc. - and more an exercise in attempted 
control, rationalization and foreclosure. 
That line of argumentation emerges obliquely from the analysis of Haddon's work, 
but, on my reading, it bequeaths a legacy" to the disciplinary critiques of 
anthropology, and one which, crucially, extends those critiques beyond 
themselves. Displacing the supposed control and transparency of anthropology's 
phonetic writings has long been the mainstay of the disciplinary critiques of 
anthropology, but the connection between both and the disavowal of indexical 
technologies (qua harbingers of contingency), is a relatively new and untapped line 
of analysis. It is an attempt to steer a course between a focus on anthropology as a 
kind of litt:rature - which rarely examines how its writings are encrusted with 
other media - and a focus on anthropological media - which rarely examines how 
such media are embedded 'within anthropological writings.99 .However, the crucial 
99 The former is most obviously represented by James Clifford and George Marcus's· hugely 
influential edited volume, Writing Culture (1986) and its associated works (e.g. Clifford, 1988; 
Marcus and Fischer, 1999 [1986]). The latter is most obviously represented by splinter groups 
within visual anthropology, ethnomusicology and folklore studies interested in ethnographic 
. uses of photography, cinematography and phonography (e.g. Edwards 2001; Grimshaw, 2001; 
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point to make here is that I am not merely calling for a more entrenched critique of 
the discipline of anthropology via Haddon's margins (Le. re-thinking why 
anthropology might have turned away from indexical technologies), but equally for 
an affirmative return to the types of complex (re)medial relations of the fin-de-
siecle period. This might even be considered a call for a type of anthropological 
'media studies', for want of a better phrase, attuned not only to media, but, 
crucially, to the types of 'remedial' rivalries between media which call into 
question the dominance of phonetic writing in the discipline, and its attendant 
structures of authority and control. Indeed, given the intrinsic bond between 
indexical technologies and contingency, there is no necessary reason why such 
technologies should be beholden to a type of superficial or regressive positivism or 
scientific racialism. What's more, if the arguments of this thesis carry any weight, it 
may be that the intrinsic bond between indexicality and contingency pushes the 
discipline further from the disconcerting residue of positivism and scientific 
racialism than it is at present. In a very concrete sense, then, contingency becomes 
a site of both double critique (of Haddon's project and anthropology as a whole) 
and a site of affirmation (of the relationship between indexicality and contingency 
as an un[fore]seen future). 
However, as broached in the previous chapter, this critique-affirmation 
relationship is itself important and is caught up in the space or tension between 
two variant strands of 'poststructuralism' that we might crudely, quickly and for 
the sake of concision gloss as 'discourse analysis' an~ 'peconstruction' (not 
necessarily reducible to the work of Foucault and Derrida). Contained in this space 
Brady, 1999). One might also think about the growing interest in the relationship between 
. anthropology and media more generally (e.g. Ginsburg, 1995; 2008). 
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or tension is a problem of scale and method, and its implications reach far beyond 
Haddon and the disciplinary critiques of anthropology. To put it bluntly, 
discursively analysing a set of specific colonial writings - like Haddon's - with a 
view to critically 'discovering' their endorsement of larger racist stereotypes, 
racialist generalisations or misogynistic gender norms is not new(s), it is 
predetermination; foresight rather than insight. If you know your conclusions in 
advance, there is little point in conducting the analysis. However, where such 
analysis can offer more, and spill beyond or surprise itself, is by attending to 
unexpected sites of displacement, moments where the analysis does not fit and 
totalizing systems start to come apart ('the centre cannot hold'). That is where 
critique and affirmation start to cross. Otherwise - and this is an issue of central 
concern to Gayatri Spivak in The Critique 0/ Postcolonial Reason (1999) and Homi 
Bhabha in The Location o/Culture (1994) - we risk paying for the coherence of our 
analysis at the cost of demonstrating the unbreakable strength of colonial 
discourse. This thesis risks the reverse: demonstrating the microscopic fault-lines 
in colonial discourse at the cost of a straightforwardly 'coherent' (that is to say, 
'predetermined') . analysis, and this pitches us, finally, into the unremitting 
complexities of the theory Jobject relation in cultural studies, postcolonial studies 
and the theoretical humanities more generally. If, as Stuart Hall suggests, '[t] he 
only theory worth having is that which you have to fight off, not that which you 
speak with profound fluency', then how do we make a case for the case study 
whilst 'wrestling with the angels' of theory (Hall, 1992, p. 280)? 
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III. Cultural Studies - Postcolonial Studies - Case Studies 
Much of the analysis in the preceding chapters originally stemmed from a very 
simple methodological and theoretical tension which, whilst initially suggesting 
itself as a structural flaw, slowly began to be revealed as something more 
symptomatic and, crucially, more generative: why - when one is accustomed to 
conceptual seepage at binary seams - is it so difficult to avoid opposing 'theory' 
and 'object' when one actually does cultural studies? Why is there so often an ill 
fitting, and, at times, uncomfortable shifting of analytical registers? Obviously, in 
attempting to answer such a question, one risks going into an ontological tailspin 
as one attempts to pin down definitions, to deconstruct implied binarisms between 
theory and object, and so forth. The crucial point, however, is how is one to ask and 
answer such questions without disowning what would conventionally be seen as 
theoretical complexity or empirical nuance? fn other words, if this thesis has 
converged with certain critiques of so-called 'top-down' theory on the grounds 
that it is insufficiently attentive to empirical nuance, then the central point is this: 
what does it mean to ask this question theoretically? The short answer, which we 
will return to in a moment, is to insist on the supplementary bond between them. 
However, this began to formulate itself into a more specific. question-: why does 
there appear to be such a gap between - what has perhaps unfairly been 
generalized as - 'postcolonial theory' and specific objects of analysis, and what 
does this mean? Is this simply the result of an insufficiently' attentive reading of 
both or something more? Indee?, much of the initial frustration of this thesis 
stemmed from a seeming lack of fit between the two. Why does one perpetually 
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read about certain figures or tropes within colonial discourse only to find that they 
are either not there in specific writings, for example, or are there in ways which 
suggest new questions? There is often a disconcerting chasm between so-called 
'theoretical' works and specific colonial writings, as if the change of focus from the 
general to the particular renders invisible up close what is clear from afar. 
Such considerations did not emerge ex nihilo and have gathered a body of writing 
around themselves. For example, postcolonial polemicists such as Benita Parry 
(e.g. 1987), for instance, have subjected the so-called 'Holy Trinity'loo of 
postcolonial studies (Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Edward Said) to 
considerable criticism in recent years in light of the perceived obscurity, difficulty 
and generality of their work, but more broadly in light of what could be argued to 
be a trend in contemporary postcolonial studies away from abstract generality, 
where one talks about colonialism in the singular as if there was only one form and 
as if it remained one and the same for all time10t, towards forms of material 
specificity, which take seriously the important differences of class, race, sex, 
gender, history, geography and language that splinter colonialism into a 
multiplicity of colonial and postcolonial encounters (cf. Thomas, 1994, p. ix). On 
such a reading - and it is fair to say that it caricatures key postcolonial theorists -
postcolonial studies stands accused of constructing colonialism as, in some senses, 
an homogeneous power block or a kind power/knowledge nexus (in Foucauldian 
terms), superimposed from the outside on unwitting populations. For these critics, 
there is no colonialism - 'or, indeed, postcolonialism - "in general. As Nicholas 
100 This phrase is from Robert Young's Colonial Desire (1995, p. 163). 
101 In this sense, Bhabha's work, for example, is about historical formations without itself being 
particularly historical in its orientation. 
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Thomas argues: 
[T]here is an impasse in much current writing that arises from too 
dogged an attachment to 'colonialism' as a unitary totality, and to 
related totalities such as 'colonial discourse', 'the Other', Orientalism 
and imperialism (1994, p. ix). 
Whilst the political impetus behind postcolonial studies may be sound, its critical 
edge is rendered blunt by its lack of nuance, or so the argument goes. It is only 
when one examines a specific case study that the deeply complex empirical 
heterogeneity of the colonial project - or colonial projects - becomes clear. '[O]nly 
localized theories and historically specific accounts can provide much insight into 
the varied articulations of colonizing and counter-colonial representations and 
practices' (Thomas, 1994, p. ix). 
Whilst acknowledging that few postcolonial theorists would recognize their work 
within a summary of this sort, such critiques are well taken, at least to the extent 
that general and particular registers may not always align well. However, one 
might equally respond that the work of Spivak, Bhabha and Said clearly does 
reward patient reading, offering complex theoretical accounts of many of the 
issues which have concerned more empirically oriented scholars in the first place 
(particularly a way of recasting the problems of postcolonial resistance and 
postcolonial inheritance'in a more complex and nuanced fashion that relies neither 
on dichotomous models of thinking nor posits an essentialist revolutionary 
agency). The problem with such critiques, therefore, is that the theory does fit 
sometimes and, at other points, it partially fits. How, then, are we to respond? Such 
a lack of fit, or partial fit, suggests certain options: ignore it; manipulate the object 
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to make it fit; jettison the theory, etc. However, what slowly started to emerge was 
the idea that this lack of fit - or partial fit - might itselfbe wherein the analysis lies. 
This is where the figure of supplementarity becomes particularly important, 
because this 'lack of fit' is not a weakness, much less a spurious split between 
'theory' and 'politics'; it is nothing more (or less) than an effect of the logic of the 
supplement. As Nicholas Royle (2003, p. 58) argues '[the] distinction between 
primary [Le. object] and secondary [Le. theory] is turned upside down, 
fundamentally disturbed by a thinking of the supplement'. Theory and object will 
never 'fit' together without residue, excess and lack. 
This has a range of implications that are as much of practical and methodological 
significance as they are of theoretical significance. For example, on one reading, the 
supplementary lack of fit is asking - if not necessarily answering - the question of 
how one is to relate cultural theory and differen~. cultural materials in a way that 
sets up both as active and potentially antagonistic partners in the same process. 
Indeed, whilst teachers of a theoretically informed cultural studies are often loath 
to teach methodology in a didactic way - because it risks submerging the 
specificity and alterity of the resultant work - attending to the supplementary 
bond between theory and object offers some methodological insights into how 
they may be brought together. This is not applied theory and cases are not sites of 
passivity. It is a two-way process which attempts to avoid the 'mastery and 
application' model that is so difficult to avoid in teaching cultural studies. Indeed, 
despite every precaution and caveat, one of the most resilient initial responses to a 
theoretically informed cultural studies is ahylomorphic one: to attempt to -make 
theory submit to one's will and then use it as a tool to open up inert cultural matter 
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and/or get it to reveal its hitherto hidden secrets. Such a response is perhaps 
understandable, but it is a timely reminder of a truistic insight: cultural theory is 
inside rather than outside the culture it analyses. Like any other comparable 
example, one can't simply dispense with one predetermined methodological model 
and replace it with another. However, a crucial precept of this thesis is this: if one 
cannot and should not predetermine the outcome, one can at least set up the 
process as a fluid one and demonstrate by examples. 
However, this is not just a practical and methodological question but also a more 
theoretical one. In other words, this is not just a traditional debate about theory 
and practice or theory and the empirical, but a more complex debate about the 
relationship between singularity and universality. Focusing on cases opens up sites 
of singularity which may offer challenges to the universality or grandiosity of some 
strands of post-Enlightenment theory. This is perhaps ironic given that attempts to 
theorize the limits of the Enlightenment - or its universality and rigidity - have 
often been conducted in the name of a certain anti-essentialist singularity -
opening up the question of difference, for example - but they have nonetheless 
often ended up repeating the arid grandiosity of overarching theory which, for 
some, submerges that very singularity (cf. Arditi and Valentine, 1999, pp. 106-142). 
As Nicholas Thomas argues: 
The paramount irony of contemporary colonial studies must be that 
critics and scholars, who one presumes wish to expose the false 
universality and hegemony of imperial expansion and modernization, 
seem unwilling themselves to renounce the aspiration of theorizing 
globally on the basis of particular strands in European philosophy 
(1994, p. x). 
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Accepting that there is a clear polemical agenda in such a sentiment, and 
acknowledging that this predicament is certainly not absolute, this risk is arguably 
heightened when theory becomes its own object. By contrast, this thesis has been 
written in the belief that there is much to be gained from the kind of case-based 
work that offers different challenges to and for theory. Indeed, it is one way to 
mark the distinction between cultural studies and philosophy, or a philosophically 
oriented cultural studies and philosophy. 
Such case-based work therefore attempts to steer between two opposed courses 
often taken in cultural studies: the one, where theory becomes its own object, and 
the other, where a revived empiricism attempts to dislodge theory. This is a 
caricature of general trends, of course, and is not to be taken too strictly, but it 
nonetheless animates much of the work produced in cultural studies and offers a 
set of difficult choices for the cultural analyst. Th~ other difficult course that such 
work attempts to set is that between an extremely focused proper-name-theory 
version of case-based analysis (e.g. Freud in the colonies) and a generalized 
theoretical bricolage where a multitude of theoretical influences are invoked in a 
superficial, piecemeal or reductive manner. The problem with the former is that it 
is often theory-as-its-own-object by another name. The specificity of the case study 
is often in danger of slipping into the background as lengthy passages of 
theoretical exegesis take its place. The problem with the latter IS that paying heed 
to the case study in a detailed way often makes it difficult to shift registers in ways 
which take each seriously. Obviously, both of these options are predicated on a set 
of specious binary oppositions which· need to be pressured, but the challenge, 
therefore, becomes one of partially or strategically conceding to one without 
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uncritically aligning it with its others. For example, if it is difficult to avoid 
separating what are conventionally thought of as theoretical and empirical 
registers, then, at the very least, we do not have to accept that, for instance, the 
former is active and the latter passive or that the relationship between them 
proceeds in one direction only. Indeed, one of the reasons why this latter point is 
significant is that it is by pushing at the seam of the latter oppositions 
(active/passive) that we may hope to also push at the seam of the former 
(theory /0 bj ect). 
On this basis, an ostensibly disabling lack of fit between theory and object can be 
rendered methodologically and theoretically enabling and creatively generative. 
This emerges as one of the core cases for the case study in cultural studies. The 
other seeming lack of fit that emerges as significant in making that case is that 
between different theoretical models, disciplines, fields and themes, etc. 
Sometimes case studies demand a rapprochement where hitherto there had been 
division. To that extent, this thesis has also been an attempt to locate the blind 
spots or acoustic dead zones between such disciplines, fields and themes (e.g. 
histories and theories of colonialism, modernity and technology, etc.). It is 
probably most accurate to therefore view this case study as a node in a discursive 
network. Such an image is particularly significant when the specifiCity of the 
analysis is under way and it becomes impossible to separate out different 
analytical registers. However, such an image makes it difficult to position or 
conceptually render the varying scales of analysis in which t,he, present study has 
been embedded. To that extent, one might simplify and attempt to view the initial 
contexts as a series of concentric rings: starting at the outer edges with attempts to 
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analyse the histories and theories of modernity, narrowing to focus on the 
relationship between modernity and technology and modernity and colonialism, 
narrowing to focus on anthropology within that context, and narrowing again to 
focus on the Torres Strait expedition within that context, etc. On that basis, the 
project becomes less an empirical specialism for its own sake and more an attempt 
to intersect such circles and their associated disciplines, themes, theories and 
methods. 
Such an intersection makes sense from the perspective of a case study, but at a 
broader level a number of peculiar and perplexing blind spots start to emerge. For 
example, whilst there are always notable exceptions (e.g. Mowitt, 2005; Rony, 
1996; Stoler, 2010, etc.), it is not difficult to read canonical and entirely creditable 
works which explore the media-modernity nexus, such as Friedrich Kittler's 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter (1999) or Mary Ann Doane's The Emergence of 
Cinematic Time (2002), and find scant references to colonial discourse (cf. Mowitt, 
2005, p. xxviii). Conversely, it is not difficult to read similar writings in postcolonial 
studies, such as Homi Bhabha's The Location of Culture (1994) or Edward Said's 
Orientalism (1995), and find scant references to technologies of communication or 
inscription. Indeed, although many strands of postcolonial criticism have paid 
close (almost fetishistic) attention to the relationship between the conceptual 
content of cultural representations, colonial governance and academic mores, 
much less has been written on the relationship between colonial governance and 
the material/technical conditIons of possibility of these cult~rql representations. 
This might be a result of simple theoretical specializations, different traditions or, 
perhaps, a selective dissemination of 'poststructuralism' where, for example, one 
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group might be more inclined to stress Derrida's reading of Rousseau in Of 
Grammatology (e.g. Paul de Man, 1971) and another his prescient account of 
science and technology in the same book (e.g. Bernard Stiegler, 1998). There are 
no doubt a wide range of contingent reasons for this - and one wouldn't want to 
endorse a crude 'two cultures' model here - but it does appear somewhat peculiar, 
not least because of the major significance that communication and inscription 
technologies played in sustaining and disseminating colonial discourse. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that when analysts do turn to examining such a connection 
(and there have been several interesting examples in recent years, e.g. Samson and 
Hight, 2004), there is often a tendency to construct another series of semiotic 
surfaces to be analysed (e.g. 'reading' colonial photographs rather than analysing 
colonial photography). There is nothing inherently wrong with such an approach, 
and this thesis owes much to it, but in my view it needs to be supplemented with 
the kinds of broader material, social and ontological questions that are raised in 
detail only in those writings which address the media-modernity nexus. 
This thesis has therefore been an attempt - perhaps not so much at a 
rapprochement per se - but at a drawing together of influences, themes, theories 
and methods from these seemingly disparate traditions. An attempt to do so at a 
broader level would likely yield different results, but an attempt to do so through 
the tight focus of a case study carves out theoretical and methodological questions 
and relationships which either did not hitherto exist or which remained at the 
margins of a number of disparate discourses. I have therefo~e ?ttempted to work 
with or against the 'grain' of the collective material (cf. Stoler, 2010), rather than 
superimpose pre-configured 'theoretical models' onto 'empirical objects'. In this 
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sense, the project has been more artisanal than architectonic, much as a 
carpenter's abstract forms take material suggestions from the wood, reversing and 
displacing the master/servant relationship between carpenter and wood, theory 
and object. Instead of opposing the relative merits and demerits of so-called 
'empirical' or 'theoretical' approaches, I have attempted to argue for a 
supplementary parity between them; each has simultaneously added to and 
displaced the other. Stressing the logic of the supplement is important because it 
acknowledges the extent to which 'theory' and 'object' will never 'complete' one 
another without excess and lack, nor can the relationship between them be aligned 
with their binary partners. Indeed, without acknowledging such a logic, the very 
language used to discuss this tension will keep falling into specious binarisms: top-
down/bottom-up, macroscopic/microscopic, large-scale/small-scale, etc. In short, 
rather than a clean set of oppositions or a clean blurring between them, there is a 
constantly shifting set of foci, which undoubtedly poses considerable 
methodological and theoretical challenges. However, although methodologically 
problematic and conceptually disabling at times, such challenges are equally 
symptomatic of core and unavoidable tensions, and - in the final analysis - are 
hopefully generative of more sophisticated creative encounters to come. 
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